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ABSTRACT: This Article interprets the Supreme Court's decision, Masterpiece
Cakeshop, Ltd. v. Colorado Civil Rights Commission, as a critical extension of
Derrick Bell's interest-convergence thesis into the LGBTQ movement. Chiefly,
Masterpiece reveals how the Court has been more willing to accommodate gay
individuals who appear more assimilated and respectable-such as those who
participated in the marriage-equality decisions-than LGBTQ individuals who
are less "mainstream" and whose exhibited queerness appear threatening to the
heteronormative status quo. When assimilated same-sex couples sought
marriage in Obergefell v. Hodges, their respectable personas facilitated the
alignment between their interest to marry and the Court's interest in affirming
the primacy of marriage. Masterpiece, however, demonstrates that when the
litigants' sexual identities seem less assimilated and more destabilizing to the
status quo, the Court becomes much less inclined to protect them from
discrimination and, in turn, reacts by reinforcing its interest to preserve the status-
quo-one that relies on religious freedoms to fortify heteronormativity. To push
this observation further, this Article explores how such failure of interest
convergence in Masterpiece extends Derrick Bell's thesis on involuntary racial
sacrifice and fortuity into the LGBTQ context-arguing that Masterpiece is
essentially an example of queer sacrifice. Thus, using the appositeness of critical
race thinking, this Article regards the reversal in Masterpiece as part of the
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contours of interest convergence, queer sacrifice, and fortuity. Such observations
ultimately prompt the Article to propose specific liberationist strategies that the
LGBTQ movement ought to adopt in forging ahead.
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INTRODUCTION
Despite equality in marriage for same-sex relationships, the Supreme
Court's 2018 decision in Masterpiece Cakeshop, Ltd. v. Colorado Civil Rights
Commission1 illustrates that the dominant status quo is still able to pick and
choose ways to discriminate against sexual minorities. This Article will show
how this impasse from fully reaching sexual orientation antidiscrimination in
Masterpiece is associated with the choices that the gay movement has made to
shape the visibility of sexual minorities, particularly from the Court's prior
marriage cases. Marriage equality is not true equality. Marriage-equality
litigation purposely depicted same-sex couples as distinctively aligned and
assimilated with the dominant status quo in order to increase the likelihood that
the Court would extend marriage rights.2 In writing about Obergefell v. Hodges,
others have noted that eventual success was premised on this carefully crafted
image of sameness, assimilation, and respectability because it allowed the
interests of same-sex couples in seeking marriage rights to converge with the
Court's interests in affirming the heteronormative institution of marriage. 3
Indeed, through such an interpretation of Obergefell, some have borrowed
Derrick Bell's well-regarded interest-convergence thesis from critical race
theory and applied it to explain how the Court reached its decision to extend
marriage rights to same-sex couples.4
In examining Masterpiece, this Article affirms and advances further such
application of Bell's thesis to the recent marriage-equality decision. It explores
Masterpiece as an example where interests failed to converge and what that
failure signifies. Deviating from its high regard for assimilated same-sex couples
in Obergefell, the Supreme Court in Masterpiece was unwilling to accommodate
the less assimilated, less seemingly respectable queer identities of the same-sex
couple involved. Instead, their queerness led the Court to reinforce interests in
preserving the status quo-one that currently protects religious exercise over the
rights of sexual minorities. In this way, the Article will extend further analogies
to Derrick Bell's racial justice theorizing-not only from his interest-
convergence thesis but also his later theories on involuntary racial sacrifice and
fortuity-to explain how Masterpiece speaks profoundly about the current
progress of LGBTQ rights in the post-marriage-equality era. Applying Bell's
theory of involuntary racial sacrifice, Masterpiece is ultimately a grave example
1. 138 S. Ct. 1719 (2018).
2. See generally Cynthia Godsoe, Perfect Plaintiffs, 125 YALE L.J. FORUM 136 (2015).
3. See Yuvraj Joshi, The Respectable Dignity ofObergefell v. Hodges, 6 CALiF. L. REV. CIRcUIT 117,
122-25 (2015); see also Neo Khuu, Obergefell v. Hodges: Kinship Formation, Interest Convergence,
and the Future ofLGBTQ Rights, 64 UCLA L. REv. 184, 214-24 (2017).
4. See, e.g., Khuu, supra note 3.
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of queer sacrifice. Nevertheless, the Article will also use Bell's theorizing to
invariably show how sexual minorities ought to forge ahead.
Part I explores assimilationist strategies in both the gay movement and
eventually the marriage-equality sub-movement that culminated in the
proliferation of images of sameness and respectability that helped leverage
marriage, but also sustained externalities that have inhibited future successes in
the gay movement. Part II first compares the assimilative characteristics of the
same-sex couples from Obergefell against the queer sexualities of the
Masterpiece couple. Then the section examines Masterpiece to show how the
decision is an example of queer sacrifice and what this sacrifice implies for
LGBTQ equality going forward. Finally, Part III uses guidance from Bell's
forged-fortuity theory for solutions in the movement's next steps beyond
Masterpiece.
I. ASSIMILATIONIST STRATEGIES IN MARRIAGE EQUALITY
A. Assimilation Versus Liberation: Historical Tensions
Questions of strategy have always embroiled themselves centrally in the
social and political advancements of sexual minorities' rights and visibility. Even
in earlier mid-twentieth-century efforts, various incarnations of the American
LGBTQ movement have pondered and taken sides between embracing
assimilationist strategies, which insist on a rights-based perspective within the
existing liberal democratic regime, and liberationist strategies, which assert
change from a more revolutionary perspective outside the dominant political
distourse.5 This basic tug-of-war between strategies famously ripped through the
Mattachine Society, an early gay rights group that dominated over the homophile
movement of the 1950s-a precursor movement of the contemporary LGBTQ
crusade.6 Initially, the Mattachine Society embraced liberationist values and led
the homophile movement by organizing a militant following, igniting participant
self-awareness as an active minority group, and dedicating efforts toward legal
advancements and changes in public perceptions against sexual minorities.
7
During the McCarthy Era, liberationist strategies and ideologies, which
embodied communist principles, eventually led to conflict within the Mattachine
Society, especially when "rank and file Mattachine members grew increasingly
concerned with the organization's possible association with communism."8 In
5. See CRAIG A. RIMMERMAN, FROM IDENTITY TO POLITICS: THE GAY AND LESBIAN MOVEMENTS IN
THE UNITED STATES 2 (2002) (describing assimilationist and liberationist approaches to gay rights).
6. id. at 21-22.
7. Id. at 20-21 (listing purposes from the Mattachine Society's official mission statement).
8. Id.
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the disagreement between founding Mattachine leaders and its membership, the
central conflict between assimilation and liberation arose as "[t]he Mattachine
founders envisioned a separate homosexual culture while other members worried
that such a strategy would only increase the hostile social climate." 9 Unlike their
liberationist-entrenched leadership, the society's newer members "called for
integration into mainstream society" and that conflict led to change at the helms
of the Mattachine in 1953.10
Such change ultimately resulted in the homophile movement's abandonment
of liberationist approaches for assimilationist ones. 11 From the mid- 195 Os, this
revamped homophile movement focused on initiating dialogue with mainstream
society by presenting sexual minorities as upright citizens in order to change
public perceptions of homosexuality. 12 Specifically, "[t]heir strategy was to
present themselves as reasonable, well-adjusted people, hoping that these
heterosexual arbiters of public opinion would rethink their assumptions
regarding homosexuality.' 3 Unlike the earlier tactic, the activists' strategy now
promoted sameness between the heterosexual mainstream and sexual minorities:
"This approach, rooted in dialogue, emphasized conformity and attempted to
minimize any differences between heterosexuality and homosexuality." 14 That
approach prevailed until the time of the Stonewall uprising in 1969.15
After Stonewall, liberationist strategies gained more traction as gay and
lesbian activism of the late 1960s transitioned to reflect the radical politics of the
1970s. 16 Assimilationist strategies took a back seat as the goal of many gay
activists at the time was to revolutionize society and not merely change
mainstream perceptions.' 7 During this time, the work of the Gay Liberation Front
came to the forefront of the gay rights movement by challenging the status quo.' 8
One of its noted works involved mainstream representations of sexual minorities
through language and cultural imagery. Known as "visibility rhetoric," its use of
9. Id. at 21.
10. Id.
11. Id.
12. Id. at 22 (describing how the homophile movement "embraced an assimilationist and




16. Id. at 23 ("This more confrontational, liberationist approach embraced unconventional politics
associated with the antiwar, women's liberation, and civil rights movements."); see also WILLIAM
N. ESKRIDGE, JR., GAYLAW: CHALLENGING THE APARTHEID OF THE CLOSET 217 (1999) ("Literally
overnight, the'Stonewall riots transformed the homophile reform movement of several dozen
homosexuals into a gay liberation movement populated by thousands of lesbians, gay men, and
bisexuals who formed hundreds of organizations demanding radical changes in the way gay people
were treated by the state.").
17. RIMMERMAN, supra note 5, at 24.
18. Id. ("[GLF] attacked the consumer culture, militarism, racism, sexism, and homophobia.").
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language was important and essential for achieving the social-group identity of
gays and lesbians. 19 For instance, the word "homosexual" was replaced with
"gay," and the consciousness of the group was reinforced with the word
"pride."20
But as activism for sexual minorities entered the 1980s and organizations
within the movement began to play active roles in national politics-particularly
as the AIDS crisis and the conservative Republican rise in the mainstream
domestic political sphere prompted the urgency for national presence-
assimilationist strategies began to return to critical prominence. 21 Preference for
assimilationist strategies deepened as marriage litigation in the early 1990s
directed the gay movement toward marriage equality. 22 In litigating and
changing public reactions to same-sex marriages, activists shifted perceptions by
crafting arguments for "sameness" between same-sex and opposite-sex
relationships and by arguing for the human universality of being 23 -arguments
that the homophile movement's assimilationist strategies had tried to instill a
generation before.
24
B. Marriage as Assimilationist Strategy
When it comes to marriage, the movement's attachment to that idea has had
a lengthy history and is nothing if not complex. Carlos Ball, who has argued for
the morality of same-sex marriages, 25 recounts that "[tlhe question of marriage
has been the subject of discussion and activism from the beginning of the LGBT
19. Andrew M. Jacobs, The Rhetorical Construction of Rights: The Case of the Gay Rights Movement,
1969-1991, 72 NEB. L. REv. 723, 725-26 (1993) ("America's twenty-three year long public
conversation about gay rights started with visibility rhetoric, or rhetoric that declared the existence
of gays as a class to the polity. As this term implies, visibility rhetoric need not be rhetoric in the
strictest sense. Demonstrations or news images that communicate no formal, articulable, cognitive
message to an audience can still demonstrate the existence of previously hidden phenomena. Simply
put, America had to notice lesbians and gays as a social class before it would talk about or with them
as a class. Even more obviously, societal cognizance of lesbians and gays as a social group inevitably
preceded any remedy formulated in group terms for injuries suffered by group members. Visibility
rhetoric says, 'I am,' a message gay and lesbian America began delivering in an organized fashion
on June 27, 1969.").
20. RIMMERMAN, supra note 5, at 24.
21. Id. at28-29.
22. CARLOS A. BALL, Introduction: The Past and the Future, in AFTER MARRIAGE EQUALITY: THE
FUTURE OF LGBT RIGHTS 2 (2016).
23. Id. at 3 (mentioning that the marriage equality efforts "allowed the movement to humanize the
discrimination faced by LGBT individuals"); see also CRAIG A. RIMMERMAN, THE LESBIAN AND
GAY MOVEMENTS: ASSIMILATION OR LIBERATION? 147 (2008) (referring to marriage equality
movement tactics as "looking to sameness and de-emphasizing ... differences").
24. Elizabeth J. Baia, Akin to Madmen: A Queer Critique of the Gay Rights Cases, 104 VA. L. REV.
1021, 1027-28 (2018) (mentioning "homophile groups' goal of assimilation" and "sameness" as
rejected by gay liberationists).
25. See, e.g., Carlos A. Ball, Moral Foundations for a Discourse on Same-Sex Marriage: Looking
Beyond Political Liberalism, 85 GEO. L.J. 1871 (1997).
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rights movement in the United States., 26 Although deprived of the right to marry
in the twentieth century, some accounts exist of same-sex couples taking part in
symbolic marriage ceremonies over the decades prior to achieving legal
recognition of same-sex marriages. 27 Then legal action took shape. In the 1970s,
same-sex couples in several states across the United States also initiated lawsuits
to obtain the right to marry.28 At that time, during the liberationist heyday, the
underlying purpose of these lawsuits focused more on the legal participation that
marriage would afford sexual minorities than on any integrationist notions of
becoming part of the mainstream. 29 Exclusion from marriage meant that the
rights and incidents of marriage enjoyed by wedded opposite-sex couples, such
as tax liability reductions, health care, and social security survivor benefits,
eluded same-sex couples. 30 Such desire for equal treatment was often the actual
goal of these early same-sex marriage suits, rather than folding sexual minorities
into the social fabric. 31 Unfortunately, none of the same-sex couples who sued
for the right to marry ever prevailed in these early efforts-including Baker v.
Nelson, a case involving a male same-sex couple who sued to determine whether
the Minnesota marriage statute authorized same-sex marriages after being denied
a marriage license. 32 The couple's case reached the Minnesota Supreme Court,
which ruled against finding that the marriage statute authorized same-sex
marriage, in part because the purpose of traditional marriage was procreative. 33
At the time, that reasoning precluded same-sex couples from having a
fundamental right in marriage, so the Minnesota Supreme Court was able to find
their exclusion was not unconstitutional.3 4 For that reason, when the couple
26. BALL, supra note 22, at 1.
27. Id. ("[D]uring the summer following the Stonewall riots, Metropolitan Community Church ministers
began conducting marriage ceremonies for same-sex couples."); see also Edward B. Fiske,
Homosexuals in Los Angeles, Like Many Elsewhere, Want Religion and Establish Their Own
Church, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 15, 1970), https://www.nytimes.com/1 970/02/15/archives/homosexuals-
in-los-angeles-like-many-elsewhere-want-religion-and.html [https://perma.cc/3P9Y-8KX2].
28. E.g., Jones v. Hallahan, 501 S.W.2d 588 (Ky. Ct. App. 1973); Baker v. Nelson, 191 N.W.2d 185,
185 (Minn. 1971), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 810 (1972); Singer v. Hara, 522 P.2d 1187 (Wash. Ct. App.
1974).
29. For instance, one of the plaintiffs in Singer v. Hara, John Singer, who tried to obtain a license to
marry Paul Barwick in Washington State in 1971, revealed in an interview that "as long as marriage
laws do exist, and do create benefits like the tax break, we will apply for it." 'Non-believers' Seek
License to Wed, ADVOC. (Nov. 1971), https://law.seattleu.edu/prebuilt/library/samesexmarriage
/images/02A-Advocate.jpg [https://perma.cc/49ZZ-J9H2]. Singer and Barwick, gay liberationist
activists in Seattle, were not in love but sought to marry as part of their activism. Michael Boucai,
Glorious Precedents: When Gay Marriage Was Radical, 27 YALE J.L. & HUMAN. 1, 38-41 (2015).
30. RIMMERMAN, supra note 5, at 139-40.
31. See, e.g., Boucai, supra note 29, at 4 ("[Rather than playing up gender roles,] the Baker, Jones, and
Singer cases deployed the symbolism of marriage to proclaim homosexuality's equality, legal and
moral, in a society that almost ubiquitously criminalized its practice.").
32. 191 N.W.2d.
33. Id. at 186.
34. Id.
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appealed to the U.S. Supreme Court, their certiorari petition was summarily
denied "for want of a federal question." 35 During that era, there was not much to
say about marriage for same-sex couples.
Notwithstanding feminist critiques of marriage as a patriarchal institution,
gay rights thinkers also exhibited apprehension toward marriage. The now-
classic 1989 debate between Paula Ettelbrick and Tom Stoddard published in
Out/Look Magazine exposes the assimilationist-versus-liberationist tensions that
activism and ultimately obtaining the right to marry would bring.36 Ettelbrick
and Stoddard were colleagues at the Lambda Legal Defense Fund, but expressed
profound differences on the idea of same-sex marriage. 37 Ettelbrick held views
against same-sex marriage while Stoddard possessed favorable ones.38 Their
debate illustrates quite succinctly, but effectively, some of the fundamental
assimilationist-versus-liberationist perspectives on marriage recognition for
same-sex couples.
Though not completely in favor of the institution of marriage, Stoddard took
the position "that every lesbian and gay man should have the right to marry the
same-sex partner of his or her choice, and that the gay rights movement should
aggressively seek full legal recognition for same-sex marriages." ' 9 He then
underscored his strong belief through practical, political, and philosophical
explanations that all more or less illustrated how marriage would uphold and
integrate same-sex couples within mainstream society. 40 As examples, Stoddard
mentioned the practical tax benefits of same-sex couples in marriage, 4 1 the
political implications of mainstream acceptance of gays through marriage,42 and
the philosophical stance of seeking the right for same-sex couples to marry as a
position of parity with opposite-sex couples and the transformative potential
same-sex couples would bring to traditional marriage as reasons for the
movement to pursue marriage.4
3
35. 409 U.S. 810 (1972).
36. Paula L. Ettelbrick, Since When Is Marriage a Path to Liberation?, OUT/LOOK, Fall 1989, at 9;
Thomas B. Stoddard, Why Gay People Should Seek the Right to Marry, OUT/LOOK, Fall 1989, at 9.
37. David W. Dunlap, Paula L. Ettelbrick, Legal Expert in Gay Rights Movement, Dies at 56, N.Y.
TIMES (Oct. 8, 2011), https://www.nytimes.com/2011/10/09/nyregion/paula-l-ettelbrick-legal-
expert-in-gay-rights-movement-dies-at-56.html [https://perma.cc/W7GD-JAEL].
38. Id.
39. Stoddard, supra note 36, at 10.
40. Id. at 10-13.
41. Id. at 10 (noting that one practical benefit of same-sex marriages is that "[m]arried couples may
reduce their tax liability by filing a joint return").
42. Id. at 12 ("[Marriage is] the political issue that most fully tests the dedication of people who are not
gay to full equality for gay people, and also the issue most likely to lead ultimately to a world free
from discrimination against lesbians and gay men.").
43. Id. at 13 (suggesting that philosophically "the issue is not the desirability of marriage, but rather the
desirability of the right to marry" and that "enlarging the concept [of marriage] to embrace same-
sex couples would necessarily transform it into something new").
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From the liberationist view, Ettelbrick articulated her anti-marriage stance
by criticizing the importance of "self-affirmation" that many gay couples ideally
seek through marriage. 44 She understood the appeal: "After all, those who marry
can be instantaneously transformed from 'outsiders' to 'insiders,' and we have a
desperate need to become insiders."45 That desire might be tantalizing to sexual
minorities for various symbolic and dignifying reasons, but Ettelbrick argued
that obtaining marriage would, firstly, force assimilation upon sexual minorities
rather than liberate them, and, secondly, minimize the plurality of queer
identities that preclude justice for sexual minorities.46 Rather, Ettelbrick argued
that "[j]ustice for gay men and lesbians will only be achieved when we are
accepted and supported in this society despite our differences from the dominant
culture and the choices we make regarding our relationships. 47 Marriage would
be antithetical to her view of equality that does not emphasize "sameness" but
rather stresses acceptance and equal treatment of plurality.48 "The law," she
wrote, "provides us no room to argue that we are different, but are nonetheless
entitled to equal protection."49 Ultimately, in marriage activism, Ettelbrick saw
the rights-based approach by assimilationists as resulting in inauthenticity:
It rips away the very heart and soul of what I believe it is to be a lesbian
in this world. It robs of me of the opportunity to make a difference. We
end up mimicking all that is bad about an institution of marriage in our
effort to appear to be the same as straight couples.50
That inauthenticity would accommodate the inequalities within gay culture and
society as well:
Of course, a white man who marries another white man who has a full-
time job with benefits will certainly be able to share in those benefits
and overcome the only obstacle left to full societal assimilation-the
goal of many in his class. In other words, gay marriage will not topple
the system that allows only the privileged few to obtain decent health
care. Nor will it close the privilege gap between those who are married
and those who are not.5
Insightfully, Ettelbrick predicted the decline in gay political advancement once
marriage is obtained: "If the laws change tomorrow and lesbians and gay men
were allowed to marry, where would we find the incentive to continue the
progressive movement we have started that is pushing for societal and legal
44. Ettelbrick, supra note 36, at 9.
45. Id.
46. Id. at 10, 14.
47. Id. at 14.
48. Id. at 15.
49. Id.
50. Id.
51. Id. at 16.
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recognition of all kinds of family relationships? '52 All in all, her reasons against
pursuing marriage were predominantly pointed at how it would subordinate
sexual minorities underneath a multidimensional, white heteronormative
supremacy both externally and from within the movement.
In pre-Obergefell 1989, the Stoddard-Ettelbrick pro-and-con debate in
Out/Look Magazine illuminated profound complications that the idea of
marriage underscored between assimilationist and liberationist strategies for the
movement as a whole. But in light of any efforts to resist conformity and
assimilation, marriage-equality activism began to advance shortly around the
time the Stoddard-Ettelbrick debate was published.53 For more than a decade,
interest in advancing same-sex marriage waned as the AIDS epidemic
overshadowed marriage in priority.54 Additionally, in 1986, the Bowers v.
Hardwick decision at the Supreme Court added new shifts and dimensions in
activist priorities as decriminalizing sodomy became a priority as well.55 Then,
however, interest in marriage increased consequentially as the impact that the
AIDS epidemic pressed upon inheritance and death benefits issues affecting
sexual minorities.56 Prompted by this correlation, in 1989, the State Bar of
California officially recommended legally recognizing same-sex marriages.
57
Then, in the early 1990s, marriage litigation reignited-this time in Hawaii-
and eventually led to the temporary success of Baehr v. Lewin, 58 where the
Hawaii Supreme Court recognized that denying same-sex couples the right to
marry could be unconstitutional. 59 The surprise success of Baehr, however
slight, brought frenzy to both social conservatives and gay rights proponents.6°
According to Carlos Ball, after Baehr "a growing number of LGBT rights
organizations, facing both the surprising prospect of a possible victory in the
Hawai'i courts and a growing conservative backlash against marital rights for
52. Id. at 17.
53. See, e.g., Philip S. Gutis, Small Steps Toward Acceptance Renew Debate on Gay Marriage, N.Y.
TIMES (Nov. 5, 1989), https://www.nytimes.com/1989/11/05/weekinreview/ideas-trends-small-
steps-toward-acceptance-renew-debate-on-gay-marriage.html [https://perma.cc/885W-MVRR].
54. See Mary Ziegler, The Terms of the Debate: Litigation, Argumentative Strategies, and Coalitions in
the Same-Sex Marriage Struggle, 39 FLA. ST. U. L. REv. 467, 477 (2012) ("During the period
between 1977 and 1990, gay rights activists also saw little reason to make same-sex marriage a great
priority. One reason for the movement's inattention to the issue was the outbreak of the AIDS
epidemic, which made marriage seem of marginal importance.").
55. d. at477-78.
56. Gutis, supra note 53.
57. Id.
58. 852 P.2d 44 (Haw. 1993).
59. Id. at 68.
60. BALL, supra note 22, at 3 ("After the [Baehr] court's ruling, social conservatives, energized by their
victory in forcing President Bill Clinton to backtrack on his promise to lift the military's ban on
lesbian, gay, and bisexual service members, began to sound the alarm about what was taking place
on the island state.").
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same-sex couples, quickly turned the pursuit of marriage equality into their most
important objective. 61 Indeed, as noted by others, "Baehr may have benefitted
the same-sex marriage cause by dramatically increasing awareness of the issue,
both in the gay rights movement and in the broader society. ' '62
Though the marriage-equality movement held possibilities for articulating
gay rights through a more universalized frame 63 and its focus on same-sex
couples pushed the discussion over sexual orientation discrimination into a
different realm,64 a substantial formulation for demanding equality in marriage
hinged on assimilationist arguments based on sameness, as
[t]hrough the process of demanding admission into the institution of
marriage, the movement sought to establish that LGBT individuals were
capable of entering and remaining in committed relationships-and, for
those who had them, of raising children-in ways that did not differ
fundamentally from the experiences of heterosexuals. 65
Such sameness arguments eventually prevailed to facilitate certain group's
desires for disparate results for other sub-groups in the LGBTQ movement,
because
[a]lthough some feminist and queer activists continued to criticize the
embrace of marriage as an assimilationist and conservative move that
would not help individuals who were not interested in, or would not
benefit financially from, marriage, those voices were largely drowned
out as many movement organizations, as well as an apparent majority
of LGBT individuals, made marriage equality their top political
priority.
66
As Ettelbrick predicted, the drive toward marriage equality was eventually fueled
by a prevalent subgroup within the LGBTQ movement at the cost of intragroup
marginalization.
61. Id.
62. Ziegler, supra note 54, at 474.
63. See, e.g., Janet R. Jakobsen, Queer Relations: A Reading of Martha Nussbaum on Same-Sex
Marriage, 19 COLUM. J. GENDER & L. 133, 137 (2010) (describing one argument in favor of same-
sex marriage as follows: "the right to freely choose whom to marry is definitive of the adult human
being, who is the subject ofjustice, and so as a matter of equality it is actually crucial that gay people
be afforded the right to make this choice").
64. See BALL, supra note 22, at 3 ("The focus on marriage put the spotlight on same-sex relationships
in ways that other campaigns, such as the push for laws that prohibited discrimination based on
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C. Assimilation, Respectability, and Interest Convergence
1. Sameness as Respectability
While Obergefell was being heard at the Supreme Court-just a little more
than two decades after Baehr-the effects of assimilationist strategies in the
marriage-equality and gay rights movements had continued to crystallize.
Ettelbrick's reasons for apprehension had, indeed, manifested. Mere months
before the Obergefell decision, Alexander Nourafshan and Angela Onwuachi-
Willig echoed what other scholars had articulated-that gay rights successes in
pursuing marriage equality had incurred some inroads toward formal equality,
but the progress retained, if not deepened, some substantial limits for the
movement as a whole:
Although Windsor and the revolution of cases that have led to Obergfell
[sic] hold significant promise for one privileged subset of gays and
lesbians-white, economically privileged, and educated gays and
lesbians-they do not necessarily carry the same potential for less
privileged subgroups within the gay and lesbian community, namely
gays and lesbians of color.
67
According to Nourafshan and Onwuachi-Willig, in championing marriage,
movement proponents had, historically throughout the struggle up to Obergefell,
embraced assimilationist tactics over liberationist ones: "[R]ather than seek to
disrupt the paradigm of heteronormativity, assimilation-oriented homosexuals
sought to fit gay rights into the existing legal and social structure, without
threatening to upend the social order." 68 Such conformity to the order would also
mean adapting to norms that replicate the existing institutional hierarchies of the
mainstream status quo.6 9 Others have similarly discerned that the assimilative
push for marriage equality was done through channeling away some important
disparities within the gay community and movement for the sake of expressing
sameness with the mainstream. 70 Thus, even before the 2003 success in
Massachusetts through Goodridge v. Department of Public Health, Darren
67. Alexander Nourafshan & Angela Onwuachi-Willig, From Outsider to Insider and Outsider Again:
Interest Convergence and the Normalization ofLGBTIdentity, 42 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 521, 521-22
(2015).
68. Id. at 526 (citations omitted).
69. See id. at 526-27 ("One of the most effective strategies for transforming homosexuality from a fringe
community to an insider group has been the construction of an insider group has been the
construction of an essentialist, immutable homosexual identity. In addition to immutability, this
essentialist identity has been rooted in both whiteness and affluence. Indeed, the popular portrayals
of 'normalized homosexuality' in the media and society at large are all the same: white, educated,
and socioeconomically privileged.") (citations omitted).
70. See, e.g., NICOLA BARKER, NOT THE MARRYING KIND: A FEMINIST CRITIQUE OF SAME-SEX
MARRIAGE 109-13 (2012) (discussing sameness strategies in various marriage equality campaigns
worldwide).
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Lenard Hutchinson had referenced what some scholars on race were already
saying about the same-sex marriage movement in the United States-that
mainstream structural and institutional hierarchies would be replicated and as a
result "many (or most) of the benefits from same-sex marriage will accrue to
white and upper-class individuals. 71
During the pursuit of marriage equality, the danger of such disparities was
already being observed within the particular degree of sameness that
assimilationist strategies in the marriage movement articulated between same-
sex and opposite-sex couples. Indeed, assimilationist strategies that promoted
sameness here skewed sameness portrayals toward standards of mainstream
respectability. As a result, the marriage-equality movement provided an
opportunity for the gay movement to engage directly with respectability
politics.72 It is in this way that Katharine Franke has claimed that "[i]n the
marriage cases, lesbians and gay men have accomplished a rebranding of what
it means to be homosexual.,
73
Respectability politics, a concept that has been extensively examined in the
realm of race studies,7 4 can be described as "a performance and project of
moving from the position of 'other,' to being incorporated into the normal,
dominant, and hegemonic." 75 For a marginalized individual or group, that
incorporation is realized by aligning with dominant mainstream features and
values in order to become worthy of establishment recognition. 76 What
respectability can symbolize for the marginalized is ascendancy and mobility
within a dominant political society. 7 Indeed, the enchanting call of
71. Darren Lenard Hutchinson, "Gay Rights" for "Gay Whites"?: Race, Sexual Identity, and Equal
Protection Discourse, 85 CORNELLL. REv. 1358, 1370(2000) (referencing David W. Dunlap, Some
Gay Rights Advocates Question Drive to Defend Same-Sex Marriage, N.Y. TIMES, June 7, 1996, at
A12).
72. Nan D. Hunter, Varieties of Constitutional Experience: Democracy and the Marriage Equality
Campaign, 64 UCLA L. REV. 1662, 1724 (2017) ("In their reconstruction of difference and
sameness arguments, marriage equality advocates were dancing on the thin line that separates a
claim for equal respect from a plea of respectability.").
73. Katherine Franke, What Marriage Equality Teaches Us: The Afterlife of Racism and Homophobia,
in BALL, supra note 22, at 238, 247.
74. See, e.g., EVELYN BROOKS HIGGINBOTHAM, The Politics of Respectability, in RIGHTEOUS
DISCONTENT: THE WOMEN'S MOVEMENT IN THE BLACK BAPTIST CHURCH, 1880-1920, at 185
(1993).
75. Osagie K. Obasogie & Zachary Newman, Black Lives Matter and Respectability Politics in Local
News Accounts of Officer-Involved Civilian Deaths: An Early Empirical Assessment, 2016 Wis. L.
REV. 541, 547 (2016).
76. See Yuvraj Joshi, Respectable Queerness, 43 COLUM. HUM. RTS. L. REV. 415, 421-22 (2012)
(differentiating respectability from assimilation by noting indirectly that respectability "capture[s]
the various ways in which lesbians and gays constitute themselves as being worthy of recognition");
see also id. at 424 ("The claim of gay sameness to heterosexuality posits that gay couples and
relationships are exactly like their heterosexual counterparts and therefore deserve the same
recognition.").
77. See, e.g., Obasogie & Newman, supra note 75, at 549 ("The politics of respectability contains a
strong element of class, and an ideal of class mobility, within it.").
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respectability projects a meritocratic sense of self-determination, materialism,
and identity, because of the idea that
[respectability] is based on a fundamentally American sense of
capitalism, individuality, and work ethic-that if you work hard, play
by the rules, and are a good, law-abiding citizen of any race, nothing
will obstruct you in your pursuit of a "better life" and integration into
social and economic prosperity.7
In other words, by being "respectable" through exhibiting the material ethos and
characteristics that the mainstream values as good, an outsider could seemingly
obtain social, economic, and political worth and recognition. For instance,
respectability narratives may focus on educational pedigrees and professional
occupations, 79 on replacing identifying markers of outsiderness with mainstream
ones, 80 and on personal wealth and economic status. 81 All of these attributes are
aspirational and things that a respectably motivated individual could seemingly
work to accomplish. However, as some have observed, respectability politics
neglects the existing structural and institutional dimensions of subordination in
society and the political body as a whole.82 Meritocracy has its fallacies. 83 As a
result of courting respectability, true progress or transformation is often
78. Id.
79. See, e.g., Angela M. Banks, Respectability & the Quest for Citizenship, 83 BROOK. L. REV. 1, 6
(2017). Banks excerpts an example of respectability politics in the case of Raymond Alexander who
argued on his and other African-American students' behalf against a 1921 ban at Harvard that barred
African-American students from residing Harvard's dormitories. Banks noted that Alexander used
the professional careers and educational pedigrees of his and many of the other students' fathers to
demonstrate their alignment with the values and norms of respectability. Id.
80. See, e.g., Justin Hansford, Demosprudence on Trial: Ethics for Movement Lawyers, in Ferguson and
Beyond, 85 FORDHAM L. REv. 2057, 2075 (2017). Here, Hansford illustrates the focus on
appearances and names in respectability politics through reference to Bill Cosby's "Pound Cake"
speech, in which a link was made between material success of African-Americans and the avoidance
of ethnic names and physical appearances. Id.
81. See, e.g., Lawrence M. Friedman, Name Robbers: Privacy, Blackmail, and Assorted Matters in
Legal History, 30 HOFSTRA L. REv. 1093, 1096 (2002). Friedman observes the connotation of
respectability that wealth conveys in the U.S., noting that
Wealth, obviously, was an important marker of status. More generally, status
depended on respectability, that is, a reputation for decency and good moral values.
The way you lived and behaved and comported yourself provided the world with
signs and indicia of respectability. It was possible to be poor and respectable, and
there were many people who fit this description. But below a certain threshold-at a
certain level of poverty and destitution-respectability vanished.
Id. In fact, "men who could not work or did not work could not hope for respectability" and "were
vilified, and treated as criminals," while "women who lacked 'virtue' were simply ostracized-at
least in polite society." Id.
82. See, e.g., id. ("[T]he political maneuvers surrounding respectability discourses 'seek[] to reform the
behavior of individuals and as such take[] the emphasis away from the structural forms of oppression
such as racism, sexism, and poverty."' (quoting Farah Jasmine Griffin, Black Feminists and Du
Bois: Respectability, Protection, and Beyond, 568 ANNALS AM. ACAD. POL. & Soc. Sci. 28, 34
(2000)).
83. E.g., Anne Lawton, The Meritocracy Myth and the Illusion of Equal Employment Opportunity, 85
MINN. L. REv. 587, 594-99 (2000) (articulating and debunking the concept of meritocracy in
employment discrimination).
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diminished, and marginalization persists, especially for those who are unable to
appear respectable.
8 4
The ability to act respectably for social gain is not exclusive to the
phenomenon of racial negotiations in American society and politics, but transfers
aptly into the context of negotiations between sexual minorities and the
mainstream status quo as well. According to Yuvraj Joshi, "[r]espectability is an
indispensable concept to understand the queer politics of recognition. 8 5 In part,
such indispensability is so because "respectability ... has characterized legal
recognition of same-sex relationships." 86 In fact, in Joshi's view, legal
recognition of same-sex relationships has concentrated on the degree of
sameness observed between same-sex and mainstream opposite-sex
relationships: "[W]here legal recognition has been afforded . . . to same-sex
relationships . . . it has tended to center on their normalcy rather than their
diversity and inherent worth. ' 87 Under Joshi's observation, same-sex couples'
"normalcy" is directed at the degree to which their normalcy matches the
normalcy of mainstream opposite-sex couples; invariably, it is another way of
describing sameness. In this way, marriage proponents have relied on
assimilationist strategies because, as Joshi notes, "[m]uch of the literature on
lesbian and gay recognition uses the language of assimilation to explain such
recognition.
8 8
Of course, what kind of normalcy and sameness also matters. Although this
relationship between assimilation and respectability can be close, the concepts
of assimilation and respectability are not one and the same. Specifically,
[a]ssimilation explains many of the pressures to integrate into the
heterosexual mainstream, but it does not capture the various ways in
which lesbians and gays constitute themselves as being worthy of
recognition. Respectability, as a discursive concept expressing a
normative ideal, provides a more comprehensive conceptual framework
to understand such recognition.8
9
One can also explain this difference between the two on utilitarian terms-that,
in essence, assimilation can serve as a means to obtain respectability. For
instance, in African-American history, as "early respectability politics sought to
challenge racist imagery of inferiority by cultivating the opposite image, i.e., the
economically successful, upright Black citizen," 90 some have observed that
"[i]ntegration and assimilation became the key vehicle through which advocates
84. Obasogie & Newman, supra note 75, at 549.
85. Joshi, supra note 76, at 421.
86. Id.
87. Id.
88. Id. (referencing generally Kenji Yoshino, Covering, 111 YALE L.J. 769 (2002)).
89. Id.
90. Obasogie & Newman, supra note 75, at 546 (citations omitted).
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of respectability politics within the Black community pursued these goals." 91
Thus, assimilationist strategies operate as a basis from which one tries to become
"respectable."
For sexual minorities, as the campaign for marriage became a venue for
adopting assimilationist strategies, respectability was the degree in which such
strategies were calibrated. "Nowhere," as Joshi states, "are the workings of
respectability more evident than in efforts to achieve marriage equality."
92
Similarly, Franke notes that "[i]f the marriage equality cases have been about
anything, they've been about the insistence that gay people have been
misrecognized by law and society and that the time has come to tell a more
respectable, decent story that, if believed, justifies a city official's signature on a
marriage license."93 In successfully achieving this image of respectability, the
strategy was assimilative; rather than seeking to transform marriage, proponents
"aim[ed] to fold same-sex couples into the institution on its own terms." 94
Specifically, sameness arguments emerged and prevailed: "As marriage equality
advocates make the plausible case that they share with conservatives the same
basic values about marriage, conservatives come around to seeing same-sex
couples who wanted to marry as 'just like us,' or enough like us to recognize a
shared identity." 95 Through sameness and assimilation, achieving that "enough
like us" sentiment is likely what allowed proponents of marriage equality to
transform, in Franke's words, "marriage into a badge of superiority" 96 that is
"awarded or 'enjoyed' by only those members of the gay community who are




Thus, assimilationist strategies and sameness arguments were harnessed to
acquire a degree of respectability.
Both Joshi and Franke have noted that the act of being respectable can exist
separately from the ftmction of using marriage to make oneself respectable.98 In
this way, marriage did not solely ignite the gay movement's overall quest for
respectability. Rather, the attainment of respectability in the marriage-equality
campaign existed in tandem with the push to construct a respectable image for
91. Id.
92. Joshi, supra note 76, at 421.
93. Franke, supra note 73, at 247.
94. Id. at 249.
95. Id.
96. Id. at 248.
97. Id.
98. Joshi, supra note 76, at 421-22 (observing that "marriage is a product and a catalyst" in the pursuit
of respectability, and also that previous image constructions of sexual minorities as respectable
"have been instrumental in bringing about marriage equality"); see also Franke, supra note 73, at
248, 251 (observing how marriage can confer respectability on same-sex couples and alluding to
uses of whiteness for "homosexuality in general" in "under[writing] the plausibility of [a] positive
transformation in the meaning of the gay identity").
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assimilated sexual minorities in the public eye-sometimes with these parallel
constructions of respectability being informed by each other and at other times
not. 99 In this way, sameness, produced through respectability, was used to
achieve marriage and to shift the image of sexual minorities away from
degeneracy.
In the marriage movement, some have sensed that in the depiction of
respectability of same-sex couples through assimilation-based strategies of
sameness certain specific features of same-sex couples were artificially and
deliberately heightened in order to resemble aspects of decency and uprightness
that the mainstream valued. As Joshi observes, "[i]f respectability is measured
by proximity to middle-class heterosexuality, same-sex marriage is a clear
manifestation of this."1"' In this way, as middle-class heterosexuality would
represent the mainstream status quo, same-sex couples vying for the right to
marry would, in order to be respectable, also have needed to embody or heighten
enough specific material sameness with the mainstream to be worthy of status
quo validation. Thus the parallel push for assimilated gays to appear respectable
in general society seemed to inform performances of respectability in the
marriage movement: "[P]rior constructions of gays and lesbians as asexual,
apolitical, producing and consuming subjects have been instrumental in bringing
about marriage equality." 10 1 From there, projecting respectability has led to a
"moral de-sexing and middle-classing of lesbian and gays. 10 2 More specifically
as to the idea of "moral de-sexing," Joshi posits that "[l]esbians and gays may
produce performances of respectability as defensive strategies of being
sexualized. Respectability may be a means of stopping their sexuality from
becoming a barrier to their success and happiness or a safe space away from the
pain and suffering of homophobia." 10 3 Thus, sexual minorities sanitize their
sexuality or "tone-down" allusions to their non-heteronormative sexual behavior
that could trigger negative stereotyping. "Middle-classing" is likely Joshi's
shorthand for the "[c]onspicuous consumption [that] has been crucial to the
construction of gay men and, to a lesser extent, lesbians as respectable citizen-
consumers." 104 It comports to the materialism that establishment norms
encourage. For instance, for sexual minorities in the professional world,
99. Joshi, supra note 76, at 431-39 (discussing constructions of respectability, outside of marriage, by
sexuality minorities to fit into the mainstream corporate world and observing that "lesbian and gay
couples do not simply become respectable through marriage, but must also bring respectability to
marriage"). Cf id. at 50 ("Even before marriage equality, many lesbians and gays were passing for
heterosexual or covering their homosexual selves in public, while privately engaging in queer sexual
practices.").
100. Id. at 421.
101. Id. at 422.
102. Id.
103. Id. at 429.
104. Id. at 431.
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"[r]espectability . . . is measured by proximity to white, middle-class
heterosexuality."' 10 5 In that regard, "LGBT employees who 'fit in' tend to be
those who most closely resemble their predominately white, male, middle-class,
heterosexual colleagues." 10 6 Indeed, Joshi and others have noticed particular
features of identity and embodiment of norms were honed and carefully crafted
into constructing the notion of respectability of same-sex relationships.
For example, with race, Franke draws a connection between respectability
and whiteness: "Rightly or wrongly, homosexuality in general and the marriage
equality movement specifically enjoy a kind of racial privilege that has
underwritten the plausibility of this positive transformation in the meaning of the
gay identity." 10 7 To validate the impetus for the careful use of race, Franke
quotes Kenyon Farrow's observation that "in order to be mainstream in America,
one has to be seen as white."'10 8 Consequently, Franke posits that marriage
became "publicly perceived to be a white issue." 10 9 Such an impetus had its
purposes in establishing respectability, and thus one aspect of respectability in
the marriage movement was built on the distancing of race from other colors to
whiteness to create "just like us" arguments that connote sameness to the
mainstream. 110 Alluding to the gestures of respectability in distinguishing
between the good outsider and the bad outsider, Franke remarks that "[w]hen
judges, policymakers, or the media are persuaded that same-sex couples are
sufficiently similar to different-sex couples when it comes to marriage, that
recognition of shared identity is premised upon the specter of a constitutive
outsider that gay couples are not like."11' According to Franke, based on that
connotation, "what [same-sex couples] are not like is African Americans (even
though, of course, many lesbians and gay men are African American)."' 2 In this
regard, the aim to seem respectable helped craft "sameness as white"
connotations to appeal to powerful elites. In part, as Franke mentions, this
underlying aim was demonstrated by the overwhelming presence of white
litigants, white lawyers, and white individuals who led mainstream LGBTQ
organizations all vying for the recognition of marriage equality up to
Obergefell.1 13 Others have noted that economic status' 14 and the embodiment of
105. Id. at 433.
106. Id.
107. Franke, supra note 73, at 251.
108. Id. (quoting Kenyon Farrow, Is Gay Marriage Anti-Black?, KENYON FARROW, (Mar. 5, 2004),
https://kenyonfarrow.com/2005/06/14/is-gay-marriage-anti-black [https://perma.cc/C5L5-R2M6]).
109. Id.
110. Id. at 249-50.
111. Id. at 251.
112. Id.
113. Id. at 250-51.
114. E.g., Nourafshan & Onwuachi-Willig, supra note 67, at 526-27.
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heteronormative expressions of sexuality115 and family1 16 were other features
and areas of emphasis that figured in establishing respectability of same-sex
couples.
Indeed, the relationship between assimilationist strategies and respectability
in the marriage movement was strong. Sameness arguments were particularized
to demonstrate respectability of same-sex relationships and to minimize their
differences from the mainstream in order to gain worth for recognition.
2. Respectability and Interest Convergence
Respectability, however, is not an end in itself. Utilizing respectability, the
movement demonstrated same-sex couples were not merely similar to
mainstream couples, they were also exemplary enough to receive the right to
marry and would not threaten the status quo or the institution of traditional
marriage because of it. Borrowing from Derrick Bell's racial justice theorizing,
his interest-convergence thesis helps illuminate the correlation between
respectability and the success of marriage equality in this way. In theorizing
racial inequality, Bell posited that the recognition of legal rights of subordinated
racial groups occurs upon convincing the white decisionmakers that the interests
of both groups converge. 117 Using Brown v. Board of Education, Bell
hypothesized that the reason why African-American claimants successfully
overturned segregation was because their interests and the interests of the
dominant status quo happened to converge. In particular, at the time of the ruling,
the impetus to maintain foreign national allies during the Cold War prompted an
imperative to repudiate instances of racial discrimination domestically in the
United States1 18 As a result, segregation was overturned.
In propelling gay rights and legal protections, the strategy to align interests
is not exclusive to race. Anthony Michael Kreis has drawn several accounts that
reveal the impact of interest convergence in gay rights advances before marriage
equality. 19 By reading together Romer v. Evans120 and Lawrence v. Texas,12 1
115. E.g., Godsoe, supra note 2, at 149-50.
116. E.g., Angela P. Harris, From Stonewall to the Suburbs?: Toward A Political Economy of Sexuality,
14 WM. & MARY BILL RTs. J. 1539, 1569 (2006).
117. Derrick A. Bell, Jr., Comment, Brown v. Board of Education and the Interest-Convergence
Dilenma, 93 HARV. L. REV. 518, 523 (1980) ("The interest of blacks in achieving racial equality
will be accommodated only when it converges with the interests of whites. However, the fourteenth
amendment, standing alone, will not authorize a judicial remedy providing effective racial equality
for blacks where the remedy sought threatens the superior status of middle and upper class whites.").
118. Id. at 524; see also Hunter, supra note 72, at 1722.
119. See generally Anthony Michael Kreis, Gay Gentrification: Whitewashed Fictions ofLGBT Privilege
and the New Interest-Convergence Dilemma, 31 LAW & INEQUALITY 117, 137-53 (2013).
120. 517 U.S. 620 (1996).
121. 539 U.S. 558 (2003).
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Kreis argues that the Supreme Court's reversal of Bowers, Romer, and Lawrence
involved several layers of interest convergence that removed a series of threats
maintained by the status quo against sexual minorities and same-sex intimacy:
"The Bowers, Romer, and Lawrence opinions are strong evidence that once
shared identity interests are realized, judicial remedies favoring sexual minorities
will be authorized provided they do not undermine the power or authority of
peer, heterosexual stakeholders." 122 By reading Scalia's scathing dissent in
Romer, Kreis discerns that an undercurrent of white privilege helped convince
the Romer majority of Amendment 2's underlying animus. 1 2 3 Kreis then pairs
the resonance of Scalia's Romer dissent with the passage in Kennedy's majority
opinion in Lawrence, when sameness was used to connote the discriminatory
effect of sodomy laws. 124 Furthermore, by the time Lawrence weighed the
legality of same-sex intimacy, other heteronormative institutions that might have
been once threatened by the overturning of Bowers-such as private and
religious organizations-already had such threats "neutralized" in other
Supreme Court decisions.' 25 Such amelioration of threats that Lawrence might
have otherwise posed further demonstrated the aligning of interests that helped
reverse Bowers. In other words, the legal protections sexual minorities were
asking for can be granted so long as such protections would not threaten the
heteronormative status quo. Interest convergence thus played out in the
Lawrence ruling.
Importing Bell's interest-convergence theory from its roots within racial-
inequality discourse into the realm of LGBTQ-rights advancement has potential
drawbacks, as the history and nature of discrimination and oppression for sexual
minorities are not identical to racial minorities.' 2 6 But, as others have noted,
Bell's interest-convergence thesis does transfer quite readily into the marriage-
equality movement. 127 Again, sameness and respectability politics play out in
aligning interests. At the start of the marriage movement, sexual minorities vying
for the right to marry appeared as outsiders attempting to appease the
heterosexual mainstream who have the ability to marry and the power to extend
122. Kreis, supra note 119; at 151.
123. Id. at 148. ("[Scalia's] intent was surely to highlight that the LGBT community is a powerful and
visible force within the legal community and that visibility makes it easier for his fellow Justices to
grant rights to a group of people with whom lawyers typically associate.").
124. Id. at 149.
125. Id. at 150; see also Boy Scouts of Am. v. Dale, 530 U.S. 640 (2000) (ruling that the First Amendment
protected a Boy Scout troop's rejection of an openly gay member); Hurley v. Irish-American Gay,
Lesbian & Bisexual Group ofBos., 515 U.S. 557 (1995) (ruling that the First Amendment does not
compel parade organizers to permit a gay and lesbian group to participate in its parade).
126. For a detailed analysis of some of the ways in which the legal and political dimensions of claims to
lesbian and gay rights differ from those to racial equality, see Margaret M. Russell, Lesbian, Gay
and Bisexual Rights and "The Civil Rights Agenda ", 1 AFR.-AM. L. & POL'Y REP. 33 (1994).
127. Khuu, supra note 3, at 214-224; Hunter, supra note 72, at 1721-25.
[Vol. 31.2:249
2020] Queer Sacrifice in Masterpiece Cakeshop
the right to marry. 128 Proponents and movement activists discarded liberationist,
outsider rhetoric to reach for sameness arguments, which revised
pronouncements that same-sex couples could love, have relationships, or rear
children well enough to deserve the rights and benefits of marriage to be "just
like you."129 Assimilationist accounts of sameness were calibrated to underscore
the respectability of same-sex couples-how they would be unlikely to threaten
the status quo.13 ° Once the establishment was convinced of the particular version
of sameness, sexual minorities were granted the right to marry.131 In this way,
returning to Franke's example of making marriage equality appear as a "white
issue," such construction facilitated respectability, which then allowed the
interests between sexual minorities and the power-granting establishment to
converge. For instance, with race again, Franke notes, "[t]he racial endowment
as white from which the marriage equality movement has benefited.. . surely
helped conservative courts, legislators, and others come to see an affinity of
interest with this cause." t32 This notion is so "even if not grounded in reality,
128. See Stoddard, supra note 36, at 9 (observing in 1989, before the start of marriage-equality
advancement, that "[lI]esbian and gay relationships, being neither legally sanctioned or commingled
by blood, are always at the bottom of the heap of social acceptance and importance" and that "those
who marry can be instantaneously transformed from 'outsiders' to 'insiders,' and we have a
desperate need to become insiders").
129. See Nourafshan & Onwuachi-Willig, supra note 67, at 526 ("In contrast to early gay rights rhetoric,
whereby the gay community sought to distinguish homosexuality as different or 'outside' the
mainstream of society, the social and legal strategy to achieve equality for gays and lesbians later
shifted to rely on assimilation-orientation. Gay rights proponents abandoned outsider rhetoric to
seek inclusion with the traditional institution of marriage and participation in the military by
highlighting similarities--by claiming, 'We're just like you."') (citations omitted); see also
Plaintiffs' Motion for Summary Judgment at 22-25, Goodridge v. Dep't of Pub. Health, 798 N.E.2d
941 (Mass. 2003) (No. 01-1647-A) (underscoring similarities that same-sex couples share with
opposite-sex couples, such as mutual emotional support, an obligation of faithfulness, and long-term
relationship commitment); Building a Family ofDreams in KY, FREEDOM TO MARRY (Aug. 2014),
https://www.freedomtomarry.org/stories/entry/building-a-family-of-dreams-in-ky
[https://perma.cc/5JZ4-FNQ4] (describing same-sex couple Paul Campion and Randy Johnson's
relationship and their adoption of four children despite the inability to marry in Kentucky).
130. See Nourafshan & Onwuachi-Willig, supra note 67, at 526 ("[R]ather than seek to disrupt the
paradigm of heteronormativity, assimilation-oriented homosexuals sought to fit gay rights into the
existing legal and social structure, without threatening to upend the social order.") (citation omitted);
see also Meet the Plaintiffs Standing upforMarriage at the 6th Circuit Today, FREEDOM TO MARRY
(Aug. 6, 2014), https://www.freedomtomarry.orgiblog/entry/meet-the-plaintiffs-standing-up-for-
marriage-at-the-6th-circuit-today [https://perma.cc/VEJ6-XRKH] (quoting Matthew Mansell,
plaintiff in Tanco v. Haslam, 135 S. Ct. 1040 (2015), consolidated in Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S.
Ct. 2584 (2015), who said, "[w]e do exactly the same things as everyone else does. We teach our
kids to ride bikes, mow the lawn, we do laundry, we argue about money. It's no different from what
my parents did or what my sister has done for 32 years.").
131. E.g., Obergefell, 135 S. Ct. at 2599. In Part III of the majority opinion, Justice Kennedy begins his
four-part analysis illustrating why the right to marriage should be extended to same-sex couples with
the noted observation of sameness: "This analysis compels the conclusion that same-sex couples
may exercise the right to marry. The four principles and traditions to be discussed demonstrate that
the reasons marriage is fundamental under the Constitution apply with equal force to same-sex
couples." Id. at 2599 (emphasis added).
132. Franke, supra note 73, at 250.
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since many of the members of the LGBT community who sought marriage rights
were people of color."'
133
Prior to Obergefell, some commentators noticed one particularly glaring
instance of interest convergence formulated by the respectability associated with
plaintiff Edith Windsor's profile in United States v. Windsor.134 For instance,
Nourafshan and Onwuachi-Willig noted that
[u]nder the theory of interest convergence, Edith Windsor, a wealthy,
white'woman in a long-term committed relationship in New York City,
was, in many ways, the perfect plaintiff to challenge DOMA [the
Defense of Marriage Act] because she could be sold as part of a
respectable, assimilation-based gay image to the general public and,
more importantly, to those in power.
1 35
Windsor's image, in the case that overturned DOMA, had been cautiously
managed; and assimilation and respectability figured into that management.
1 36
Elements of race, wealth, and sexuality were at the heart of constructing
Windsor's image. Russell Robinson and David Frost have mentioned that
"Windsor's case did not accidentally end up at the Supreme Court' 13 7 and that
"her lawyer Roberta Kaplan argued within the marriage-equality movement that
Windsor was a superior client for a Supreme Court challenge" because certain
features such as her widow status, her gender, and her age lent favorable
optics. 138 Highlighting several features of respectability, Cynthia Godsoe has
remarked that "[tihe fact that [Windsor] is white, well-educated, and wealthy no
doubt also helped Supreme Court Justices relate to her,"' 39 and that the lawyers'
depiction of Windsor's relationship with her deceased spouse Thea Spyer as
"decidedly G-rated" was in part to minimize her sexual orientation. 140
Nourafshan and Onwuachi-Willig illustrate even further the respectability
implications of Windsor's image control. Beyond the "G-rated" connotations of
Windsor's marriage to Spyer, particular aspects of their marriage embodied
sameness arguments skewed toward respectability. According to Nourafshan
and Onwuachi-Willig, Windsor's "wedding was 'mainstream' enough to be
featured in the New York Times wedding section, even though the state of New
York did not recognize same-sex marriage until 2012., '14' The educational levels
133. Id.
134. Nourafshan & Onwuachi-Willig, supra note 67, at 522-23; 570 U.S. 744 (2013).
135. Nourafshan & Onwuachi-Willig, supra note 67, at 522.
136. See Russell K. Robinson & David M. Frost, The Afterlife of Homophobia. 60 ARiZ. L. REv. 213,
224-25 (2018); Godsoe, supra note 2, at 142.
137. Robinson & Frost, supra note 136, at 224-25.
138. Id.
139. Godsoe, supra note 2, at 142.
140. Id. at 142-43.
141. Nourafshan & Onwuachi-Willig, supra note 67, at 522 n.7.
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of both women connoted an elevated social status. In addition, "[b]oth Windsor,
who holds a Master's degree from N.Y.U., and Spyer, who has a Ph.D., have
elite pedigrees in terms of education."'142 Beyond the ways Windsor's identity
could be construed as "conforming to society's perceived normative ideal in all
ways except for sexuality,"'143 the financial losses associated with how DOMA
discriminated against her state-recognized marriage on the federal level
(charging her $363,053 in estate taxes) made her "sympathetic." 144 The
combination of these attributes made the conclusion viable that "Edie Windsor
closely hues to the image of homosexuality that has been consciously crafted in
the public sphere." 145 In other words, she appeared respectable and non-
threatening to the mainstream-ostensibly as much "as a non-threatening little
old lady" ever could.'46
In deconstructing the image that Windsor presented, Nourafshan and
Onwuachi-Willig teased out the converging interests established by her
respectable, non-threatening image. Windsor's estate-taxes dispute could be
"highly salient to white elites, both gay and non-gay alike." 14' Her
"respectability-based identity as a lesbian represented a departure from the
stereotype of hyper-sexuality that is often affiliated with or imputed to gay
culture' '148-even though "[i]n truth, Windsor's relationship with Spyer was very
sexual"-and she agreed to avoid discussing her sexuality throughout the case. 149
Windsor's "racial identity as a white woman reified the primacy of whiteness in
the gay community and gay rights movement.' 150 Not to mention, "her identity
as an educated Northerner reinforced notions of sophistication and assimilation
in the gay and lesbian community.' 151 Combined, these attributes "helped to
remove the stigma of otherness (to an extent) and thus enabled broad swaths of
people to identify with her."' 152
. Facilitated by this projection of respectability-and by extension a
projection of respectability of same-sex couples-that convergence of interests
eventually brought about the ruling in Windsor; in part this convergence would
be gleaned from one of Kennedy's key observations that "DOMA singles out a
142. Id.
143. Id. at 523.
144. Id.
145. Id. at 522 n.7.
146. Ariel Levy, The Perfect Wife, NEW YORKER (Sept. 30, 2013), https://www.newyorker.com/
magazine/2013/09/30/the-perfect-wife [https://perma.cc/GCB2-SWN6].
147. Nourafshan & Onwuachi-Willig, supra note 67, at 523.
148. Id.
149. Robinson & Frost, supra note 136, at 224.
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class of persons deemed by a State entitled to recognition and protection to
enhance their own liberty" and "imposes a disability on the class by refusing to
acknowledge a status the State finds to be dignified and proper."' 53 When he
remarks that DOMA's imprimatur to refuse to recognize the same-sex marriages
certain states had already validated was "treating [same-sex couples] as living in
marriages less respected than others," 154 Kennedy appears implicitly to
acknowledge respectability as a crucial reason for overturning DOMA. He seems
to underscore the effect that DOMA had placed on valid state same-sex
marriages compared to opposite-sex marriages on the federal level, noting that
DOMA suggests "[a couple's valid same-sex] marriage is less worthy than the
marriages of others," and as a result "disparage[s]" and "injure[s]" those same-
sex couples who legitimately sought state protections to marry.155 Why deny
federal recognition and unnecessarily demean same-sex couples who seem
respectable enough to be considered sufficiently similar to opposite-sex couples
and who seemingly would not threaten the institution of marriage? The
implication here is that same-sex marriages are like opposite-sex marriages in
terms of worthiness. Worthiness, having been conceived in respectability, ought
to counter perceptions that same-sex couples threatened marriage. Thus, any
mainstream interest to protect marriage against these "worthy," respectable
couples were ameliorated enough for Windsor and other couples to be federally
recognized. In essence, here in Windsor, the interests of same-sex couples and
the dominant status quo sufficiently converged.
D. The Obergefell Couples
1. The Respectability Template
In examining the Obergefell plaintiffs, Cynthia Godsoe has noted that
attorneys' strategies in managing their plaintiffs' "ordinariness" and
"approachability" also hinged on portraying a sense of normality. 156 This
observation is reminiscent of Joshi's reflection that "normalcy" appeared in the
construction of respectability in assimilationist strategies. Indeed, animating
both the selection of the twenty-nine Obergefell plaintiffs and their performance
of attributes, the strategy of being normal was targeted chiefly toward convincing
the status quo that same-sex couples were "just like them" in ways that
maximized and ensured sufficient interest convergence that would render
positive outcomes-using the members of the Court as proxies for the status quo:
153. United States v. Windsor, 570 U.S. 744, 775 (2013).
154. Id.
155. Id.
156. Godsoe, supra note 2, at 136.
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[T]he Supreme Court is mainstream in its own way, composed of nine
individuals from a very narrow slice of the population. Skilled advocates
"play by its rules, and tell the Justices stories they like to hear about
people who remind them of themselves." In other words, plaintiffs
should assimilate to norms that the Justices understand and their lawyers
should play down differences.1 57
The payoff of such persuasive perception-building has some notable
corroboration. As former Chief Justice William Rehnquist has written, "judges
go home at night and read the newspapers or watch the evening news on
television; they talk to their family and friends about current events. Somewhere
'out there'-beyond the walls of the courthouse-run currents and tides of public
opinion which lap at the courthouse door.' 58
In Obergefell, Godsoe observes that the result of such elaborate perception-
building "reveals some deep-rooted assumptions about what a family should
look like and what is an appropriate path to social change.' ' 159 Assimilationist
strategies would likely pave that path. According to Godsoe's research, the
Obergefell plaintiffs were "largely homogenous and non-representative of LGB
families,' 160 and their similarities and attributes can be categorized and compiled
into an archetypal template. Though self-identified as sexual minorities, the
Obergefell plaintiffs appear to Godsoe to share four common traits; they are (1)
typically all-American, (2) asexual, (3) devoted to child-rearing and/or
caregiving, and (4) accidentally political. 161 And despite being framed as
assimilation-based, these four traits ultimately achieve not merely a sense of
assimilation but one of respectability as well.
As a matter of fact, Godsoe's first category of "all-Americanness"
straightforwardly connotes respectability. After all, what does "all-American"
signify if not that which is situated at the pinnacle of mainstream American
society and identity? Consonant with this thought, Godsoe describes "all-
American" as "reflect[ing] a traditional 'Leave it to Beaver' American ideal ' 162
typified by their "overwhelmingly white and middle or upper-middle class 1 63
157. Id. at 140 (emphasis removed) (footnotes omitted) (quoting Dahlia Lithwick, Extreme Makeover:
The Story Behind the Story of Lawrence v. Texas, NEW YORKER (Mar. 4, 2012),
https://www.newyorker.com!magazine/2012/03/12/extreme-makeover-dahlia-lithwick
[https://perma.cc/GEQ3-ER5Z]).
158. William H. Rehnquist, Constitutional Law and Public Opinion, 20 SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 751, 768
(1986). Of course, one ought not to place over-reliance on the "mainstream" characteristics of the
Supreme Court membership either because, as Reva Siegel has observed, changing public opinion
also shaped some of the progress that led to marriage equality in Obergefell. See Reva Siegel,
Community in Conflict: Same-Sex Marriage and Backlash, 64 UCLA L. REV. 1728, 1746-52 (2017).
159. Godsoe, supra note 2, at 140.
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composition that is "starkly different than the gay and lesbian population."'164 In
fact, only five Obergefell plaintiffs are non-white and, out of sixteen couples,
just three are racially mixed. 165 These ratios amongst the Obergefell plaintiffs
are incongruous and unrepresentative of the racial breakdown in the LGBTQ
population as Godsoe reports.' 66 But, as mentioned by Franke, whiteness has its
supremacy in mainstream American culture.'6 7
Moreover, to continue building their all-American features, Godsoe notes
that they "all have eminently respectable jobs."' 68 She illuminates this all-
Americanness using one example of an actual Obergefell plaintiff-couple:
"[T]wo attractive veterinary professors who were recruited because they are 'in
a stable, good relationship,' and are 'likeable' 'homeowners' with respectable
jobs.' ' 169 In other words, using Godsoe's own synonym for all-American, the
Obergefell plaintiffs are more or less "mainstream"' 70°-and they are so because
of their respectability, whether culturally, economically, or both. Some, as she
observes, even exemplified their all-Americanness to the Court through a sense
of patriotism from prior military service. 17 1 From Godsoe's research, this group
of litigants exhibited few features that would personify them readily as "queer";
they did not appear to embody attributes normally associated with sexual
minority life, status, or culture. There were no trans people or HIV-positive
individuals amongst these plaintiffs. 172 Nor did these litigants possess less
seemingly "respectable" jobs, characteristics, or backgrounds that would label
them alternative from the mainstream in some way. 173 They were
overwhelmingly white and privileged, and presented themselves and their
families as "'do[ing] exactly the same things as everyone else does,"",174 or they
considered themselves 'just as boring and crazy and loud as any other
164. Id.
165. Id.
166. See id. at 140-41.
167. Franke, supra note 73, at 251 (quoting Farrow, supra note 108).
168. Godsoe, supra note 2, at 146.
169. Id. at 138 (quoting Joan Biskupic, Two Moms, a Baby and a Legal First for U.S. Gay Marriage,
REUTERS (Apr. 9, 2014, 5:50 AM), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-usa-courts-
samesexmarriage/two-moms-a-baby-and-a-legal-first-for-u-s-gay-marriage-
idUSBREA380B420140409 [https://perma.cc/HP7N-2UD3]).
170. Id. at 145.
171. Id. at 146 ("Twice in the opinion Justice Kennedy applauds plaintiff Ijpe DeKoe, who fought in
Afghanistan, for 'serv[ing] this Nation."').
172. Id.
173. Id. (noting none of the plaintiffs had a criminal history or tattoos).
174. Id. at 147 (quoting 6th Circuit Plaintiffs Stand Strong in Face ofLoss in Court Today, FREEDOM TO
MARRY (Nov. 6, 2014), https://www.freedomtomarry.org/blog/entry/6th-circuit-plaintiffs-stand-
strong-in-face-of-loss-in-court-today3 [https://perina.cc/HR39-VTTN] [hereinafter 6th Circuit
Plaintiffs]).
[Vol. 31.2:249274
Queer Sacrifice in Masterpiece Cakeshop
family."",175 In essence, one can alternatively designate what Godsoe identifies
as "all-American" or "mainstream" in the Obergefell plaintiffs as assimilated,
respectable characteristics. They are respectable because of their projections of
normalcy.
Godsoe also noted that the Obergefell plaintiffs were "asexual" or de-
sexualized 176-meaning that their highly crafted image avoided the stereotypical
notions of gay promiscuity or even reminded the public or the Court of non-
heteronormative sex: "Not one of the many photographs and videos available
online depict a plaintiff kissing his or her partner. Sex is never mentioned.' 77
Instead, their "asexual" images portray monogamous couples comnitted in their
relationships to one another a78 To borrow from Kreis's observations regarding
interest convergence from Lawrence,179 the desexualization of plaintiffs here
likely serves to signal and underscore their non-threatening nature-how the
qualities of their same-sex relationships (which would include aspects of sex and
sexual intimacy) would not threaten the establishment's sense of social order.
One might find irony in the Obergefell attorneys' need to desexualize their
plaintiffs despite the progress already made by the Court in Lawrence to
decriminalize consensual same-sex intimacy-in other words, despite the Court
having perhaps neutralized that threat. 180 Thus, the tactic to desexualize the
Obergefell plaintiffs here would seem overprotective, and overstates the notion
in Lawrence that consensual same-sex sexual activity bore no harm to the
establishment. But that ironic view is shortsighted. First, as with Edith Windsor's
case, respectability required desexualization of the plaintiffs to maintain
sameness and to avoid triggering notions of non-heterosexual sexuality. The
specter of gay or queer sexualities and sexual practices-or worse, the
hypersexual stereotypes of gay men-could still prove destabilizing or
threatening to a heteronormative mainstream. Secondly, the truth about the sex
in controversy in Lawrence itself was that it was unlikely to have met
traditionally heteronormative standards of sex and monogamy. 81 The Lawrence
175. Id. (quoting Amanda Terkel & Christine Conetta, 'Just as Boring and Crazy and Loud as Any Other
Family', HUFFINGTON POST (Apr. 20, 2015), https://www.huffmgtonpost.com/2015/04/20/paul-
campion-randy-johnson n 7057500.html [https://perma.cc/A5CF-SVM9]).
176. Id. at 147-48.
177. Id. at 148.
178. Id. at 147-48
179. Kreis, supra note 119, at 149.
180. See Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 566-79 (2003) (refuting moralizing notions against same-sex
intimacy).
181. See Godsoe, supra note 2, at 145 ("By keeping the true story of Lawrence and Garner hidden,
lawyers gave the Court a tabula rasa upon which to inscribe its vision of sex and relationships-
monogamous, committed, and private.") (citing Katherine Franke, Public Sex, Same-Sex Marriage,
and the Afterlife of Homophobia, in PETITE MORT: RECOLLECTIONS OF A QUEER PUBLIC 156, 157
(Carlos Motta & Joshua Lubin-Levy eds., 2011).
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litigants involved were likely not a committed couple,' 82 and, as Franke has
pointed out, the idea of sex in Lawrence was "domesticated" or hetero-
normalized to some degree by Justice Kennedy's handling of the sodomy issue,
which underscored that "[h]eterosexual relationships remain the normative
baseline for considering which rights [sexual minorities] might enjoy. ' 183 Thus,
in Obergefell, the plaintiffs had to avoid triggering such perceptions by
appearing asexual or sterile enough for sex to be categorically ignored. 84 All in
all, the prophylactic move to desexualize the Obergefell plaintiffs seemed aimed
at minimizing any indication of threat to the mainstream social order in exchange
for respectability.
According to Godsoe, the Obergefell plaintiffs were also engaged in child-
rearing at a degree much higher than statistics for the sexual minority population
or, if they did not have children, were often engaged in caretaking
responsibilities for their partners or parents. 185 Godsoe observed that caregiving
"not only further desexualizes LGB relationships, but also entrenches the
privatization of dependency, exempting the state from responsibility for
supporting the disabled and children."'1 86 Not only does caregiving facilitate the
"reward" for receiving legal recognition of marriage, as Godsoe describes,187 but
the use of child-rearing and caregiving also aligns the interests of sexual
minorities with the establishment by again minimizing same-sex relationships as
non-threatening and appearing to uphold mainstream values of child-rearing and
family 188-hinting at the societal worthiness attributed to respectability. Here,
one is reminded of a quote from House of Cards: "Everyone can get behind
children.",189 This suggestion remains even if the Obergefell plaintiffs overstated
the prevalence of child-rearing amongst the sexual minority population.
1 90
Finally, Godsoe perceives Obergefell plaintiffs as political outsiders, calling
them "Accidental Activists." '19' Indeed, "[t]he final ingredient in the perfect
182. See Dale Carpenter, The Unknown Past ofLawrence v. Texas, 102 MICH. L. REv. 1464, 1478 (2004)
(raising the possibility that "Lawrence and Garner may have been occasional sexual partners, but
were not in a long-term, committed relationship when they were arrested").
183. Katherine M. Franke, The Domesticated Liberty ofLawrence v. Texas, 104 COLUM. L. REV. 1399,
1419 (2004).
184. Godsoe, supra note 2, at 147-48.
185. Id. at 149.
186. Id. at 150.
187. Id.
188. See, e.g., Suzanna Danuta Waiters, Breaking Up Is Hard to Do: Comments on Martha Fineman 's
Cracking the Foundational Myths: Independence, Autonomy, and Se If-Sufficiency, 8 AM. U. J.
GENDER SOC. POL'Y & L. 205, 206 (2000) (describing the rise of the concept of "family values" as
a heterocentric position against progress in gay and feminist rights).
189. House of Cards: Chapter 1 (Netflix Feb. 1, 2013).
190. Godsoe, supra note 2, at 149.
191. Id. at 150.
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plaintiff [in Obergefell] is a disdain for politics. The Obergefell plaintiffs have
been cast as 'ordinary' folks who just happened to get involved."'192 They claim
not to be "activists"; rather, they are interested in their private existence.1 93 Yet,
their apolitical nature seems disingenuous to Godsoe, who notes their public
involvement with the press, appearances at advocacy events, contributions to the
media, and attendance at Supreme Court arguments once they were selected as
plaintiffs. 194 Again, the "apolitical" narratives seem directed at lessening any
militant or "activist" connotations and perhaps both adding to their non-
threatening personas and respectability.
Godsoe's intricate scholarship on the Obergefell plaintiffs details motivated
interest convergence that underscores the reason why attorneys opted for
respectability branding-one that complements and proves on a litigative scale
Franke's remark about the collateral rebranding of the gay identity by the
movement's focus on obtaining marriage equality. 195 Franke's observations
about respectability in the marriage litigation also match Godsoe's on
Obergefell. What the public sees is that
[t]he homosexual portrayed in these filings is the soccer mom, the
partner who is a good provider, the loving father, the de-facto daughter-
in-law, and the fellow who attends stamp-collecting conventions. The
legitimate homosexual is he or she who is willing to keep quiet about
the sex part of homosexual. 196
What Godsoe uncovers in her study also reflects Franke's observations regarding
respectability in the marriage movement-that success has hinged upon
respectability. 197
2. Interest Convergence and Respectability
Ultimately, respectability politics, as demonstrated by the Obergefell
plaintiffs, accesses the same interest-convergence mechanism as Windsor.198
Identifying marriage as the "keystone of our social order," Kennedy eventually
extended the right to marry to same-sex couples. 199 This extension was
192. Id.
193. Id. at 151 (quoting Same Sex Marriage Plaintiffs Share Stories ofLove, Life, Death, DETROIT NEWS
(Apr. 22, 2015, 11:49 PM ET), https://www.detroitnews.com/story/news/politics/2015/04/22/sex-
marriage-plaintiffs-stories-love-life/26222099 [https://perma.cc/Q4KB-93KZ].
194. Id. at 151-52 ("They protest too much.").
195. Franke, supra note 73, at 247.
196. Franke, supra note 181, at 159.
197. Franke, supra note 73, at 249.
198. See, e.g., Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584,2601-02 (2015) (discussing reasons why "the right
of same-sex couples to marry that is part of the liberty promised by the Fourteenth Amendment is
derived, too, from that Amendment's guarantee of the equal protection of the laws").
199. Id. at 2601.
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accomplished, in part, by the Obergefell plaintiffs' performative display of
specific respectable attributes. In turn, once the plaintiffs' respectable identities
were established, respectability facilitated sufficient interest convergence and
ultimately accessed Kennedy's dignity jurisprudence. It is through such interest
convergence, built up by respectability politics, that the transitive connection
between assimilationist strategies in marriage and Kennedy's dignity
jurisprudence emerges.
In Obergefell, much of the descriptive and historical portions of Kennedy's
majority opinion-the sections that eventually tee up to his fundamental-rights
rationale-demonstrates his acceptance of the assimilated and respectable vision
of same-sex couples. First, his aim, as he reveals at the beginning of the
decision's second section, seems to involve countering mainstream sentiments
that "it would demean a timeless institution if the concept and lawful status of
marriage were extended to two persons of the same sex." 20 0 In effect, he
explicitly references the establishment's interest in protecting marriage from
threats of institutional sullying, pointing out that some in the mainstream still
view same-sex couples as an indecent threat in this way-perhaps a threat of ill-
repute that respectability could fix. Likely, in what Nan Hunter deems "cultural
interest convergence,""2 1 Kennedy first draws portrayals of some of the plaintiffs
vying for the legal recognition of marriage to rebut mainstream notions that
same-sex couples were perceived threats to marriage. 202 He attempts to
humanize them, but does so on respectable terms. Plaintiff Jim Obergefell is the
committed and tireless caretaker of an ailing husband.20 3 April DeBoer and Jayne
Rowse, committed in a long-term relationship, are nurses who have fostered and
adopted abandoned infants. 204 Ijpe DeKoe, who married Thomas Kostura
outside their home state, had served in the military in Afghanistan for a year and
is in the Army Reserves full time.20 5 In brief but notable terms, Kennedy draws
out features such as their careers, their military affiliations, their dutiful
caretaking, their devotion to children, and their commitment to and love for their
respective spouses-features that Godsoe later flags in her archetype-as
proxies of who these litigants are: respectable same-sex couples who embody the
same characteristics of outstanding, exemplary heterosexual citizens and who
would not threaten or "demean" the institution of marriage. In fact, they are
respectable and normal enough that perhaps they would even fortify marriage.
Kennedy notes, "[t]heir stories reveal that they seek not to denigrate marriage
200. Id. at 2594.
201. Hunter, supra note 72, at 1721-25.
202. Obergefell, 135 S. Ct. at 2594.
203. Id.
204. Id. at 2595.
205. Id.
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but rather to live their lives, or honor their spouses' memory, joined by its
bond. , 206
Because of their respectability, Kennedy intimates that excluding these
couples from marriage inflicted stigma and harm. With sincere and heart-
wrenching flair, Kennedy describes the lengths to which Obergefell and his
husband John Arthur had to go in order to obtain their out-of-state marriage
because their home state of Ohio would not recognize them. 207 Arthur's
amyotrophic lateral sclerosis made it difficult for the couple to wed anywhere
else but on a medical transport plane on a Baltimore tarmac.20 8 But after Arthur's
death, Obergefell is erased from his deceased husband's death certificate-both
men required on paper to "remain strangers even in death" because Ohio had not
recognized same-sex marriages. 20 9 Likewise, unable to marry and thus legally
adopt together, lesbian couple, DeBoer and Rowse, faced losing their children if
"tragedy [were] to befall" one of them.210 Sergeant DeKoe's military service and
patriotism ought to have leveraged Tennessee's recognition of his marriage to
Kostura in New York state, but instead "their lawful [out-of-state] marriage
[wa]s stripped from them whenever they reside[d] in Tennessee, returning and
disappearing as they travel[ed] across state lines. 211 Invariably, one could gleam
from this section of Obergefell that Kennedy sees the interests of same-sex
couples in obtaining marriage rights as converging with mainstream interests to
protect marriage from denigration. Their respectability lessens any demeaning
threat to marriage, and in fact should signal to society at large their legal and
symbolic need to be protected by marriage. Consequently, the interests of same-
sex couples and the mainstream over marriage seem to align.
Secondly, to further underscore interest convergence, Kennedy finds same-
sex couples respectable in other ways by narrating a transformative history of
gay and lesbians post-World War II. He first notes how society "did not deem
homosexuals to have dignity in their own distinct identity. 212 He mentions that
initially their "just claim to dignity was in conflict with both law and widespread
social conventions ' 213 and referenced laws against sodomy and policies of
sexual orientation discrimination to illustrate.21 4 But a major transition begins,
according to Kennedy, when homosexuality was no longer considered a
206. Id.
207. Id. at 2594-95.
208. Id.
209. Id. at 2595.
210. Id.
211. Id.
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pathology or mental disorder.215 Then, to extend that transformation to more
recent decades, Kennedy narrates that "following substantial cultural and
political developments, same-sex couples began to lead more open and public
lives and to establish families." 216 His statement here could be interpreted as a
subtle reference to assimilation and respectability. First, his observation switches
from focusing on sexual minorities as individuals to same-sex couples. Secondly,
the public visibility of same-sex couples (rather than of LGBTQ individuals) that
he characterizes does not appear as a liberationist gesture of visibility, but is
attenuated by his curious attention to same-sex couples' "establishing
families"--as if during the moment same-sex couples began to live more openly,
they also started having families. In this way, Kennedy draws the line between
same-sex couples and respectability, aligning them with norms of the
mainstream heterosexual status quo. In part, this visibility and embrace of family
seems to suggest, in Kennedy's view, the "shift in public attitudes toward greater
tolerance" of same-sex couples. 21 7 Their open lives did not threaten or transform
mainstream society, but rather embraced it. In its exchange, an important degree
of societal tolerance was begotten.
The significance of Kennedy's historical rendering here again reveals that
respectability is the impetus for social recognition of sexual minorities. The
families that Kennedy mentions same-sex couples were establishing could not
be interpreted in any likely sense other than resembling "good" mainstream ones.
He seems to suggest that same-sex couples were exemplary in this stroke to
become family-oriented. But writing from his position on the Court, as
representing an elite demographic, and addressing the American public, his
description of "establishing families" would not likely have referred to visibly
queer ones. In this way, he implies that same-sex couples appear respectable in
their desires to embrace mainstream values and norms, and as such, their
presence and existence in society is non-threatening-and would be non-
threatening in marriage as well. In fact, at the end of Kennedy's historicism, just
before he reaches the opinion's most significant portion on due process and
dignity, he emphasizes respectability with his recount of why Windsor, the prior
same-sex marriage case, overturned the DOMA: "DOMA . . . impermissibly
disparaged those same-sex couples 'who wanted to affirm their commitment to
one another before their children, their family, their friends, and their
community."21 Again, as with Kennedy's individual portrayals of some of the
Obergefell plaintiffs, he draws on the respectable vision of same-sex couples to




218. Id. at 2597 (quoting United States v. Windsor, 570 U.S. 744, 764 (2013)).
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As a result, revealed in another way in the subtext of Kennedy's opinion, the
interests of same-sex couples in obtaining marriage matches the interests of the
status quo in maintaining marriage's sanctity. Again, respectability prompted
interests to converge.
3. Interest Convergence and Dignity Jurisprudence
Because respectability solicits converging interests by allowing Kennedy to
find same-sex couples non-threatening to marriage, he proceeds in Obergefell to
extend to same-sex couples the right to marry. To accomplish this extension,
Kennedy insists that legal exclusion from marriage discriminates against same-
sex couples. He does so through showing that exclusion harms same-sex couples
by leaving them undignified; in the other words, he shows discriminatory harm
by invoking dignity.
The relationship between the interest convergence that Kennedy seems to
portray in Obergefell and his dignity analysis is significant here. Interest
convergence, by way of respectability, accesses his dignity jurisprudence. In
short, in Kennedy's opinion, the subterranean logic for extending the marriage
right to same-sex couples in Obergefell appears like this: Same-sex couples who
want marriage are respectable and thus non-threatening enough to harm
marriage, which aligns their interests with status-quo interests in protecting
marriage; in this regard, embodying such similarities to opposite-sex couples
through their respectability, same-sex couples deserve legal recognition of
marriage, or otherwise such exclusion leaves them undignified or lacking
dignity.
In Lawrence and Windsor, Kennedy relied on human dignity to demonstrate
that dignitary harms led to discriminatory injury in the realm of criminalized
consensual sex acts and federal recognition of marriage through DOMA.219 As
Kreis, Nourafshan, and Onwuachi-Willig have all noted, interest convergence
has worked in the background of those cases to help reach legal outcomes that
rule in favor of sexual minorities and same-sex couples. 22 ' Here, specifically in
Obergefell, interest convergence--established through the respectable and non-
threatening presence of same-sex couples-allows Kennedy to draw the
inference that exclusion from marriage incites undignified results that prove
discriminatory. In this way, Kennedy's version of human dignity does not
219. Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 567 (2003) ("[A]dults may choose to enter upon this relationship
in the confines of their homes and their own private lives and still retain their dignity as free
persons."); Windsor, 570 U.S. at 775 ("The federal statute is invalid, for no legitimate purpose
overcomes the purpose and effect to disparage and to injure those whom the State, by its marriage
laws, sought to protect in personhood and dignity. By seeking to displace this protection and treating
those persons as living in marriages less respected than others, the federal statute is in violation of
the Fifth Amendment.").
220. Kreis, supra note 119, at 147-53; Nourafshan & Onwuachi-Willig, supra note 67, at 522.
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resemble the Kantian notion of dignity that human worth is inherent and ought
to be respected accordingly.221 Instead, his view of dignity is tied to a view of
dignity supplied by social and political rank and status.222 Respectability, which
is materially preoccupied with status, would seem to be compatible for building
a case that not having the legal right to marry would be unjustifiably undignified
and discriminatorily harmful.
The ascendancy of same-sex couples in respectability and social standing
drawn in Kennedy's short account of gay and lesbian political history in
Obergefell-in short, the realized interest convergence-sets up the dignity crux
of his Fourteenth Amendment analysis. Speaking with the status quo "we,"
Kennedy begins the section with the impetus on recognition: "The nature of
injustice is that we may not always see it in our own times."223 However, "[w]hen
new insight reveals discord between the Constitution's central protections and a
received legal stricture, a claim to liberty must be addressed. ' 224 Such new
insight appears when he applies the four reasons why marriage is considered a
fundamental right to same-sex couples--couples who do not have legal
recognition of marriage but, as he has drawn, resemble opposite-sex couples in
other mainstream and respectable ways adequately enough that they should
receive that right.
First, he discusses implications for personal autonomy in having the choice
to marry. He finds that, because "[t]here is dignity in the bond between two men
or two women who seek to marry and in their autonomy to make such profound
choices," 25 the exclusion from this "right to personal choice regarding
marriage" 226 lessens autonomy but also lessens same-sex couples' commitment
in relationships in comparison to opposite-sex couples.227 Marriage as an option
for committed couples has a dignifying premise; without this choice, same-sex
couples, as respectable and non-threatening as they are, appear to suffer some
profound but implicit sense of injustice represented by unjustified harms to
dignity.
221. See IMMANUEL KANT, THE METAPHYSICS OF MORALS 209 (Mary J. Gregor ed. & trans., Cambridge
Univ. Press 1996) (1797) ("Humanity itself is a dignity; for a human being cannot be used merely
as a means by any human being (either by others or even by himself) but must always be used at the
same time as an end.").
222. See, e.g., Rex D. Glensy, The Right to Dignity, 43 COLUM. HUM. RTS. L. REV. 65, 74 (2011)
(mentioning ancient Roman views of dignity attached to a person's office and rank rather than to
their inherent humanity).
223. Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584, 2598 (2015).
224. Id.




Queer Sacrifice in Masterpiece Cakeshop
Secondly, marriage dignifies the close bond and intimacy of monogamous
couples. 228 Underscoring the "intimate associations" that marriage provided and
protected for couples in Griswold v. Connecticut and Turner v. Safley, Kennedy
asserts that "[t]he right to marry thus dignifies couples who 'wish to define
themselves by their commitment to each other.' ' 229 Marriage dignifies the
commitment and intimate association of couples; and if Kennedy is relying on
the illustration that the same-sex couples possess a redeeming respectability and
their relationships do not pose a threat to marriage, then same-sex couples,
without the right to marry, remain undignified as far as being able to protect their
closeness and privacy. Same-sex couples are left undignified despite their
respectability. Again, interest convergence accesses Kennedy's dignity
jurisprudence.
Kennedy's noted third principle for the fundamental right to marry involves
how marriage protects children and families. The right to marry provides
material security to children and families.230 But marriage dignifies families as
well.231 This principle appears consonant with the Obergefell plaintiffs' heavy
involvement with child-rearing and caretaking, which is in line with their
respectability branding. What is interesting about Kennedy's connection
between the exclusion of marriage and how it leaves same-sex couples
undignified here in terms of family is that, despite their commitments to raising
children, despite interest convergence, Kennedy articulates that the lack of
dignity transfers to the children raised by same-sex couples: "Without the
recognition, stability, and predictability marriage offers, [children of same-sex
couples] suffer the stigma of knowing their families are somehow lesser."232
Even their children would suffer "harm and humiliat[ion].,, 233 This argument
works well to dramatize the stigma of children--that indignity, indeed-if we
can accept the inference that same-sex couples' respectability in raising families
with conscious deference to mainstream family values comports with the status
quo's interest to protect marriage. 34 Consequently, interest convergence brings
228. Id. at 2599-2600.
229. Id. at 2600 (quoting United States v. Windsor, 570 U.S. 744, 763 (2013)).
230. Id. at 2600-01.
231. Id. at 2600 (quoting Windsor, 570 U.S. at 772) ("By giving recognition and legal structure to their
parents' relationship, marriage allows [a couple's] children 'to understand the integrity and
closeness of their own family and its concord with other families in their community and in their
daily lives."').
232. Id.
233. Id. at 2601.
234. Kennedy accepts this premise. Indeed, he writes, "As all parties agree, many same-sex couples
provide loving and nurturing homes to their children, whether biological or adopted. And hundreds
of thousands of children are presently being raised by such couples." Id. at 2600. Moreover, adoption
rights for gays and lesbians in certain states "provide[] powerful confirmation from the law itself
that gays and lesbians can create loving, supportive families." Id.
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about another rhetorical effect that raises dignity concerns in same-sex couples'
exclusion from marriage.
Finally, in the last principle discussed, interest convergence again proves
helpful for illustrating same-sex couple's dignitary harms. "[M]arriage is a
keystone of our social order, ' 23 Kennedy writes to depict the status and social
standing marriage afforded couples: "[Wlust as a couple vows to support each
other, so does society pledge to support the couple, offering symbolic recognition
and material benefits to protect and nourish the union."236 Because of its high
regard and its social and material potency, marriage dignifies couples with a
social and legal standing in the most premier fashion. Kennedy recites a litany
of benefits that states attach to marital status to justify his point.237 Through
interest convergence, however, Kennedy observes that same-sex couples are
harmed by the exclusion from this social and legal standing of marriage. He
writes:
There is no difference between same- and opposite-sex couples with
respect to this principle. Yet by virtue of their exclusion from that
institution, same-sex couples are denied the constellation of benefits that
the States have linked to marriage. This harm results in more than just
material burdens. Same-sex couples are consigned to an instability
many opposite-sex couples would deem intolerable in their own lives..
[This exclusion] demeans gays and lesbians for the State to lock them
out of a central institution of the Nation's society.238
Interest convergence, established by respectability, lurks in the background of
Kennedy's observations. Having found same-sex couples non-threatening to
marriage, having found them respectable in the prior sections of his opinion, he
directly notes how similar same-sex couples are to opposite-sex couples in
respect to their relationships and desire to obtain marriage. In this way, interest
convergence, through respectability, draws out that inequality by showing how
exclusion "demeans" same-sex couples-in other words, offends their dignity.
Upon establishing all of this, Kennedy is able to proclaim that "[s]ame-sex
couples, too, may aspire to the transcendent purposes of marriage and seek
fulfillment in its highest meaning."239
Even more so than Windsor, Obergefell demonstrates the line from mere
assimilationist strategies in marriage to respectability branding and finally
interest convergence in the movement's successful achievement of marriage
equality. As Kennedy adopts the respectable vision of same-sex couples in
Obergefell, he also realizes the convergence of interests to allow access to his
235. Id. at 2601.
236. Id.
237. Id.
238. Id. at 2601-02.
239. Id. at 2602.
[Vol. 31.2:249
Queer Sacrifice in Masterpiece Cakeshop
dignity jurisprudence in order to support his Fourteenth Amendment due process
rationale. Thus, the discussion above theorizes the extent to which assimilationist
strategies eventually operated to actualize the doctrinal and constitutional
underpinnings of extending marriage to same-sex couples.
Of course, marriage equality was momentous for same-sex couples because
of the rights and benefits that same-sex couples and their families can receive
through marriage. But because marriage rights were achieved through
assimilationist strategies that eventually aligned interests between respectable
sexual minorities and the establishment, such achievements seem to have more
likely folded same-sex couples into the heteronormative institution of marriage
rather than give same-sex couples more opportunity to transform the institution
in a dynamic way.
Looking at this issue from another angle, then, assimilationist strategies
seem to have produced a limiting effect on successes for sexual minorities on the
whole. What happens when sexual minorities who do not fit the mold of
respectability, who did not possess assimilated characteristics, appear before the
status quo to seek redress of rights? What about qualities of sexual minorities
that show differences that matter in cases of sexual orientation discrimination?
What happens when interests between sexual minorities and the establishment
do not converge? Considered this way, the contours of formal equality from
recent advancement in gay rights seem problematic. 240 The reliance on
respectability within such advances for formal equality for sexual minorities
normatively makes formal equality less than ideal-somewhat pernicious
even-as a form of equality.
This could be seen in the doctrinal limits that sameness arguments and
interest convergence have produced in recent advances at the Supreme Court.
For instance, in Windsor, Kennedy essentially replicated and extended his use of
rationality with bite from Romer.241 While in Obergefell, he extended the right
to marry primarily based on Fourteenth Amendment due process
considerations-reflective of a similar stroke he used in Lawrence-and left a
very thin equality jurisprudence hinged again on due process considerations, not
on any scrutiny analysis. 242 As Kreis remarked about lower district and appellate
240. See, e.g., Nourafshan & Onwuachi-Willig, supra note 67, at 523 ("[l]f associating whiteness and
wealth with homosexuality has in fact helped gays and lesbians make strides toward equality, then
the inverse implication is that the public will not be particularly responsive to concerns that exist for
gays and lesbians of color, especially those who are poor or working class.").
241. See Terri R. Day & Danielle Weatherby, The Case for LGBT Equality: Reviving the Political
Process Doctrine and Repurposing the Dormant Commerce Clause, 81 BROOK. L. REv. 1015, 1048
(2016).
242. See Obergefell, 135 S. Ct. at 2603-05; see also Peter Nicolas, Obergefell's Squandered Potential, 6
CALIF. L. REv. CIR. 137, 139-40 (2015) ("[I]n Obergefell, Justice Kennedy's majority opinion
eschewed class-based equal protection grounds. Instead, the Justice concluded that such laws
interfered with the fundamental right to marry protected by both the Fourteenth Amendment's Due
Process and Equal Protection Clauses." (footnote omitted)).
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court marriage decisions that rendered favorably for same-sex couples, "[f]rom
a judge's perspective, it might very well be considerably difficult to apply a more
exacting level of judicial review to a class of people that appear privileged. 243
Thus, although these decisions produced monumental successes for same-sex
couples, they were also doctrinally limited. None of these cases propelled sexual
orientation into suspect or quasi-suspect terrain. That prospect remained elusive
even after Obergefell' s significant win for marriage proponents.
In that way, assimilation and sameness have a plateauing limit as Bell's
interest-convergence thesis demonstrated: "So long as the interests ofjudges and
White elites remain converged with the interest of the LGBT community due to
a perceived common intersection of identity, and so long as remedies for LGBT
discrimination do not undermine heteronormative interests, LGBT rights will
ultimately prevail. 244 Post-Obergefell, assimilationist strategies have proved to
be an obstacle in future advances for true equality. According to Kreis's take on
interest convergence, gay rights will only prevail so long as interests are aligned
and reparations for discrimination do not disturb the status quo.245 In similar
fashion, Joshi has noted that advances for sexual minorities will stall or regress
if sexual minorities are no longer presented as respectable.2 46 Such a result could
signify that the progress for advancing sexual minorities has stalled since
Obergefell and will likely taper unless a transformative strategy intervenes. As
Part II will show, that stagnancy is apparent in aspects of the Masterpiece
decision.
II. UNALIGNED INTERESTS IN MASTERPIECE
The Masterpiece dispute originated in 2012 when Charlie Craig and David
Mullins, a same-sex couple in Colorado, tried to order a custom-made wedding
cake from Masterpiece Cakeshop and its owner-baker, Jack Phillips. 247 Because
Colorado did not recognize same-sex marriages at the time, Craig and Mullins
had planned to marry lawfully in Massachusetts and then return to Colorado to
celebrate their out-of-state marriage. 248 A custom-ordered wedding cake from
243. Kreis, supra note 119, at 160.
244. Id. at 161.
245. Id. More specifically to Obergefell's effect, Kyle Velte has observed the narrowness of the
Obergefell ruling, noting that "[i]t will not regulate behavior outside of marriage. It will not prohibit
discrimination against LGBT individuals in other contexts." Kyle C. Velte, Obergefell's Expressive
Promise, 6 HOUS. L. REV.: OFF THE REC. 157 (2015).
246. Joshi, supra note 3, at 124 ("[C]oupling dignity with social acceptance is troubling when social
approval becomes the precondition for dignitary claims, or the absence of social approval becomes
an excuse for disregarding dignitary injuries.").
247. Joint Appendix at 110-11, Masterpiece Cakeshop, Ltd. v. Colo. Civil Rights Comm'n, 138 S. Ct.
1719 (2018) (No. 16-111).
248. Id. at 110.
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Phillips's shop would have been part of that celebration.249 Upon hearing that
Craig and Mullins wanted a custom wedding cake for their party, Phillips
refused, and later claimed that baking and selling a cake that celebrated a same-
sex wedding was contrary to his Christian beliefs. 250 Craig and Mullins
subsequently filed a complaint against Phillips and his bakery with the Colorado
Civil Rights Commission (Commission), alleging sexual orientation
discrimination under the public accommodations section of Colorado's Anti-
Discrimination Act (CADA).251 The couple's claim succeeded before the
Commission and Phillips appealed.252 The Colorado Court of Appeals affirmed
the Commission's findings that Phillips had discriminated against Craig and
Mullins. 253 Yet in its 2017-2018 term, the Supreme Court reversed the Court of
Appeal's decision, ruling that the Commission and the appeals court did not
exercise religious neutrality when examining the baker's actions.2 54 The finding
of insufficient religious neutrality allowed the Court to pass on deciding whether
substantively CADA ought to prevail in favor of Craig and Mullins or whether
Phillips's speech and religious exercise rights under the First Amendment were
violated.255 The Court, instead, turned to criticizing the adjudicating processes
below to reset the postures of the case.
2 5 6
A. Queering the Respondents
In contrast to the assimilated, respectable, and mainstream-aligned identities
that the Obergefell couples projected during litigation, the same-sex couple in
Masterpiece did not appear as readily assimilated nor as aligned with mainstream
respectability when they engaged in their legal battles over their allegations of
sexual orientation discrimination. Indeed, it is difficult to envision sameness
arguments when we place Craig and Mullins and their destabilizing sexualities
within the context of queerness that differs from the Obergefell plaintiffs.
Although Craig and Mullins are both racially white and male, they did not share
many of the other "normalized," respectable features of the Obergefell plaintiffs.
They lacked the same perceived socioeconomic respectability. They flaunted
their sexuality in public. They played with androgyny and avoided wearing
conventional clothing to court appearances. They dodged any family-oriented
249. Id. at 110-11.
250. Id. at 111.
251. Id. at 50-52.
252. Masterpiece, 138 S. Ct. at 1723.
253. Id.
254. Id. at 1723-24.
255. Id.
256. Id. at 1724, 1730-31.
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responsibilities of childcare or caretaking and seemed more deliberate in their
activism. In essence, they affirmatively challenged the assimilated image of
normalcy the Obergefell plaintiffs had embodied and curtailed any sameness
arguments to be made for successfully increasing the levels of respectability and
interest convergence. One way to perceive them is that they are "more queer"
than "gay." The notion of "queerness" itself evades a concrete and stabledefinition,257 and it is indeed theoretically less stable than the terms "gay and
lesbian"--which, in recent decades, have taken on more mainstream
associations.258 Unlike "gay and lesbian," the terminology "queer" does not
merely describe sexual practices or demarcate certain traits, features, or
conventions of same-sex lifestyles or practices; instead, whatever features that
embody "queerness" defy such identity-oriented classifications and exist as a
means for "a destabilization of heterosexual hegemony. '259 Applying queerness
to Craig and Mullins's public personas, this observation could affirm and explain
how their sexualities appeared more destabilizing to members of the Supreme
Court than the Obergefell plaintiffs did previously.
One might find Craig and Mullins "more queer" by using Godsoe's
categories for assimilation and respectability to differentiate them from the
Obergefell plaintiffs. Substantially missing from Craig and Mullins' public
personas were characteristics that would have easily fallen within any of
Godsoe's four assimilative archetypal traits of respectability in Obergefell: (1)
projections of all-Americanness; (2) asexuality; (3) child-rearing or caretaking
257. ANNAMARIE JAGOSE, QUEER THEORY: AN INTRODUCTION 3 (1996) ("Broadly speaking, queer
describes those gestures or analytical models which dramatise incoherencies in the allegedly stable
relations between chromosomal sex, gender and sexual desire. Resisting that model of stability-
which claims heterosexuality as its origin, when it is more properly its effect-queer focuses on
mismatches between sex, gender and desire."); see also Llewellyn Joseph Gibbons, Semiotics of the
Scandalous and the Immoral and the Disparaging: Section 2(a) Trademark Law After Lawrence v.
Texas, 9 MARQ. INTELL. PROP. L. REv. 187, 193 n.29 (2005) ("The concept of creating a queer
identity is problematic in queer theory as queerness rejects the identity, assimilationist, exclusionary
politics of the mainstream lesbian and gay civil rights movement.").
258. See Bijal Shah, Gay American "'Deviance: " Using International Comparative Analysis to Argue for
a Free Speech and Establishment Clause Approach to Furthering Gay Marriage in the United
States, 26 WIS. INT'L L.J. 1, 85 n.3 (2008) (describing the differences in the terms "queer," "gay"
and "homosexual": "While a specific definition of 'queer' is difficult, I engage it in the Stychinian
sense of oppositional identities that have developed due to societal resistance to them, within the
general context of sexuality, sexual performance, and sexual relationships-fluid and constructed.
This identity can be found in those who defy heterosexuality, gender choice, and precise definitions
of sexuality, such as homosexuals, the transgendered, the intersexed, genderqueers, and a variety of
others who express and conduct themselves in a distinctly non-heteronormative way. I believe that
the term as I employ it will become easier to understand throughout its usage in this Article. Further,
I also utilize the term "gay" in this paper when referring to a specifically Western history of
mainstream homosexual communities; by "mainstream," I mean as compared to post-modem queer
politics. Finally, I use the word "homosexual" when I am describing someone in the narrow sense
of a person who engages in same-sex sexual relations." (citations omitted)).
259. Darren Rosenblum, Queer Intersectionality and the Failure ofRecent Lesbian and Gay "Victories,"
4 LAW & SEXUALITY 83, 87 (1994).
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obligations; and (4) accidental activism. 260 If Godsoe's four categories are to be
taken at some value for what it means to be gay, assimilated, and respectable-
at least in the Obergefell universe-then under a similar analysis, Craig and
Mullins would stand outside such contours. Consequently, as discussed below,
major aspects of their public personas-their lifestyle, images, dress,
personalities, political motivations, perceived dissociation from family values,
occupations, and the like--destabilized both heteronormative associations of
sexuality and connotations from mainstream gay assimilated culture as well.
From there, the dissonance-generated from their queerness--could quite
possibly be taken as a threat to the status quo's norms regarding sexuality and
respectable minorities. In addition, because Craig and Mullins's CADA
complaint claimed discrimination on the basis of their sexual orientation in the
context of marriage, their respectability could be judged against both respectable
different-sex couples and respectable sexual minorities, as others have noted that
respectability images of gay and lesbians had been constructed both within
relationships and marriage, and beyond.2 61 In both cases, a profound sense of
threat could have provoked the Court's much less sympathetic reaction in
Masterpiece, ultimately deeming the couple unworthy of social and legal
recognition.
1. Not Mainstream All-American
First, the couple here appears less mainstream or "all-American" than the
Obergefell plaintiffs. Neither of them have jobs or careers that would survive a
judgmental, status-driven scrutiny; neither of them have careers comparable to
those held by the Obergefell plaintiffs that Godsoe had termed "eminently
respectable. 262 During the case, only one of the two, Mullins, had professional
employment, and that was as an office manager at a real estate firm rather than
a job that would connote to the status quo membership in a respectable
professional class.26 3 Craig, meanwhile, was not employed despite his interior
design training; during the years of the Masterpiece litigation he had stalled in
launching his career.264 Also, to deviate further from perceived respectability,
Mullins, aside from his day-job as an office manager, admitted to harboring
260. See Godsoe, supra note 2, at 145-52.
261. Joshi, supra note 76, at 421-22; Franke, supra note 73, at 248, 251.
262. Godsoe, supra note 2, at 146 (listing "teachers, nurses, ministers, even soldiers" as the respectable
jobs of Obergefell plaintiffs).
263. Allison Sherry, Afier the Masterpiece Ruling, David Mullins and Charlie Craig Hope to Move On,
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literary ambitions as a poet.265 The couple neither embodied the more stable,
upper-middle-class professional template that Godsoe had identified with the
Obergefell plaintiffs or (extending comparisons further back to Windsor)
possessed the independent wealth or elite education that Edith Windsor and Thea
Spyer had shared. 66 Of course, Craig and Mullins could be millionaires in
private. On the surface, however, their professional and class identities vastly
deviated from the upper-middle-class, "all-American" image of prior marriage-
equality plaintiffs.
Culturally, Craig and Mullins also did not embody "all-American" identities,
nor did they project themselves as "Leave It to Beaver"-types-borrowing from
Godsoe's phraseology. Neither seemed to have served in the military and thus
would lack the easy connotation that service could offer for creating a
conventional sense of patriotism. 267 In their physical appearances, Craig and
Mullins did not exhibit the "gendered" norms of hetero-masculinity typical of a
"Leave It to Beaver," traditionally all-American world. Various media
photographs of the couple during their litigation depicted them adhering less to
a "straightacting," hetero-masculine script. In fact, they often played with gender
expectations with their choices of clothing, hairstyle, and jewelry. 268 For
instance, on the day of the Supreme Court arguments, both Mullins and Craig
stood outside the Supreme Court Building in suits and ties. 269 However,
deviating from traditional dark suits and conservative shirt-and-tie combinations,
Mullins wore a brighter navy blue suit with his shirt and patterned tie, both in
dark purple, while Craig wore an all purple ensemble except for his bright white
tie that stood out vividly along with his stylized hair dyed in platinum
lavender. 270 The couple matched themselves more than they matched their
265. Id.
266. Nourafshan & Onwuachi-Willig, supra note 67, at 522 n.7.
267. See, e.g., Godsoe, supra note 2, at 146 (observing Justice Kennedy's mentions of Iljpe DeKoe's
service in Obergefell opinion).
268. See, e.g., George F. Will, More Wrongs than Rights in Masterpiece Cakeshop Case, DENVER POST
(Dec. 2, 2017, 6:00 PM), https://www.denverpost.com/2017/12/02/more-wrongs-than-rights-in-
masterpiece-cakeshop-case [https://perma.cc/P36J-MA4B] (showing the couple in a straightforward
pose before a white background); see also Sherry, supra note 263 (feauturing a photograph of the
couple in a domestic setting); Lucas Grindley, Owner Says He'd Close Before Selling Wedding Cake
to Gay Couple, ADvoc. (Aug. 2, 2012, 6:40 PM EDT),
https://www.advocate.com/business/2012/08/02/cake-shop-owner-says-he-would-rather-close-sell-
gay-couple-wedding [https://perma.cc/Q927-K23H] (showing an older photo of the couple in which
their choice of clothing, hairstyle, and accessories is eccentric).
269. See, e.g., Lucia Graves, 'This Happens All the Time': Why A Gay Couple Took Their Cake Case to
the Supreme Court, GUARDIAN (Jan. 18, 2018, 1:00 AM EST), https://www.theguardian.com/us-
news/2018/jan/l 8/colorado-cake-shop-case-supreme-court [https://perma.cc/G8WG-SSP9]
(showing a photograph of the Masterpiece couple in front of the Supreme Court).
270. Id.; see also Jeffrey Toobin, Justices Ginsburg and Kagan Ask About the Artistry of Wedding Cakes,
NEW YORKER (Dec. 5, 2017), https://www.newyorker.com/news/daily-comment/justices-ginsburg-
and-kagan-ask-about-the-artistry-of-wedding-cakes [https://perma.cc/7C84-JYX3] (showing the
couple in full in front of the Supreme Court).
[Vol. 31.2:249290
Queer Sacrifice in Masterpiece Cakeshop
attorneys, and would have been easily noticed--deliberately so. By stark
contrast, at the Obergefell oral arguments, Jim Obergefell wore a traditional
black suit paired with a lighted-colored checkered shirt and a matching tie that
was trendy but more conventional.271 More so than the Masterpiece couple, Jim
Obergefell blended in with his attorneys and resembled an "upright" litigant
entering and leaving the most prominent courthouse in the country.
Beyond judicial appearances, the Masterpiece couple's other public image
choices in the media also exhibited their play with traditional masculine
expectations. Often the couple was photographed wearing flashy, ostentatious
clothing and alternative jewelry.272 Instead of keeping a stable sense of physical
appearance, they varied their hair and grooming-especially Mullins who
appeared from one photographical moment to the next altering his hair color and
length, maintaining what some might deem a more "androgynous" look.273
Meanwhile, Craig often sported a sharply-trimmed beard and would seem to be
the less androgynous of the two, but he also changed his hair color from time to
time.274 Compared to traditional, unwavering notions of all-American maleness,
frequent variations in appearances would connote destabilizing "gendered"
characteristics and even personality traits of instability, or a lack of sense of self.
In contrast with the Obergefell plaintiffs, Craig and Mullins projected an image
that suggested they were not doing "exactly the same things as everyone else
does. ' 275 Stereotypically, they seemed more diverse, and less "family-oriented."
In other words, they appeared "alternative," rather than "normal" or
"mainstream"-even "queer" rather than "gay," against the Obergefell
template.276
271. E.g., Michael S. Rosenwald, A Day in Court for Jim Obergefell, the Face of the Historic Gay
Marriage Case, WASH. POST (Apr. 28, 2015), https://www.washingtonpost.com/local/a-day-in-
court-for-jim-obergefell-the-face-of-the-historic-gay-marriage-case/2015/04/28/99a00bdc-eda5-
1 le4-8666-ald756d0218e-story.html [https://perma.cc/9U2G-M27C] (photograph of Jim
Obergefell at the Supreme Court on the day of the arguments).
272. See, e.g., David Crary, Opponents in LGBT Case Agree: It's Not About Wedding Cake, AP NEWS
(Dec. 1, 2017), https://www.apnews.com/b4ef2e38d9bl4l d2ad82df3229a15928
[https://perma.cc/BN9L-ZCJA] (photograph of couple); Allison Sherry, Colorado's Masterpiece
Cakeshop Case Winds Toward A Decision with SCOTUS Arguments, COLO. PUB. RADIO (Dec. 3,
2017), https://www.cpr.org/news/story/colorado-s-masterpiece-cakeshop-case-winds-toward-a-
decision-with-scotus-arguments [https://perma.cc/2XTW-UD44] (photograph of couple).
273. Compare sources cited supra note 272, with Sandhya Somashekhar, Trial Begins in Colorado Same-
Sex Marriage Cake Case, WASH. POST (July 5, 2017, 5:38 AM MST),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/post-nationwp/2015/07/07/trial-begins-in-colorado-same-
sex-marriage-cake-case [https://perma.cc/89ZU-TXEY].
274. E.g., Richard Wolf, Gay Couple, Devout Baker Take Cake Fight to High Court, USA TODAY (Nov.
26, 2017, 1:00 PM ET), https://www.usatoday.com/story/news/politics/2017/11/26/gay-couple-
devout-baker-take-cake-fight-high-court/875305001 [https://perma.cc/75GU-F859].
275. 6th Circuit Plaintiffs, supra note 174.
276. Janet Halley, among other scholars, has offered one illustrative example of the differences between
"gay" and "queer," observing that
gay and queer thought and aims diverge. Each seeks the welfare of a different kind
of sexual subject. A gay-identity approach posits that some people are homosexual
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2. Not Asexual
Secondly, unlike the Obergefell plaintiffs, Craig and Mullins did not obscure
or hide their sexuality. Many of the couple's public photos offered examples of
them not shying away from affectionate gestures that could remind the public of
their same-sex sexual desires or attractions. Often they were photographed in
loving poses-ranging from holding hands 277 and slight, suggestive
embracing 278 all the way to mouth-to-mouth kissing 279-- even kissing on the
steps of the Supreme Court.280 Their photograph in an NBC News feature in
December 2017 depicted them casually but affectionately huddled together in a
public setting-Mullins with his body and legs curled in a loose but upright fetal
position against Craig, who was closely flanked and attentive to cradling
Mullins. 281 Noticeably, Craig's right hand was reaching over the bottom of
Mullins' thighs while his left hand was draped over the space between his own
open legs, covering his genitals.282 Another photograph with Politico showing
the couple kissing seemed to have been done with a bit of provocative intent.283
In addition to their visual displays of same-sex affection, the couple also
discussed their physical affections publicly. In one interview, Mullins even
recounted a personal experience of gay public affection with a previous lover as
both a liberating life event and a moment of personal bravery and pride,
and that the stigma attached to this kind of person should be removed. By contrast, a
queer approach regards the homosexual/heterosexual distinction with skepticism and
even resentment, arguing that it is historically contingent and is itself oppressive.
Janet Halley, Sexuality Harassment, in LEFT LEGALiSM/LEFT CRITIQUE 80, 82 (Wendy Brown &
Janet Halley eds., 2002).
277. See, e.g., US Supreme Court Questiots Bias in 'Gay Wedding Cake' Case, BBC (Dec. 5, 2017),
https://www.bbc.com/news/world-us-canada-42232162 [https://perma.cc/7AAA-BC7Z] (holding
hands).
278. Zod Henry, Why a Gay- Themed Wedding Cake (and What the Supreme CourtSays About It) Matters
to Your Business, INC. (Dec. 8, 2017), https://www.inc.com/zoe-henry/gay-wedding-cake-case-
heads-to-supreme-court.html [https://perma.cc/8UAU-LD2T] (foreheads touching).
279. Josh Gerstein, Trump Administration Sides with Cake Baker in Gay Wedding Legal Fight, POLITICO
(Sept. 7, 2017, 6:33 PM EDT), https://www.politico.com/story/2017/09/07/trump-administration-
gay-rights-supreme-court-242460 [https://perma.cc/SS2G-PQ7T] (kissing).
280. Erin Scott, CHARLIE CRAIG (L) and DAVID MULLINS kiss outside the Supreme Court after oral





image 188455863.html [https://perma.cc/L9RM-3D4Z] (kissing while standing before the Supreme
Court building).
281. Julie Compton, Meet the Couple Behind the Masterpiece Cakeshop Supreme Court Case, NBC
NEWS (Dec. 6, 2017, 11:28 AM MST), https://www.nbcnews.com/feature/nbc-out/meet-couple-
behind-masterpiece-cakeshop-supreme-court-case-n826976 [https://perma.cc/NBR3-2MWQ].
282. Id.
283. Gerstein, supra note 279.
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describing the gesture of intimate handholding in public as "the most normal
thing in the world ' 284 and "the first moment in my life where I presented myself
as unabashedly gay in a public space. '285 In their NBC news interview, the
couple revealed that their decision to marry came during an intimate moment
while "[t]hey were cuddling on their couch. 286 From that statement, one could
facetiously interpret that the entire case of Masterpiece might not have resulted,
but for this one moment of intimacy.
Although public displays of affection between opposite-sex couples are so
frequent as to render them commonplace, if one situated Craig and Mullins's
affectionate gestures back into the hands (and bodies) of a male same-sex couple,
their gestures could have appeared unfamiliar, unnatural, or jarring enough to
some in the mainstream that such displays seemed threatening on several levels.
First, Craig and Mullins's public displays of affection could seem antithetical to
the image of the respectable gay couple that has been built up, for instance, by
the desexualized, assimilated impressions left by the Obergefell plaintiffs. 287
Craig and Mullins's public gestures risked reminding the world of their sexuality
and hinted at consensual intimacy behind closed doors. In that way, their public
displays of affection would have violated the tenets of gay respectability.
According to Joshi, "[l]esbians and gays may produce performances of
respectability as defensive strategies against being sexualized. Respectability
may be a means of stopping their sexuality from becoming a barrier to their
success and happiness or a safe space away from the pain and suffering of
homophobia. 288 In comparison to any notions of assimilation; Craig and
Mullins's public displays of affection could have been interpreted as flaunting-
a heightened reaction of threat even though Lawrence had legally sanctioned
even the most intimate forms of such acts between same-sex couples.
On another level, their affection also had the potential to risk distinguishing
their sex acts from those of opposite-sex couples. The image of two men being
affectionate with each other rather than the image of a man and a woman doing
the same could have triggered responses that distinguished consensual same-sex
intimacy from consensual acts of opposite-sex intimacy: one way to do so would
be by focusing on the latter's procreative agency.289 Such images could also
distinguish consensual same-sex intimacy by triggering stereotypical
284. Eric Shorey & David Reddish, David Mullins & Charlie Craig Stood Against the "Humiliation of




286. Compton, supra note 281.
287. Godsoe, supra note 2, at 14748.
288. Joshi, supra note 76, at 429.
289. E.g., Skinner v. Okla. ex rel. Williamson, 316 U.S. 553, 541.(1942).
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connotations of promiscuity, deviancy, and disease historically associated with
negative, biased opinions of gay sex, particularly those stereotypes that
contributed to the political marginalization of sexual minorities during the AIDS
crisis. 290 As a male same-sex couple rather than an opposite-sex couple, the
ample public images of their affection could have alienated them from
"mainstream" individuals who typically regarded same-sex affection as prurient
or just plain dissonant. Such imagery and affectionate public displays reinforced
their sexuality, enhanced the danger for social distinction, and perhaps even
provoked homophobic reactions. This effect would undo the sameness
arguments within gay assimilationist tactics and engender heteronormative
shaming or disapproval.
3. Not Family-Oriented Caretakers
According to Godsoe, involvement in child-rearing or family caretaking was
the third archetypal characteristic of respectability the Obergefell plaintiffs
displayed.291 By contrast, in the public revelations about their lives, the
Masterpiece plaintiffs made no mention of child-rearing or caretaking of a loved
one-neither Craig or Mullins seemed to have any adopted or biological
children, nor did they seem involved in caretaking of a family member; instead
Craig and Mullins projected the image of a young, mobile couple who traveled,
attended media parties, and were essentially carefree from familial
responsibilities than the same-sex couples in Obergefell.292 Thus, they did not
conform to the image of domestic and family values that the Obergefell plaintiffs
projected.293 In Craig and Mullins's case, their lack of attachment to a domestic,
family-oriented lifestyle left their lives up for alternative interpretations. In
contrast to the effect that caregiving had on further "desexualizing" the
Obergefell plaintiffs and their relationships, the lack of caregiving or child-
rearing here could have had the opposite effect. It suggested that Craig and
Mullins had less domesticated lives and were more easily differentiated from
"respectable" or responsible gay couples who do have children or take care of
sick dependents. They seemed more hedonistic than the Obergefell plaintiffs-
less selfless with their time and resources than gay couples helping to rear
290. MARTHA NUSSBAUM, FROM DISGUST TO HUMANITY: SEXUAL ORIENTATION & THE LAW 5-6
(2010).
291. See Godsoe, supra note 2, at 149.
292. E.g. Chris Johnson, Meet the Gay Couple at the Center of Masterpiece Cakeshop Case, WASH.
BLADE (Nov. 21, 2017, 3:35 PM EST), https://www.washingtonblade.com/2017/11/21/meet-the-
gay-couple-at-the-center-of-the-masterpiece-cakeshop-case [https://perma.cc/L9SL-7TL2]
(mentioning that the couple traveled to Provincetown to get married); see also Red Carpet Fashion,
Picture 21, VH-1 (June 21, 2018) https://www.vh l.com/photos/Owr209/2018-trailblazer-honors-
red-carpet [https://perma.cc/ZFC4-Z6Z9] (showing the couple at the red carpet at a VH-1 event).
293. Godsoe, supra note 2, at 149-50.
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society's next generation or caring for the elderly. Moreover, being childless and
independent disqualifies them from "the reward of caregiving" that has
accompanied marriage equality cases previously. 294 This image had the slippery
effect of making their marriage seem less dignified and less worthy of
recognition.
4. Not Accidental Activists
Lastly, although Craig and Mullins have claimed that they were-as the
Obergefell plaintiffs had been-"accidental activists," 295 they seemed
inconsistent during interviews about just how "accidental" they were. First, they
contradicted their own claims that they had no prior interest in LGBTQ activism.
During interviews, they mentioned that they both "actually tried to avoid politics
when they decided to get married ' 296 and they "were never activists in the gay
rights movement. 297 That seemed more true for Mullins, who claimed he
"considered himself apolitical until the day he and Craig were turned away at
Masterpiece Cakeshop." 298 But in another interview with Craig, it was revealed
that he did harbor some prior activist experiences: "Craig, an alumnus of
University of Wyoming in Laramie, said 15 years ago he was a board member
of a student LGBT group that sought to raise awareness for the Matthew Shepard
Foundation and HIV testing."299 In fact, whether true or not, Craig seemed to
harbor latent motives for activism; early experiences of being ostracized for his
sexuality were "hardships" that eventually "pushed him to fight for himself on
the cake case." 300 Secondly, the act of pursuing a case of sexual orientation
discrimination against Phillips and the bakery intrinsically seemed like a
deliberate gesture of activism. Of course, the slippery slope emerges to interpret
any act of litigation, small or large, as an act of premeditated activism. But the
focus of this category is less on the truth of whether the couple was purposeful
or not in their CADA complaint. The focus, rather, is how militant they could be
seen in the mainstream's eye-given the kind of unconscious bias that exists
against queer individuals, and the negative stereotypes that conflate queer
identities with radical activism.30' Thus, from an establishment perspective, one
could, with some implicit bias, project militancy from the series of events
294. Id. at 150.
295. Id. at 150-52; Sherry, supra note 263.
296. Godsoe, supra note 2, at 150-52.
297. Id.
298. Id.
299. Johnson, suprq note 292.
300. Sherry, supra note 263.
301. See KENti YoSHINO, COVERING: THE HIDDEN ASSAULT ON OUR CIVIL RIGHTS 87-88 (2006)
(mentioning the stereotype of the "gay activist").
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following Phillips's refusal at his bakery. After suffering from the humiliation of
Phillips's refusal, the couple first took their story online to Facebook, "which
quickly went viral worldwide in a couple of days." 30 2 The couple could have
decided to forget the incident with Phillips and ordered their wedding cake from
another bakery. Taking their story to social media instead could have been read
as attention-seeking. The Facebook post led Mullins and Craig to the discovery
that Colorado public accommodations law afforded them recourse.30 3 They got
their wedding cake from another bakery.304 Then the Lambda Legal Defense
Fund and the ACLU became involved in their case.305 According to Mullins,
"[e]ventually, someone at the ACLU found us and we spoke to them, and we
decided to move forward to the complaint .... They sort of helped us file the
paperwork a little bit, and then after that and much discussion on their part, they
decided to take up the case."
30 6
During their Supreme Court litigation, the couple participated very publicly.
Until the decision was rendered, they had given over three hundreds interviews,
including interviews with major news outlets. 30 7 They were honored with the
VH- 1 Trailblazer Award for their "public fight against LGBTQ
discrimination. ' 30 8 Unlike some plaintiffs in prior gay rights cases, such as
Lawrence v. Texas, both Craig and Mullins noticeably attended the oral
arguments at the Supreme Court. 309 While in Washington, D.C. for the
arguments, they made speeches at several rallies 310 and said they felt that "it's
important for people to see us just for the fact of we're standing up for
ourselves." 311 It was by chance that Craig and Mullins experienced
discrimination at the Masterpiece Cakeshop; they had not expected Phillips to
refuse them based on his religious beliefs.312 Some of the facts of the case had
accidental elements. Yet, the couple's subsequent reactions-taking their story
to social media and speaking to major advocacy groups--could suggest
decisiveness in attention-seeking. When pressed in one interview about the state
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of the LGBTQ community beyond their own lawsuit, Mullins remarked with a
keen sense of political acumen, saying:
The three changes I see happening that most inspire me are the
aggressive dismantling of the gender binary, the embrace of
intersectionality, and the push to make sure that marginalized voices,
the voices of transgender individuals, of non-white people, of women,
are not silenced or filtered through the experiences of their cisgender,
white male counterparts.3 13
With less detail, but sharing a similar political tone, Craig responded to the same
question with his analysis about gay visibility, stating:
For a long time the concept of fitting in was really important and for
good reason. Now, that we are becoming more accepted by the public
in general, I see more people embracing their individuality, and showing
that our differences are what make our culture unique. Pride month
gives the necessary visibility to our shared humanity. 314
These seemingly liberationist remarks reflected their admission after the
Supreme Court decision was rendered that "they are lifetime activists now."315
At that point, one could, with an implicitly biased viewpoint, think that the
couple was less "accidental" or reluctant in their activism-or find them
disingenuous if they were to claim to be reluctant or "accidental." They
inadvertently lent an image of willingness in their challenge of sexual orientation
discrimination against them personally and pursued it as part of a comprehensive
political impetus for change. From this, one could surmise that for them the
personal had become political.
B. Preserving the Status Quo
Failing to satisfy each of Godsoe's underscored characteristics of
assimilation likely prevented Craig and Mullins from manifesting the version of
gay assimilation and respectability propagated in the marriage cases.
Consequently, the couple could not avail themselves as readily to the sameness
arguments nor respectability branding that the Obergefell plaintiffs used in
making their collective case for marriage equality. They would have failed to
appear "normal" enough to be recognized or protected within establishment
standards and values. In fact, they would have threatened the idea of what
"normal" entails. Their inability to seem respectable because of their perceived
queerness affected the chances that their interests would substantively align with
313. Shorey & Reddish, supra note 284.
314. Id.
315. Sherry, supra note 263.
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the Court's interests in affirming or protecting the status quo.316 Their queerness
challenged and threatened the status quo precisely through that inability as
minorities to seem respectable under establishment norms. First, their queerness
did not fit the norms of respectability governing gender and sexuality,
socioeconomics, family choices, and minority political participation, and to seek
legal protection under CADA is essentially seeking recognition of their
queerness. Secondly, because Phillips's religious views were involved in the
claim, the couple's request for recognition also directly challenged religious
freedoms and values that the status quo embraces-freedoms and values that
substantively reinforce norms of sexuality and respectability. Thus, on both
levels, Craig and Mullins's lack of respectability weakened any interests within
the mainstream because, rather than seeming respectable and worthy of
recognition, they challenged and threatened the status quo. Accordingly, the
focus of the opinion was heavily on Phillips's religious freedom-and by
extension reinforcing the discriminatory status quo-even when Phillips did not
fit within any religious protections under CADA. Reactions to Craig and Mullins
as threats to the status quo are discussed below, showing that the Court
eventually reinforced its interest in preserving the status quo against any interest
in protecting the couple's queerness.
1. Distancing from Dignity Jurisprudence
Without appearing assimilated, Craig and Mullins were unable to avail
themselves to Kennedy's dignity jurisprudence to the extent that marriage-
equality plaintiffs in Obergefell and Windsor previously had. In Masterpiece,
Craig and Mullins's lack of comparable respectable traits offered fewer
opportunities for the couple to align their interests with those of the status quo.
There was little incentive for the mainstream to recognize and protect the couple.
In this way, this failure of interest convergence led to their exclusion from
Kennedy's dignity paradigm. Unlike Obergefell, where interest convergence
accessed Kennedy's dignity jurisprudence, here the lack of interest convergence
and the perceived threats the couple posed permitted Kennedy to portray them
as rightfully undignified.
First, Kennedy accomplishes this portrayal by virtually committing the
opposite of what he had done in his Obergefell opinion, where he specifically
tried to humanize Jim Obergefell and the other couples. Compared to the way he
had acknowledged sympathetically some of the personal details of select
316. In his study of interest convergence in Lawrence, Kreis argues that the interest convergence that
took place in Lawrence involved a perception that a sequence of threats to heteronormative and
establishment values had been overcome. Kreis, supra note 119, at 147-52. This observation
suggests that challenges involving recognition of sexual minorities would likely involve appeasing
those who wish to defend the status quo.
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Obergefell plaintiffs, here Kennedy avoids mentioning Craig and Mullins's
personal characteristics in any specific and meaningful way. He only mentions
Craig and Mullins minimally, and when he does, it is transactional, to recite
either procedure 317 or relevant facts.318 Such brief passages of acknowledgment
are devoid of any significant, personalizing descriptions. Kennedy refuses to
explore just how being denied a wedding cake as a same-sex couple demeaned
the couple's human dignities. There are no extrapolations of unjustified
indignity-no dramatizations akin to those in Obergefell involving medical
transport planes or missing names on death certificates. 319 Instead, the only
passages that bring up the possibility that sexual orientation discrimination can
result in violating human dignity or stigma are in two brief sections when
Kennedy postulates about gay couples and individuals in the abstract. 320 To
Kennedy, it seems quite possible that gay people can be unjustifiably demeaned
in the marketplace if denied goods and services. 321 But he never applies such
abstractions to Craig and Mullins's sexual orientation discrimination claim.
Thus, Craig and Mullins stand outside of those circumstances. Motivating this
silent denial might be the lack of sameness and respectability in Craig and
Mullins' identities, compared to litigants in the prior gay rights cases-
particularly in the marriage context, even though Craig and Mullins were asking
for an item (a wedding cake) that resides typically and symbolically as the apex
of "respectable" or assimilating purchases for wedded couples. There is nothing
as redeeming or worthy enough about this couple to consider them otherwise.
There is nothing worth mentioning to show that they were unjustifiably
demeaned.
Secondly, not only does Kennedy demonstrate that are they not worthy of
recognition, but even before presenting the issues, Kennedy attempts to insinuate
that what Craig and Mullins had requested from Phillips was somewhat
illegitimate and, as a result, portrayed the couple in a justifiably undignified light.
Beyond reciting that Phillips had denied Craig and Mullins's request for a
custom wedding cake because of his religious views against same-sex marriages,
Kennedy noted separately that Colorado had not recognized same-sex marriages
at the time. 32 2 This observation directs attention off Craig and Mullins' sexual
identities, which CADA protects, and suggests illicit conduct that would
317. Masterpiece Cakeshop, Ltd. v. Colo. Civil Rights Comm'n, 138 S. Ct. 1719, 1723-25 (2018).
318. Id. at 1724.
319. Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584, 2594 (2015).
320. Masterpiece, 138 S. Ct. at 1727-1732.
321. Id. at 1727 (positing that if CADA's religious exemption "were not confined, then a long list of
persons who provide goods and services for marriages and weddings might refuse to do so for gay
persons, thus resulting in a community-wide stigma").
322. Id. at 1723 ("The shop's owner told the couple that he would not create a cake for their wedding
because of his religious opposition to same-sex marriages-marriages the State of Colorado itself
did not recognize at that time.").
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invariably bolster or support Phillips's discriminatory refusal; after all, Craig and
Mullins had been legally married in Massachusetts and were not officially
seeking to be recognized as a married couple in Colorado at the time. 323 The cake
was merely desired for celebrating that occasion.3 24 This slight reference that
Colorado was not a marriage-equality state at the time the couple ordered the
cake from Phillips does not reflect their true intentions; instead it misconstrues
the facts and poses the dubious effect of insinuating that Craig and Mullins were
asking for something from Phillips that they were not legally entitled to and,
under that logic, that Phillips would have been complicit had he agreed to their
cake request. In reality, all they wanted was cake; Craig and Mullins were only
asking Phillips to create a wedding cake to celebrate their legally obtained, out-
of-state marriage. They were not seeking Colorado's recognition of their out-of-
state marriage. Kennedy's factual mischaracterization is one step in denying
Craig and Mullins' dignifying potential. After all, it would seem hard to
dignify--or even sympathize with-individuals who were refused for seeking
something that was illegal. Melissa Murray has theorized that in wedding-vendor
cases, including prior adjudications of Masterpiece, this blurring between
marital and nonmarital statuses has strategic purpose:
For example, a claim for a religious exemption from the operation of
antidiscrimination law may seem more plausible if the believer's
objections concern an institution like marriage, which has religious
underpinnings, rather than objections to homosexuality in general.325
In other words, the blurring takes the emphasis off the illegality and
blameworthiness of Phillips's acts under CADA and shifts the focus to
mischaracterized illegality in the couple's request for a wedding cake to celebrate
their valid out-of-state Massachusetts marriage in Colorado, a state that had not
yet recognized same-sex marriage. Seen in this way, Craig and Mullins, who
would seem to be seeking something illegal in Colorado under Kennedy's
implication here, would not deserve sympathy for harms to their dignity. In fact,
in Kennedy's wrongful portrayal, they would seem rightfully undignified for
appearing to ask Phillips to help recognize them for something that was illegal
at the time.
323. Id. at 1724. In this part of the opinion, Kennedy restates the facts more clearly and accurately than
he did at the beginning of Masterpiece: "Phillips met Charlie Craig and Dave Mullins when they
entered his shop in the summer of 2012. Craig and Mullins were planning to marry. At that time,
Colorado did not recognize same-sex marriages, so the couple planned to wed legally in
Massachusetts and afterwards to host a reception for their family and friends in Denver." Id.
324. Id.
325. Melissa Murray, Accommodating Nonmarriage, 88 S. CAL. L. REv. 661, 662-64 (2015) (emphasis
added). Similarly, Kyle Velte has flagged another literary technique Kennedy deploys in
Masterpiece, which involves his use of the word "difficult" or "difficulties" in describing the baker's
claims. Velte notes that such uses of these adjectives "signals a tacit acceptance that the baker's
argument has met a baseline standard of acceptability and legitimacy." Kyle C. Velte, Postponement
as Precedent 26 (Sept. 5, 2019) (unpublished manuscript) (on file with author).
[Vol. 31.2:249
Queer Sacrifice in Masterpiece Cakeshop
Consequently, Kennedy's rhetorical techniques for dignifying individuals-
and, with that, his entire dignity jurisprudence-evade Craig and Mullins. This
result stands even when their CADA claim for sexual orientation discrimination
had substantive merit, as attested in the lower state forums. If dignity was the
way in which Kennedy illustrated discriminatory harm in prior gay rights cases,
such as Obergefell and Windsor, then Kennedy's refusal to dignify the couple
here is significant. It is possibly intended to lessen any discriminatory levels of
harm the couple suffered when Phillips denied them their custom cake order.
Rather than being just "gay enough" to succeed, Craig and Mullins's queerness
seemed to have broken the boundaries that lie at the core of what assimilationist
strategies have done to essentialize the gay identity. The destabilizing effect of
their queer sexualities undoubtedly clashed with the assimilationist images of
litigants in the marriage-equality cases and probably exceeded the Court's
tolerance of gay identities as well. They just did not garner the type of
respectability for the Court to sympathize fully with their pursuit of formal
equality. Instead, the couple likely threatened the status quo in a way that
prompted Kennedy to ignore their humanity and mischaracterize the facts in
order to portray them in an undignified light.
2. Refraning the Issues
To add to Kennedy's refusal to dignify Craig and Mullins's queerness in the
way he had dignified the gay, assimilated plaintiffs in the marriage cases, to
demonstrate another reaction to the perceived threat that Craig and Mullins
represent, Kennedy also reframes the legal issues from how the claims had been
discussed in prior forums below. The Colorado Court of Appeals had observed
that the dispute involved both Craig and Mullins's rights under CADA and
Phillips's claim that his rights to speech and religious expression were violated,
but then very quickly dismissed Phillips's claim.326 Kennedy, on the other hand,
begins his majority opinion by questioning the weight of Colorado's public
accommodations law and its respect for sexual minorities against a status quo
that finds religious intolerance compelling.327 Then he articulates the issues as a
struggle between of the level of protection for the "rights and dignity of gay
persons who are or wish to be, married but who face discrimination when they
seek goods or services" 328 and "the right of all persons to exercise fundamental
326. See, e.g., Craig v. Masterpiece Cakeshop, Inc., 370 P.3d 272,276 (Colo. Ct. App. 2015). ("This case
juxtaposes the rights of complainants, Charlie Craig and David Mullins, under Colorado's public
accommodations law to obtain a wedding cake to celebrate their same-sex marriage against the rights
of respondents, Masterpiece Cakeshop, Inc., and its owner, Jack C. Phillips, who contend that
requiring them to provide such a wedding cake violates their constitutional rights to freedom of
speech and the free exercise of religion.").
327. Masterpiece, 138 S. Ct. at 1723.
328. Id.
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freedoms under the First Amendment, as applied to the States through the
Fourteenth Amendment." 329 As articulated above, Craig and Mullins are outside
his dignity jurisprudence. From here, it becomes even clearer that the decision
will weigh these competing interests, framed similarly. In recapitulating the
issues thusly, Kennedy also legitimizes and raises the interest in protecting
Phillips's free speech and religious exercise. Indeed, he is focusing on the
interest in preserving the status quo. First, he observes sympathetically that
Phillips's free speech claim is "an instructive example, however, of the
proposition that the application of constitutional freedoms in new contexts can
deepen our understanding of their meaning. '"330 Similarly, Kennedy finds that
"[t]he same difficulties arise in determining whether a baker has a valid free
exercise claim." 331 He alludes to potentially validating Phillips's actions. In
essence, Kennedy's effort to explain why Phillips's claims regarding free speech
and religious exercise might pose a difficulty in this case begins to establish what
will be a plausible deniability that perhaps Phillips's refusal could be
constitutionally protected in light of Craig and Mullins's CADA discrimination
claim, or suggest that he regards Phillips's claims with more urgency than
previous venues had.33 2
By juxtaposing the issues and amplifying Phillips's free speech and religious
exercise claims, Kennedy hints at his potential deference to the status quo--one
that is discriminatory. It seems likely that religious freedoms represent the status
quo's interest in two ways. First, religion is a means or tactic for Kennedy to rely
upon for defending Phillips's actions against challenges of discrimination
because religion is constitutionally protected. Secondly, religion is itself an end
because here Phillips's anti-gay Christian views would affirm certain hegemonic
329. Id.
330. Id. ("One of the difficulties in this case is that the parties disagree as to the extent of the baker's
refusal to provide service. If a baker refused to design a special cake with words or images
celebrating the marriage-for instance, a cake showing words with religious meaning-that might
be different from a refusal to sell any cake at all. In defining whether a baker's creation can be
protected, these details might make a difference.").
331. Id. ("A baker's refusal to attend the wedding to ensure that the cake is cut the right way, or a refusal
to put certain religious words or decorations on the cake, or even a refusal to sell a cake that has
been baked for the public generally but includes certain religious words or symbols on it are just
three examples of possibilities that seem all but endless.").
332. Some social science commentators have identified such plausible deniability from the vantage points
of the status quo as a product of relative positioning and bias in the social hierarchy; in other words,
the dominant power will articulate what it perceives to be an objective approach on an social issue
from its own position atop the hierarchy, and thus more easily consider its own conduct and part in
the issue with the benefit of the doubt and continue to preserve its interests. See JIM SIDANIUS &
FELICIA PRATTO, SOCIAL DOMINANCE: AN INTERGROUP THEORY OF SOCIAL HIERARCHY AND
OPPRESSION 43 (1999) (labeling this phenomenon explicitly as "plausible deniability, or the ability
to practice discrimination, while at the same time denying that any discrimination is actually taking
place"); see also David Simson, Whiteness as Innocence, 96 DENV. L. REv. 635 (2019) (recognizing
this plausible deniability as "whiteness as innocence" in the context of race-conscious remediation).
If such plausible deniability exists within the status quo, then it is probable that this a psychological
vantage point would supplement Bell's theory of interest convergence.
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ideas, norms, and values about sexual orientation that the status quo is willing to
accept and embody. After all, despite marriage equality victories and the
increasing positive image of sexual minorities in mainstream culture in the
handful of years since Lawrence, the status quo has continued to recognize
dominant religious views and sentiments-some that invariably have led to
severe inequalities and legal detriments for sexual minorities and other
marginalized people. 333 Nevertheless, such views have received constitutional
protection. For instance, in the face of legal and political advances for sexual
minorities, many states have enacted religious freedom acts.334 In the same vein,
after Obergefell, some states have relied on religion to motivate and legitimize
bills that restrict restroom use for transgender people.335 And even the Supreme
Court has recently prioritized religion over some aspects of women's
reproductive rights.33 6 Each of these examples shows religion as a means to
challenging political progress for sexual minorities and as a substantive
reflection of status quo norms. In essence, a discriminatory status quo that is
partly validated and perpetuated by religious freedom has received heightened
legal protection, and, from the beginning of Masterpiece, Kennedy raises a
strong interest in preserving that status quo by reframing the issues.
333. The Supreme Court's Dunn v. Ray ruling in the 2018-2019 Term following Masterpiece exemplifies
the status quo's hierarchical priority for Judeo-Christian faiths over other religious faiths. See 139
S. Ct. 661 (2019). In Dunn, officials at an Alabama prison who had previously allowed Christian
chaplains to be present at executions on the request of the death row inmates denied one death row
inmate's request for a Muslim imam to be present at his execution. Id. (Kagan, Ginsburg, Breyer,
and Sotomayor, JJ., dissenting). On final appeal, the Court's majority sided with the prison on a
technicality: the inmate had waited too close to his execution date to file for a stay of execution
pending the merits of a possible discrimination case. Id. (Thomas, J., majority); see also id. (Kagan,
Ginsburg, Breyer, and Sotomayor, JJ., dissenting). The Court denied even when the Eleventh Circuit
Court of Appeals had found that the denial violated the First Amendment's Establishment Clause.
Id. Justice Kagan's dissent criticized the majority's ruling as affirming a preference in religious
denominations. Id. at 661-62. Commentators have found the Court's ruling in Dunn, which relies on
timely procedures, to be questionable in light of the substantive merits of the case. E.g., Leah Litman,
The Substance of the Court's Procedure, TAKE CARE BLOG (Feb. 13, 2019),
https://takecareblog.com/blog/the-substance-of-the-supreme-court-s-procedure
[https://perma.ccV7Y9-98ZH]; Adam Liptak, Justices Allow Execution of Muslim Death Row
Inmate Who Sought Imam, N.Y. TIMEs (Feb. 7, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com
/2019/02/07/us/politics/supreme-court-domineque-ray.html [https://perma.cc/T7PF-C8VW]. In
essence, the Supreme Court's Dunn ruling could be interpreted as exemplifying mainstream bias
toward certain religions.
334. Religious Freedom Acts by State, FINDLAW https://civilrights.fmdlaw.com/discrimination/religious-
freedom-acts-by-state.html [https://perma.cc/K9U8-WWJF].
335. Tom Dart, Transgender 'Bathroom Bill'Leaves Texas Christians Deeply Divided, GUARDIAN (Aug.
6, 2017, 7:00 AM EDT), https://www.theguardian.com/us-news/2017/aug/06/transgender-
bathroom-bill-texas-christians-lgbt-rights [https://perna.cc/N9HV-H6MB].
336. Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2751 (2014).
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3. Weighing the Preservation Interest of the Status Quo
In the second section of his Masterpiece opinion, Kennedy underscores the
primacy of protecting anti-gay religious sentiments, despite a lack of a CADA
exemption for Phillips, and, simultaneously, he marginalizes any incentive to
protect Craig and Mullins's sexual identities from discriminatory harm. Kennedy
accomplishes this in part by articulating how Craig and Mullins came up short
in their dignified respectability. As he states, "[o]ur society has come to the
recognition that gay persons and gay couples cannot be treated as social outcasts
or as inferior in dignity and worth." '337 At first, Kennedy seems consonant with
his recognition of same-sex couples in Obergefell.338 By itself, the statement
seems absolute in terms of protecting sexual minorities. However, Kennedy
immediately qualifies his declaration by writing, "For that reason the laws and
the Constitution can, and in some instances must, protect them in the exercise of
their civil rights. The exercise of their freedom on terms equal to others must be
given great weight and respect by the courts." 33 9 By inserting how the
Constitution "can, and in some instances must" provide sexual minorities with
civil rights protections, he suggests that negotiation exists at setting the level of
interest in which protections of civil rights based on sexual orientation are
given-that there must be situations in which the Constitution has less interest
in affording civil rights protections of sexual minorities even if their freedoms
"on terms equal to others" are subject to "great weight and respect by the
courts. 34° Other commentators have read this passage in the second section of
Masterpiece Cakeshop with greater optimism because, just on these three
sentences alone, one could read a friendly ambiguity in favor of sexual minorities
into Kennedy's statement.341 Such a reading, however, would ignore the series
of further qualifications that follow in which Kennedy raises the importance of
preserving religious views against same-sex marriages: "At the same time, the
religious and philosophical objections to gay marriage are protected views and
in some instances protected forms of expression." 342 Here is where Kennedy
repeats the disparity of interest levels. Like the protection of the civil rights of
337. Masterpiece Cakeshop, Ltd. v. Colo. Civil Rights Comm'n, 138 S. Ct. 1719, 1727 (2018).
338. This opening passage in Masterpiece embodies a sentiment and tone similar to Kennedy's final
section in Obergefell: "As some of the petitioners in these [marriage] cases demonstrate, marriage
embodies a love that may endure even past death .... Their hope is not to be condemned to live in
loneliness, excluded from one of civilization's oldest institutions. They ask for equal dignity in the
eyes of the law. The Constitution grants them that right." Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584,
2608 (2015).
339. Masterpiece, 138 S. Ct. at 1727.
340. Id.
341. E.g., Elizabeth Sepper, More at Stake Than Cake - Dignity in Substance and Process,
SCOTUSBLOG (June 5,2018, 11:23 AM), https://www.scotusblog.com/2018/06/symposium-more-
at-stake-than-cake-dignity-in-substance-and-process [https://perma.cc/BR4T-DQJV].
342. Masterpiece, 138 S. Ct. at 1727.
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sexual minorities, such religious views against marriage equality are not absolute
either. In the commercial context, these views are subject to public
accommodation laws and would not survive so long as such laws are general and
neutrally applicable.343 But he does not critique how CADA itself is not general
and neutrally applicable. There is no direct attack premised on the opinion that
Phillips's bakery ought to have been exempted. He is just weighing the interests.
Constitutionally, despite public accommodations legislation, Kennedy notes
that the law could not compel members of a religious clergy to perform same-
sex wedding ceremonies if doing so clashes with the free exercise of religion.344
In fact, such protections of a clergy member's refusal, based on freedom of
religious exercise, to officiate a same-sex wedding ceremony is so "well
understood in our constitutional order as an exercise of religion" that Kennedy
supposes sexual minorities could subordinate their rights in the face of such
refusal-as "an exercise that gay persons could recognize and accept without
serious diminishment to their own dignity and worth. 34 5 Such an overly
presumptuous observation patronizes and ignores the indignities that sexual
minorities have suffered at the hands of religious exclusion.3 46 Yet again, the
disparity of interest levels exists and is demonstrated by how Kennedy
subordinates the interest of protecting sexual minorities beneath the interest in
religious protections. The passage potentially condones certain acts of religious
animus against sexual minorities, placing exercise of religion over the protection
of non-heteronormative sexual identities. This priority exists despite Kennedy's
observation that protection for free exercise of religion must be "confined"; 347
otherwise, a mass commercial refusal to provide goods and services to sexual
minorities might lead to "a community-wide stigma inconsistent with the history




346. Recent examples include the policy in the Mormon Church of regarding same-sex couples as
apostates and excluding children of such couples from early baptism. See Sarah Pulliam Bailey,
Mormon Church to Exclude Children of Same-Sex Couples from Getting Blessed and Baptized Until
They Are 18, WASH. POST (Nov. 6, 2015, 2:22 PM MST), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news
/acts-of-faith/wp/2015/11/05/mormon-church-to-exclude-children-of-same-sex-couples-from-
getting-blessed-and-baptized-until-they-are-18 [https://perma.cc/VK9Q-DSKJ]. This particular
policy was divisive within Mormon congregations and has since been revoked. See Elizabeth Dias,
Mormon Church to Allow Children ofL. G.B. T. Parents to Be Baptized, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 4, 2019),
https://www.nytimes.com/2019/04/04/us/lds-church-lgbt.html [https://perma.cc/9R73-NSVF].
Another example involved the United Methodist Church's ban on same-sex marriages and LGBTQ
clergy, which has driven a split within the denomination. See Tom Gjelten, After Disagreements
Over LGBTQ Clergy, U.S. Methodists Move Closer to Split, NPR (June 26, 2019, 4:44 PM ET),
https://www.npr.org/201 9/06/26/736344079/u-s-methodists-meet-to-consider-what-comes-next-
after-disagreements-over-lgbt-cl [https://perma.cc/A82S-PXJZ].
347. Masterpiece, 138 S. Ct. at 1727.
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public accommodations., 348 But it also shows that there is enough room for
Phillips to have validly refused Craig and Mullins. In terms of dignity, this
discussion injects a hierarchical limitation: sexual minorities deserve some
constitutional protection based on their dignity, but not enough to surpass some
instances of free religious exercise. This hierarchy resembles the Court's prior
reluctance to raise the lower-level scrutiny analysis of sexual minorities--even
in cases featuring assimilated and socioeconomically privileged plaintiffs, such
as in Windsor-and reveals how the Court actually views sexual orientation as a
protectable trait below other protectable identity traits.34 9 Kennedy seems to
signal that the Masterpiece couple could not confidently use their CADA sexual
orientation discrimination claim to break through to a fuller or higher treatment
of formal equality for civil rights protections of sexual minorities in this federal
forum. Even when Phillips and his bakery clearly did not fall within CADA's
religion exemption, his religious exercise rights conflict and ought to be noted
substantially enough as if he deserved exemption.
We see how Kennedy regards Phillips's rights when he directly examines
Phillips's claim. In examining Phillips's account, Kennedy sides with Phillips on
his distinction that creating a custom-ordered cake for Craig and Mullins would
have used "his artistic skill to make an expressive statement, a wedding
endorsement in [Phillips's] own voice and of his own creation." 35 0 Here,
Kennedy entwines both Phillips's free speech and religious justifications for
refusing Craig and Mullins and finds that "Phillips' dilemma was particularly
understandable given the background and legal principles and administration of
the law in Colorado at that time," since Colorado had not yet recognized same-
sex marriages when Phillips's refusal occurred.351 In fact, Kennedy finds that
there is some force to the argument that the baker was not unreasonable
in deeming it lawful to decline to take an action that he understood to be
an expression of support for their validity when that expression was
contrary to his sincerely held religious beliefs, at least insofar as his
refusal was limited to refusing to create and express a message in
348. Id.
349. According to Kreis, "[t]he false perceptions of the sexual minority community as privileged are not,
at first blush, universally beneficial in the constitutional domain." Kreis, supra note 119, at 160. At
first, this observation seems counterintuitive, given the historical marginalization of sexual
minorities. E.g., Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584,2596 (2015) (discussing the marginalization
of sexual minorities since World War II). However, "[f]rom ajudge's perspective, it might very well
be considerably difficult to apply a more exacting level of judicial review to a class of people that
appear privileged. If judges--even those sympathetic to LGBT constitutional rights-view sexual
minorities through the same lens as Justice Scalia does, applying heightened scrutiny is questionably
justifiable." Kreis, supra note 119, at 160.
350. Masterpiece, 138 S. Ct. at 1728.
351. Id.
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support of gay marriage, even one planned to take place in another
State.352
Kennedy seems to suggest that had Phillips reluctantly agreed to create a cake
for Craig and Mullins, this act would have severely violated a term so personal
to Phillips because of his religious beliefs that the government would need to
take notice. He notes the three William Jack cake cases in which the Colorado
Civil Rights Division found it was lawful for three bakers to have separately
refused creating cakes that bore messages demeaning to sexual minorities or
same-sex marriages 353 and noted that "[a]t the time, state law also afforded
storekeepers some latitude to decline to create specific messages the storekeeper
considered offensive."354 All of his ruminations about the protections of sexual
minorities and exercise of religious freedom culminates in qualifications that
appear as if Kennedy is heavily posturing to preserve what results in the bottom
line regarding Phillips's actions-that ultimately, despite the dignity and worth
the Court has previously given to sexual minorities in the marriage equality cases
and despite how Phillips is not exempted from CADA here, formal equality for
sexual minorities must give way to religious freedom. Essentially, the interest to
protect sexual orientation from discrimination is not on equal footing with the
interest in protecting free exercise of religion. Of course, categorical denial of
services and goods to sexual minorities based on a provider's religious beliefs
would not be condoned; however, as Kennedy recognizes, "Phillips was entitled
to the neutral and respectful consideration of his claims in all the circumstances
of the case." 355 On Phillips's behalf, Kennedy reaches extensively to
comprehend Phillips's moral and religious dilemma, reading the case narrowly
at the expense of diminishing the dignity and worth of Craig and Mullins.
Overall, Kennedy essentially embeds a plausible deniability favoring Phillips's
actions over the dignity of Craig and Mullins's sexual identities. Thus, he heavily
prioritizes the interest in preserving the discriminatory status quo in order to curb
the threat against it.
4. Religious Hostility
In truth, the tension between sexual orientation antidiscrimination and
religious freedom that Kennedy raises, explores, and then seemingly resolves in
favor of Phillips never comes to an actual determination on the merits. Kennedy
never proclaims the doctrinal dividing line between Phillips's religious




355. Id. at 1729.
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sexual identities from discrimination. Masterpiece never overrules CADA. So,
Kennedy's prioritization of the interest in preserving the status quo is never given
binding effect. Within the factual contours of Masterpiece, Kennedy merely
suggests that the interest in preserving the status quo outweighs the interest in
protecting Craig and Mullins's sexual orientation from discrimination. On the
substantive legal merits of Craig and Mullins's discrimination claim, the formal
equality aspects would reach a favorable outcome for the couple. CADA had
stood on the couple's side. Even Kennedy admits that CADA expressly forbids
sexual orientation discrimination in the reaim of public accommodations.
356
Despite this, Kennedy effectuates preservation interest by examining the case
procedurally to reverse the Court of Appeals. He reviews the public hearings on
the matter by the Colorado Civil Rights Commission and reads into the record
religious hostility displayed by members of the Commission sufficient for him
to violate religious neutrality.357 Specifically, Kennedy focuses on remarks that
disparage personal religious beliefs:
At several points during its meeting, commissioners endorsed the view
that religious beliefs cannot legitimately be carried into the public
sphere or commercial domain, implying that religious beliefs and
persons are less than fully welcome in Colorado's business community.
One commissioner suggested that Phillips can believe "what he wants
to believe," but cannot act on his religious beliefs "if he decides to do
business in the state." . . . A few moments later, the commissioner
restated the position: "[I]f a businessman wants to do business in the
state and he's got an issue with the-the law's impacting his personal
belief system, he needs to look at being able to compromise. "358
Although Kennedy admits that such statements could be construed differently,
he finds such comments are "more likely" hostile toward Phillips. 359 He is
convinced of having observed more religious hostility made at a later public
hearing at the Commission that furthered the animosity toward Phillips's
religious views. 360 Kennedy heavy-handedly compounds the Commission's
previous statements he excerpted with a Commission member's quote criticizing
societal uses of religion for advancing discriminatory ends throughout human
history-for instance, justifying slavery or the Holocaust.361 That Commission
member's quote had ended with a personal tone, which Kennedy expressly
356. Id. at 1725.
357. Id. at 1729.
358. Id. (citations omitted).
359. Id. ("[T]hey might be seen as inappropriate and dismissive comments showing lack of due
consideration for Phillips' free exercise rights and the dilemma he faced.").
360. Id. ("On this occasion, another commissioner made specific reference to the previous meeting's
discussion but said far more to disparage Phillips' beliefs.").
361. Id. ("And to me it is one of the most despicable pieces of rhetoric that people can use to-to use
their religious to hurt others.").
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interprets as a disparagement that effectuated the Commission's alleged hostility
to Phillips-that calling his religious views "despicable" and contextualizing
them as rhetoric for advancing discrimination that belittled and dehumanized
such views and actions.362 Although Kennedy does not expressly use "dignity"
rhetoric here in these passages, he employs these remote excerpts from the
Commission's extensive hearings and review to draw conclusions that such
remarks about Phillips's religious views and acts ultimately demeaned Phillips.
All in all, Kennedy surmises that the Commission's remarks had suggested "that
religious beliefs and persons are less than fully welcome in Colorado's business
community"; could be seen as "inappropriate and dismissive comments showing
lack of due consideration for Phillips' free exercise rights and the dilemma he
faced"; and had "disparaged [Phillips's] religion" in ways that characterized it
as "despicable," and "something insubstantial and even insincere."'3 63 Even
without expressly using the word "dignity" here, Kennedy tries to convince us
that the Commission's criticisms and observations of Phillips's "sincerely held
religious beliefs' 364 were a kind of hostility that violated Phillips's personhood
in some waV. Kennedy's repeated characterizations of Phillips's religious
motivations as "sincere" imply that Phillips was being genuine and truthful about
his religious beliefs.365 It also suggests that Phillips's actions against Craig and
Mullins were somehow blameless-that his refusal was somehow naturally
justified because they were backed by "sincere" religious beliefs against same-
sex marriages and that Phillips could not help himself from acting inconsistently
with his beliefs. As such, Kennedy again views Phillips's religiously motivated
actions of sexual orientation discrimination with plausible deniability in favor of
Phillips. Because Phillips's religiously motivated actions are backed by
"sincere" religious beliefs, the Commission's public remarks on record about
Phillips's exercise of religion-and the lack of objections to these remarks at the




365. For instance, Kennedy observes that "[t]he reason and motive for the baker's refusal were based on
his sincere religious beliefs and convictions." Id. at 1723. Kennedy suggests at least a sympathetic
ear when he depicts that "as Phillips would see the case, this contention has a significant First
Amendment speech component and implicates his deep and sincere religious beliefs." Id. at 1728.
In contrast, showing how strongly Kennedy takes up Phillips's side, Kennedy is not as sympathetic
to the Colorado Civil Rights Commission when Phillips's sincere beliefs are seemingly attacked:
"The Civil Rights Commission's treatment of his case has some elements of a clear and
impermissible hostility toward the sincere religious beliefs that motivated his objection." Id. at 1729.
366. Id. 1729-30 ("The record shows no objection to these comments from other commissioners. And the
later state-court ruling reviewing the Commission's decision did not mention those comments, much
less express concern with their content. Nor were the comments by the commissioners disavowed
in the briefs filed in this Court. For these reasons, the Court cannot avoid the conclusion that these
statements cast doubt on the fairness and impartiality of the Commission's adjudication of Phillips'
case. Members of the Court have disagreed on the question whether statements made by lawmakers
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inappropriate, and disparaging to Phillips's personal character. In this way, he
moralizes and nearly essentializes Phillips's religious identity. He dignifies
Phillips. This reasoning pantomimes the kind of dignity rhetoric he had used in
Lawrence, Windsor, and Obergefell to show respectively how anti-sodomy laws,
DOMA, and exclusion from marriage all demeaned the identities of same-sex
couples.367 He ushers in such indication because the type of religious freedom
Phillips subscribes to, after all, is within the dominant status quo. The dignity in
Phillips's religious identity unquestionably exists and so it must be that his
beliefs are "sincere."
This sense that Kennedy is not merely defending Phillips's religious views,
but also Phillips's dignity is furthered by his comparisons between the
Commission's prior decisions in three other Colorado cases where bakers had
refused customers who had requested cakes that would have conveyed
derogatory and hateful messages about same-sex marriages.368 Those bakers had
won their cases and lawfully legitimized their refusals before the Commission
on the basis of conscience. 369 Comparing those cake cases to the present one
before the Court, Kennedy finds that "the Commission's consideration of
Phillips' religious objection did not accord with its treatment of these other
objections., 370 To perpetuate another example that the Commission had shown
religious hostility toward Phillips, Kennedy sides with Phillips's view that "this
disparity in treatment reflected hostility on the part of the Commission toward
his beliefs. 37 1 In doing so, Kennedy implies that the Commission had treated
the conscience-based objections in the other cake cases as legitimate because the
Commission had equated designing a custom cake with derogatory messages as
may properly be taken into account in determining whether a law intentionally discriminates on the
basis of religion.").
367. See Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 567 (2003) ("This, as a general rule, should counsel against
attempts by the State, or a court, to define the meaning of the relationship or to set its boundaries
absent injury to a person or abuse of an institution the law protects. It suffices for us to acknowledge
that adults may choose to enter upon this relationship in the confines of their homes and their own
private lives and still retain their dignity as free persons. When sexuality finds overt expression in
intimate conduct with another person, the conduct can be but one element in a personal bond that is
more enduring."); see also Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584, 2606 (2015) ("There is dignity in
the bond between two men or two women who seek to marry and in their autonomy to make such
profound choices.... ljpe DeKoe and Thomas Kostura now ask whether Tennessee can deny to one
who has served this Nation the basic dignity of recognizing his New York marriage."); United States
v. Windsor, 570 U.S. 744, 772 (2013) ("The principal purpose is to impose inequality, not for other
reasons like governmental efficiency. Responsibilities, as well as rights, enhance the dignity and
integrity of the person. And DOMA contrives to deprive some couples married under the laws of
their State, but not other couples, of both rights and responsibilities. By creating two contradictory
marriage regimes within the same State, DOMA forces same-sex couples to live as married for the
purpose of state law but unmarried for the purpose of federal law, thus diminishing the stability and
predictability of basic personal relations the State has found it proper to acknowledge and protect.").
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an endorsement of that message; meanwhile Kennedy finds that the
Commission's treatment of Phillips's objection and the appellate court's later
disregard of the comparison both ignored a similar logic that baking Craig and
Mullins's cake signified for Phillips as an endorsement of same-sex marriage,
which would violate his religious beliefs.372 One could draw from Kennedy's
comparison that Phillips's compliance with Craig and Mullins's request would
have been such a violation of Phillips's genuine religious sentiments against
same-sex marriage by becoming an endorsement adverse to his own religious
character-and by extension, to his religious identity. In essence, by making that
cake for Craig and Mullins, he would be endorsing something that he did not
believe in-so much so that he could not even go along with it without it
becoming personal. Again, therein lies the hostility, according to Kennedy.3 73
One could argue that Kennedy does not merely defend Phillips's sincerely held
religious beliefs here but also defends Phillips's religious identity.
5. Speciousness and Questions of Motives
Kennedy's religious hostility findings in the Commission's treatment of
Phillips's case become specious and thin when his version of religious hostility
competes with the versions expounded in his colleagues' concurrences and
dissents. Whether the other Justices found lesser, deeper, or no violations of
religious neutrality, disagreement exists over both the Commission's remarks
toward Phillips's religiously motivated refusal and the handling of the William
Jack cake cases on below. Such disagreement calls into question the substance
of Kennedy's findings of religious hostility and illustrates the desperate attempt
to preserve the status quo.
Although in agreement with the majority's overall ruling in Masterpiece that
religious hostility existed in lower proceedings, Justice Kagan, with Justice
Breyer joining, offers a lesser degree of religious hostility in her concurrence.
She suggests that the Commission and the appellate court's regard for the
different results between the Masterpiece case here and the three other Colorado
cake cases was legally justified and not a sign of religious hostility.3 74 In her
view, the different regard between those cake refusals and Phillips's hinged on
factual interpretation: "[I]n refusing that request, the bakers did not single out
Jack because of his religion, but instead treated him the same way they would
have treated anyone else-just as CADA requires. By contrast, the same-sex
couple in this case requested a wedding cake that Phillips would have made for
372. Id. at 1730-31.
373. Id. at 1731.
374. Id. at 1733-34 (Kagan & Breyer, JJ., concurring).
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an opposite-sex couple." 31 Such refusal violated CADA's public
accommodations protections against sexual orientation discrimination.37 6 In that
way, "[t]he different outcomes in the Jack cases and the Phillips case could thus
have been justified by a plain reading and neutral application of Colorado law-
untainted by any bias against a religious belief., 377 Kagan only agrees with
Kennedy's majority that the views and sentiments of the Commission members
at the public hearings were religiously hostile, and thus, her version of religious
hostility-though it exists sufficiently in this case for her to join in the Court's
reversal-seems less severe.
Justice Gorsuch, joined by Justice Alito, concurs by re-examining on his
own terms the Commission's treatment of the other Colorado bakers' refusals in
those three cake cases and Phillips's case. Gorsuch disagrees with Kagan's
interpretation of the cakes. While Kagan had accepted that the cake that Craig
and Mullins had requested from Phillips was a wedding cake, 378 Gorsuch
interprets that what Craig and Mullins had asked for was "a cake celebrating a
same-sex wedding."379 This interpretation allows Gorsuch to read the William
Jack cake cases and Masterpiece similarly and question the Commission's and
appellate court's distinguishing of those cases from Phillips's. If the bakers were
legally allowed to refuse Mr. Jack's requests for cakes that denigrated same-sex
weddings because the messages were morally offensive to the bakers, then
Phillips should have been able to refuse Craig and Mullins's request for a cake
celebrating a same-sex wedding because same-sex marriages were religiously
repugnant to Phillips.380 As Gorsuch sees it, "[i]n both cases, it was the kind of
cake, not the kind of customer, that mattered to the bakers ' 381 and that "[t]he
problem here is that the Commission failed to act neutrally by applying a
consistent legal rule."382 Gorsuch's concurrence heightens that disparity with a
deeper analysis than Kennedy's opinion. But to see the cake as one that
particularly celebrates a same-sex wedding or marriage is problematic and
resembles the "special rights" rhetoric that conservative opponents had lodged
against gay rights movement initiatives in the past.383 In this way, Gorsuch's
deeper analysis engenders more animosity toward the couple than Kennedy's.
375. Id. at 1733.
376. Id.
377. Id.
378. Id. at 1733, n.*.
379. Id. at 1735 (Gorsuch & Alito, JJ., concurring).
380. Id. at 1735-36.
381. Id. at 1736.
382. Id.
383. See generally Erin M. Adam& BetsyL. Cooper, EqualRights vs. SpecialRights: Rights Discourses,
Framing, and Lesbian and Gay Antidiscrimination Policy in Washington State, 42 LAW & SOC.
INQUIRY 830 (2017). Opponents of LGBTQ advancements often use special rights rhetoric to
counter a pro-LGBTQ equal rights framework that proposes that sexual minorities ought to have
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Likewise, Justice Thomas's concurrence, joined by Gorsuch, also seemed to
deepen the religious hostility findings. Unlike Gorsuch or Kagan, his
concurrence focused exclusively on the free speech claim that Kennedy had left
unexplored in the majority opinion. 384 Because Phillips refused Craig and
Mullins on the grounds that he was religiously opposed to same-sex marriage,
his act of refusal, which Thomas analyzes as speech, is invariably entwined with
religion. First, Thomas finds that for Phillips the design and creation of custom
wedding cakes is expressive enough to qualify as speech.385 In addition, Thomas
finds that wedding cakes themselves are highly symbolic, which further
heightens the expressiveness of creating them. 3 86 Thus, the act of creating
wedding cakes for Phillips is an expressive one for speech protection.387 As such,
Thomas regards Craig and Mullins's request as one that asked Phillips to create
a cake for a same-sex wedding and sought endorsement with the couple's
speech-not his.388 Essentially, "[b]y forcing Phillips to create custom wedding
cakes for same-sex weddings, Colorado's public-accommodations law 'alter[s]
the expressive content' of his message." 389 Thomas's rationale here amplifies
Phillips's personal endorsement when he creates a wedding cake---"Colorado is
requiring Phillips to be 'intimately connected' with the couple's speech"-and
thus his First Amendment speech protections arise.39 ° Such speech would be
antithetical to Phillips's religious identity, and Thomas demonstrates this by
drawing out Phillips's religious nature. 39 1 To add this free speech violation to
equal access and treatment within the law, and thus states ought to include sexual minorities in
antidiscrimination laws, protect sexual minorities from hate crimes, and provide legal recognition
of same-sex relationships. Id. at 835-36. In contrast, opponents will often reframe what proponents
of equal rights for sexual minorities as asking for as "special rights" that "tap into fundamental
cultural values concerning individualism and prejudicial views of lesbian, gay, bisexual, and transfer
people" and find that the legal changes in which pro-LGBTQ proponents are seeking are "for more
rights than the average American receives." Id. at 836. In Gorsuch's concurrence here, one could
find the analogy to special rights rhetoric if one views the cake as a cake "for a same-sex wedding,"
rather than as a wedding cake--especially if that view is juxtaposed with the fact that at the time
Craig and Mullins tried to order their cake, Colorado did not recognize same-sex couples in
marriage. Under this problematic logic, the couple would seem to be asking for something more
than what they could get.
384. Masterpiece, 138 S. Ct. at 1740 (Thomas & Gorsuch, JJ., concurring in part & concurring in the
judgment).
385. Id. at 1742.
386. Id. at 1743.
387. Id.
388. Id. at 1743 n.3.
389. Id. at 1743-44.
390. Id. at 1743 n.3.
391. Id. at 1745 ("Phillips routinely sacrifices profits to ensure that Masterpiece operates in a way that
represents his Christian faith. He is not open on Sundays, he pays his employees a higher-than-
average wage, and he loans them money in times of need. Phillips also refuses to bake cakes
containing alcohol, cakes with racist or homophobic messages, cake criticizing God, and cakes
celebrating Halloween--even though Halloween is one of the most lucrative seasons for bakeries.").
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Kennedy's analysis deepens the findings of religious hostility in the majority
opinion.
In her dissent, Justice Ginsburg, joined by Justice Sotomayor, completely
disagrees with her colleagues' finding of religious hostility and would have
affirmed the ruling below that Phillips's refusal amounted to sexual orientation
discrimination against Craig and Mullins.39 2 She contests the majority's finding
of religious hostility.3 93 First, she sides with Kagan's view that the Masterpiece
cake was a wedding cake and not a cake that had special meaning attributed to
the baker, as Gorsuch had read.394 Predictably, Ginsburg's take on the cake leads
to the finding that Kagan had asserted in her comparison between Phillips's
refusal and the refusal of other Colorado bakers of requests to bake cakes with
anti-gay messages: "The different outcomes the Court features do not evidence
hostility to religion of the kind we have previously held to signal a free-exercise
violation." 395 This rendering would contradict one of Kennedy's two reasons for
finding religious hostility. In Ginsburg's opinion, she argues against Gorsuch's
view that the case is about the kind of cake and not the identity of the parties.
Rather, "[w]hat matters is that Phillips would not provide a good or service to a
same-sex couple that he would provide to a heterosexual couple."396 This reading
reveals her perspective that the cake was a wedding cake and not a cake with a
pro-marriage-equality message: "When a couple contacts a bakery for a wedding
cake, the product they are seeking is a cake celebrating their wedding-not a
cake celebrating heterosexual weddings or same-sex weddings-and that is the
service Craig and Mullins were denied. 39 7 The reason for that denial, as
Ginsburg surmises, is Craig and Mullins's sexual orientation.
398
Ginsburg also firmly contradicts Kennedy's other reason for finding
religious hostility, which regarded certain Commission members' remarks as
intolerant of Phillips's religious views. Just as the treatment of the other
Colorado cake cases with Phillips's refusal should not have prompted a reversal
based on religious hostility, "nor do the comments by one or two members of
one of the four decisionmaking entities considering this case justify reversing the
judgment below." 399 In Ginsburg's perspective, "[w]hatever one may think of
the statements in historical context, I see no reason why the comments of one or
two Commissioners should be taken to overcome Phillips' refusal to sell a
392. Id. at 1752 (Ginsburg & Sotomayor, JJ., dissenting).
393. See id. at 1748-49.
394. Id. at 1748 n.1.
395. Id. at 1749.
396. Id. at 1750.
397. Id.
398. Id.
399. Id. at 1749.
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wedding cake to Craig and Mullins."'400 To support her view here, she observes
that the lower proceedings also "involved several layers of independent
decisionmaking, of which the Commission was but one" and narrated four stages
of rulings in Colorado before the case reached the Supreme Court.401 Such layers
of adjudication make Kennedy's findings of religious hostility questionable and
hollow.40 2 According to Ginsburg, even the Court's prior precedent on religious
neutrality, Church ofLukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. Hialeah,4 °3 "implicated a sole
decisionmaking body" and not the kind of proceedings on below in
Masterpiece.40 4 Had she penned the majority ruling, she would have rendered a
completely opposite opinion.
Taken altogether, the differences amongst Masterpiece's majority,
concurring, and dissenting opinions over the existence, intensity, and
nonexistence of religious hostility against Phillips seem to suggest that the
religious hostility issue was a tenuous one to consider. Did religious hostility
exist in both the Commission members' remarks against Phillips's religious
views and how the Commission distinguished Phillips's refusal in Masterpiece
from the bakers' refusals in the William Jack cases, as Kennedy argues in the
majority? Or did religious hostility only exist in the remarks and not in the way
Kennedy or Gorsuch read the Commission's distinguishing of the other cake
cases, as Kagan writes in her concurrence? Did it arise within the free speech
violation as well, as Thomas seems to suggest? Was the religious hostility more
intense and more pernicious than Kennedy's majority suggest, as Gorsuch tries
to demonstrate in his reconciliation of the William Jack cake cases and
Masterpiece? Or did neither the remarks nor the Commission's distinguishing of
the William Jack cake cases from Masterpiece amount to any religious hostility
in the lower proceedings, as Ginsburg tries to assert? There is no consensus here,
revealing that the Court's review of general applicability in Masterpiece is
potentially plausible but could also be misleading. Because of the way in which
differing viewpoints of the concurrences and dissents would recalibrate or
disagree with Kennedy's religious hostility finding, the Court's review of general
applicability could be specious. Of course, when members of the Court disagree,
the specter of speciousness is not always warranted. But in Masterpiece, this
non-consensus does suggest the possibility that the Court majority's rendering
was not quite accurate. Instead it was Kennedy's best argument to make in light
of stronger, more definite facts that sexual orientation discrimination did occur
under CADA when Phillips refused to fulfill Craig and Mullins's request. And
400. Id. at 1751.
401. Id.
402. Id. ("What prejudice infected the determinations of the adjudicators in the case before and after the
Commission? The Court does not say.").
403. 508 U.S. 520 (1993).
404. Masterpiece, 138 S. Ct. at 1751-52.
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that best argument--religious hostility that violates general applicability-is a
contentious and debatable one, at best. That emphatic urgency in Masterpiece to
stick with such a questionable argument as the crux to overturning the prior state
court ruling of sexual orientation discrimination possibly reveals a tension-
even with some of the non-conservative justices-for finding sexual orientation
as a trait worthy of fuller protections, even after Obergefell. Or it could
exemplify the Justices' tension with the kind of sexual minority litigants this time
before the Court. In essence, the Court seems to articulate a higher interest in
preserving a discriminatory status quo over affirming an instance of sexual
orientation antidiscrimination. Sexual orientation as a protectable trait against
discrimination reached some progress in Obergefell but has never achieved the
kind of heightened scrutiny protections that race and gender have received. And
that limited progress is definitely underscored by the interests the Court
anxiously engenders around religious freedom in this sexual orientation
discrimination case.
The instability of the religious hostility argument amongst Justices of the
Masterpiece Court, hence, raises questions of motives. The case's resolution
through Kennedy's majority opinion depends on the Justices' review of the
procedural aspects of the lower proceedings in order to dispense with the task of
determining the couple's sexual orientation discrimination claim under CADA.
That strategic reliance on procedure forecloses any substantive review between
Craig and Mullins's antidiscrimination interests and Phillips's religious freedom
interests-a substantive review that could have sided in favor of the couple as
the Commission and the Court of Appeals exhibited strong findings of
discrimination in their CADA reviews. Not to mention, the Court's review of the
procedures on below is directly related to Phillips's religion--directly attached
to interests in preserving a discriminatory status quo though affirming religious
freedom. Consequently, the Court highlights the interests of status-quo
preservation over protecting sexual minorities-here, sexual minorities who
showed little resemblance to the assimilated, respectable sexual minorities in
Obergefell. Of course, it will be unknown, given the way the Court handled its
decision in Masterpiece, whether Craig and Mullins would have prevailed here
had they exhibited more of the same traits that the plaintiffs from the marriage-
equality cases had exhibited. However, in terms of sexual orientation, one view
remains evident from Masterpiece. When confronted with religion--even in the
context of marriage--queer sexual identities, rather than assimilated ones,
engender much less deference with the Court. In Masterpiece, the Court's
conception of sexual orientation antidiscrimination very likely does not include
protection of less assimilated, less mainstream sexual minorities.
Indeed, the primacy that Kennedy gives to protecting Phillips's exercise of
religion is so paramount that it makes deference to religion seem circuitous and
difficult to critique. After all, acts of discrimination often stem from some form
[Vol. 31.2:249316
Queer Sacrifice in Masterpiece Cakeshop
of harbored animus.4 05 In pinpointing discrimination, drawing such motives help
establish that an act of discrimination occurred. However, because Kennedy
finds that even the Commission's remark about the historical use of religion for
advancing discrimination is one that had tarnished Phillips's religious identity
rather than having served constructively to demonstrate religiously motivated
discrimination, future adjudicating bodies must tread carefully when their fair
and neutral application of laws is prompted in religion cases. Such perspective
on the Court's finding of religious hostility has scholarly support. According to
Leslie Kendrick and Micah Swartzman,
[i]n Masterpiece, the Court mistook the neutral application of civil
rights law for what Justice Scalia once called a "fit of spite." The
Commission's decision to deny Phillips a religious exemption was not
the product of religious hostility, but rather a good faith effort to
interpret and apply CADA, which forbids discrimination on the basis of
sexual orientation in public accommodations. In holding that the
Commission failed to treat Phillips's claims with neutrality and respect,
the Court improperly applied free exercise doctrine to the facts of the
case, finding unconstitutional hostility and intolerance where there were
none.
406
Correspondingly, the effect of Masterpiece, in regard to future application of
neutrality, seems unclear according to John Inazu: "The [Masterpiece Court's]
jurisprudence means that we're going to have state-by-state norms that vary quite
a bit . . about what counts as protections for religious freedom. 4 °7 These
comments and the different versions (or in Ginsburg's case, non-version) of
religious hostility renders Kennedy's finding and use of religious hostility in the
majority opinion shaky. Indirectly, it could exhibit the Court's hasty anxiety to
prioritize the interest in protecting religious freedom within a discriminatory
status quo over the interest in promoting sexual orientation antidiscrimination. It
serves as another possible sign of failure to satisfy the requisite interest
convergence needed for Craig and Mullins's success.
All of this demonstrates the heightened interest the Court has in preserving
a discriminatory status quo in Masterpiece as a reaction to the threats Craig and
Mullins represented. Not only does Kennedy prioritize the interest in protecting
religious freedom over the interest in protecting against sexual orientation
discrimination, but he also demonstrates how paramount the former interest is-
in fact, he reinforces it-when he reverses the sexual orientation discrimination
405. E.g., Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 632 (1996) (discussing how Colorado's Amendment 2 was a
product of animus).
406. Leslie Kendrick & Micah Schwartzman, The Etiquette of Animus, 132 HARV. L. REV. 133, 145
(2018).
407. Tom Gjelten, Court Sees 'Hostility' to Religious Beliefs in Case of Baker and Same-Sex Couple,
NPR (June 5, 2018), https://www.npr.org/2018/06/05/617029562/colorado-bakers-supreme-court-
win-revives-religious-freedom-debate [https://perma.cc/M2V3-46AY].
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ruling on the grounds that the Colorado proceedings did not sufficiently respect
Phillips's "sincere" religious beliefs.4 °8 At the end of the Court's majority
opinion, despite Colorado's interest in protecting sexual orientation
discrimination through CADA and despite the state's adjudicated findings of
sexual orientation discrimination against Craig and Mullins, this interest in
preserving a discriminatory status quo stands strong and towering. But in
reaching that towering height, Kennedy and the concurring Justices seem to have
offered an unsatisfying fimding of religious hostility. It belies a deep, pernicious
sense of queer anxiety against Craig and Mullins fueled by a perception that the
status quo was being threatened.
C. Queer Sacrifice
Speciousness and anxiety in the Court's religious hostility finding leaves a
frustrating regard for Kennedy's opinion. Can such dubious reasoning undo what
had been a strong showing of sexual orientation discrimination under CADA?
Craig and Mullins were refused service and goods because of their sexual
orientation. Phillips was not exempt under CADA's religious exception.
Nevertheless, looking at the case through Derrick Bell's interest-convergence
theory, the ruling makes more sense because, although the law stands thinly, the
motives are clear. Under the Court's perception, Craig and Mullins likely
threatened the status quo.
But if the only conclusion drawn from observing the lack of interest
convergence in Masterpiece is that dominant authorities-i.e., the Supreme
Court-are reluctant to protect unassimilated sexual minorities, then merely
noticing the absence of converging interests would be a limiting feat. The utility
of seeing Bell's interest-convergence theory demonstrated in the context of gay
rights would be constrained as well-and, like the Court's majority decision,
only half-baked. What Masterpiece actually demonstrates is not merely that
Bell's interest-convergence thesis exists in gay movement progression, but also
what Kreis had identified when he applied Bell's interest-convergence thesis as
a predictive model for future gay rights advancements. Kreis had reiterated
Bell's thesis of involuntary sacrifice in the sexual minority context-a theory
Bell called "racial sacrifice" that compliments interest-convergence thesis to
form what Bell referred to as "racial fortuity. ' ' 409 In writing several years before
Obergefell and Masterpiece, Kreis was right to import Bell's racial sacrifice
thesis into the progress of LGBTQ movements then because Masterpiece's
misalignment of interests here-its lack of interest convergence-is an example
408. Masterpiece, 138 S. Ct. at 1731-32 ("[T]he Commission's consideration of Phillips' case was neither
tolerant nor respectful of Phillips' religious beliefs.").
409. Kreis, supra note 119, at 121-22; DERRICK BELL, SILENT COVENANTS: BROWN V. BOARD OF
EDUCATION AND THE UNFULFILLED HOPES FOR RACIAL REFORM 69 (2004).
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of that kind of involuntary sacrifice. Indeed, Masterpiece is an instance of queer
sacrifice.
1. Bell's Theory
For Bell, interest convergence helped clarify why the Court in Brown v.
Board of Education had the opportunity to overturn its previous segregation
holding in Plessy v. Ferguson.410 The theory offered a predictive mechanism for
exploring when dominant powers might accommodate marginalized groups. Yet,
interest convergence is merely one piece of Bell's later theory of racial fortuity.
In the context of that racial fortuity theory, interest convergence is merely one
variable that is complimented by another theory: racial sacrifice. Within the
struggles to overcome racial inequality, Bell defined racial sacrifice as the way
in which "society is always willing to sacrifice the rights of black people in order
to protect important economic or political interests of whites." ' 4 1  Bell later
reiterated racial sacrifice as a predictive moniker-in the inverse logic of interest
convergence-to anticipate when the white dominant power will decide not to
wield their authority for legal and political change that would help advance
interests of marginalized racial groups, such as African-Americans: "Even when
interest-convergence results in an effective racial remedy, that remedy will be
abrogated at the point that policymakers fear the remedial policy is threatening
the superior societal status of whites, particularly those in the middle and upper
classes., 41 2 Both interest convergence and racial sacrifice are "two sides of the
same coin. The two-sided coin, with involuntary racial sacrifice on the one side
and interest-convergent remedies on the other, can be referred to as racial
fortuity. 413 Consequently, Bell conceptualizes the underpinnings of racial
progress through "racial fortuity," which are animated by instances of interest
convergence and racial sacrifice.414 And if one views racial fortuity as the way
American society has achieved racial justice, then one would assume very
pessimistically that racial justice occurs not through "hard-earned entitlement"
but is "pre-ordained" through this mechanism of racial fortuity plotted by
converging interests and racial sacrifice, altemating side-by-side. 415
410. 163 U.S. 537 (1896).
411. Derrick Bell, "Here Come De Judge": The Role of Faith in Progressive Decision-Making, 51
HASTINGS L.J. 1, 8 (1999).
412. BELL, supra note 409, at 69.
413. Id.
414. See Kathleen A. Bergin, Mixed Motives: Regarding Race and Racial Fortuity, 23 CONST.
COMMENT. 271, 274 (2006) (discussing Bell's racial fortuity thesis and noting that"[t]he pace of
racial progress is thus dictated by repetitive cycles of 'racial sacrifice' and moments of 'interest
convergence"').
415. BELL, supra note 409, at 9.
2020]
Yale Journal of Law and Feminism
Bell noticed examples of involuntary racial sacrifice in several American
historical moments. For example, he saw racial sacrifice during the original
drafting of the Constitution when slavery was protected to bolster slave-owner
support for the document.4 16 Bell also considered the Compromise of 1877,
which staved off resurgence of the Civil War, as racial sacrifice at the expense
of the rights of southern blacks.41 7 As a third example, he saw racial sacrifice in
the way that the Court in Plessy constitutionally permitted segregation as a way
to engender white support for existing economic policies that were not favoring
white people.
418
Within the school desegregation era after Brown, Bell adopted the view that
white resistance to desegregation lingered long after the landmark decision,
which affected implementation of desegregation, but that decision itself had left
room for white resistance through its subtle deference to Southern whites.
4 19
Kathleen Bergin, in her study of Bell's racial fortuity theory, concentrates on this
observation as a way that Brown eventually led to racial sacrifice, arguing that
[t]he seeds of racial sacrifice were planted even prior to the
announcement of Brown, when a number of Justices voiced concern
during the Court's judicial conferences for the impact desegregation
would have on Whites. No matter how irrational "prosegregation
emotion," Justice Jackson wrote, "we can hardly deny the existence of
sincerity and passion of those who think that their blood, birth and
lineage are something worthy of protection by separatism." Justice Reed
was even more solicitous, urging the Court to "start with the idea that
there is a large and reasonable body of opinion in various states that
separation of the races is for the benefit of both." The record suggests
that several Justices agreed to strike down segregation on the condition
that Chief Justice Warren draft an opinion that did not require immediate
implementation from the South.420
The passages of the Justices Robert Jackson and Stanley Reed by the Brown
Court bear sharp resemblance to the deference that Kennedy gave in Obergefell
to those who opposed same-sex marriages, whom he characterized as acting "in
good faith" in their religious belief and "reasonable and sincere."' 42 1 In
416. Bell, supra note 411, at 8.
417. Id.
418. Id. at 8-9.
419. See BELL, supra note 409, at 95 (noting Judge Robert Carter's suggestion that "[t]he Court failed to
realize the depth or nature of the problem, and by attempting to regulate the page of desegregation
so as to convey a show of compassion and understanding for the white South, it not only failed to
develop a willingness to comply, but instead aroused the hope that resistance to the constitutional
imperative would succeed"). Judge Carter was a former NAACP General Counsel. Id.
420. Bergin, supra note 414, at 285 (quoting and referencing RICHARD KLUGER, SIMPLE JUSTICE: THE
HISTORY OF BROWN V. BOARD OF EDUCATION AND BLACK AMERICA'S STRUGGLE FOR EQUALITY
693, 698 (2004); and THE SUPREME COURT IN CONFERENCE (1940-1985): THE PRIVATE
DISCUSSIONS BEHIND NEARLY 300 SUPREME COURT DECISIONS 649 (Del Dickson ed., 2001)).
421. Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584, 2594 (2015).
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Masterpiece, sincerely-held religious antipathy toward same-sex marriages
became the focus of defense by the majority.422 In addition, Bergin observes that
in implementing Brown, the Court's "all deliberate speed" standard for schools
to comply with desegregation left some directives unclear, as
[t]he [Brown] decree instructed local school boards to make a "prompt
and reasonable start" towards full desegregation, but district courts
charged with monitoring compliance were never told when
desegregation should begin, when it should end, or what pace of
progress to demand in between. They were instead instructed to move
cautiously and authorized to interrupt a desegregation plan once it began
if circumstances warranted "additional time." The Justices hoped this
cooling off period would induce voluntary compliance from the South,
but only prolonged delay by relinquishing oversight to "the most
recalcitrant judge and the most defiant school board., 423
By analogy, the Obergefell Court mandated marriage equality by state courts,
but left the contours of implementation vague--especially the tensions with
religious freedom-which led to resistance immediately after the decision with
local clerks refusing to issue marriage licenses424 andjudges who tried to disobey
the ruling.4 25
To further hone in on her observation of racial sacrifice in the desegregation
era, Bergin observes that "[i]mmediately after Brown, the Court let stand a series
of district court judgments that distinguished between 'integration' and
'desegregation' by recognizing a right of White school children to avoid
compulsory integration with Blacks." 426 Lower courts followed suit and
eventually "[t]he distinction between 'desegregation' and 'integration'
established in these cases led to the proliferation of 'freedom of choice' plans,
transfer provisions and other measures that maintained actual segregation while
422. E.g., Masterpiece Cakeshop, Ltd. v. Colo. Civil Rights Comm'n, 138 S. Ct. 1719, 1732 (2018)
("While the issues here are difficult to resolve, it must be concluded that the State's interest could
have been weighed against Phillips' sincere religious objections in a way consistent with the
requisite religious neutrality that must be strictly observed. The official expressions of hostility to
religion in some of the commissioners' comments--comments that were not disavowed at the
Commission or by the State at any point in the proceedings that led to affirmance of the order-
were inconsistent with what the Free Exercise Clause requires.").
423. Bergin, supra note 414, at 285 (quoting and referencing Brown v. Board of Educ., 349 U.S. 294,
300 (1955); James E. Pfander, Brown II: Ordinary Remedies for Extraordinary Wrongs, 24 LAW &
INEQUALITY 47, 49-52 (2006); J.W. PELTASON, FIFTY-EIGHT LONELY MEN: SOUTHERN FEDERAL
JUDGES AND SCHOOL DESEGREGATION 55 (1971); and CHARLES J. OGLETREE, ALL DELIBERATE
SPEED: REFLECTIONS ON THE FIRST HALF-CENTURY OFBROWN v. BOARD OFEDUCATION 11 (2004)).
424. E.g., Sheryl Gay Stolberg, Kentucky Clerk Defies Court on Marriage Licenses for Gay Couples,
N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 13, 2015), https://www.nytimes.com/2015/08/14/usikentucky-rowan-county-
same-sex-marriage-licenses-kim-davis.html [https://perma.cc/67RH-XRVE].
425. E.g., Campbell Robertson, Roy Moore, Alabama Judge, Suspended Over Gay Marriage Stance,
N.Y. TIMES (May 6, 2016), https://www.nytimes.com/2016/05/07/us/judge-roy-moore-alabama-
same-sex-marriage.html [https://perma.cc/5ZYV-WXRS].
426. Bergin, supra note 414, at 286.
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purporting to comply with Brown.'A27 Here it is not difficult to draw comparisons
between Bergin's identification of racial sacrifice post-Brown and the Court's
deference to religious beliefs in Obergefell and its use of religious exercise as
leverage to limit sexual orientation antidiscrimination in Masterpiece. Between
Bell and Bergin, these post-Brown observations of racial sacrifice resemble the
homophobic reactions after Obergefell and eventually the ruling in Masterpiece.
2. Queering Bell's Theory in Masterpiece
If one can conclude that interest convergence did occur in Obergefell and in
other gay rights decisions 428-then it is also possible to apply the rest of Bell's
thesis toward interpreting the mechanism of advancements in justice for sexual
minorities. If Obergefell signified interest convergence, then Masterpiece, with
its lack of converging interests, could stand as an example of the kind of
involuntary sacrifice akin to what Bell and Bergin pegged as racial sacrifice post-
Brown-only here perhaps what the Court's decision represents is a moment of
''queer sacrifice."
To reiterate the definition of racial sacrifice, Bell states that "[e]ven when
interest-convergence results in an effective racial remedy, that remedy will be
abrogated at the point that policymakers fear the remedial policy is threatening
the superior societal status of whites, particularly those in the middle and upper
classes. '429 Bell's theory is applicable to Masterpiece. At the start of the case,
the effective remedy available to sexual minorities against sexual orientation
discrimination was Colorado's public accommodations law.4 30 As Kennedy
notes in Masterpiece, CADA's protection of sexual minorities against
discrimination in places of public accommodation was an addition made in 2007
and 2008.431 Prior to this amendment, sexual orientation had lacked CADA
protection. The Colorado state legislature's addition of sexual orientation as a
protected class within its state antidiscrimination law could have been an
instance of interest convergence that resulted in a remedy for protecting sexual
minorities.432 This possible instance of interest convergence could have been
427. Id. at 286 (referencing cases).
428. See Khuu, supra note 3 at 214-24; see also Kreis, supra note 119, at 142-51.
429. BELL, supra note 409, at 69.
430. COLO. REV. STAT. §24-34-605 (2017).
431. Masterpiece, 138 S. Ct. at 1725.
432. A source that narrates the legislative history of CADA's amendment inclusion of "sexual
orientation" in 2008 suggests purposes and reasons beyond merely protecting the civil rights of
sexual minorities for the specific inclusion of "sexual orientation" as a category of protection. At
the forefront of the legislative debate was a concern that not adding "sexual orientation" continued
the perception that Colorado was not a friendly state to sexual minorities. Brief of Colo. Orgs. &
Individuals in Supp. of Respondents 11-14, Masterpiece Cakeshop, Ltd. v. Colo. Civil Rights
Comm'n, 138 S. Ct. 1719 (2018) (No. 16-111). In addition, the legislative negotiations that led up
to the 2008 amendment appeared very mindful of accommodating religious interests while
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facilitated also by the Court's decision in Romer v. Evans in 1996, striking down
Colorado's Amendment 2, which specifically denied protections for sexual
orientation discrimination.433 In addition, since Masterpiece was following the
Court's marriage equality decision in Obergefell, an interpretation could also be
made that interest convergence could have contributed to another effective
remedy for sexual minorities here, even though the facts of Masterpiece predated
the Obergefell decision. The references to Obergefell in the respondents' briefs
could reasonably allow such an inference; Craig and Mullins were trying to use
Obergefell to leverage the outcome of their case.434 Thus, the Court's own
interest convergence in Romer and Obergefell likely influenced the available
relief at this judicial level of review. In other words, the couple had CADA on
their side--especially after the lower proceedings.
From here, it is possible to read into Masterpiece the effect that Craig and
Mullins' less assimilated, less respectable sexual identities had toward producing
the Court's reversal of their successful CADA discrimination claim against the
religious baker, Phillips. Borrowing Bell's description of racial fortuity,
conditions that had been fortuitous for marriage equality and same-sex couples
in the Obergefell case were now changed in Masterpiece.435 As discussed above,
the Masterpiece couple did not embody the assimilated and respectable traits of
the Obergefell plaintiffs and they did not share perceived mainstream American
characteristics or demographics, nor did they seem similar to the justices
themselves. Instead, their queer identities made them more like outsiders to the
American mainstream or elite, as well as to assimilated and respectable gay
populations. Instead of fitting in with perceived heteronormative ideals of family
and gender roles, Craig and Mullins played with androgyny and repeatedly
displayed their sexuality in public for the media to harness. They did not have
family-oriented obligations such as caretaking of children or relatives. When
they ought to have been more politically quiet, they did not relent. They did not
present themselves as having sufficiently respectable jobs or careers. Outside of
traditional dominant ideas about gender, family, and respectability, they
appeared threatening to the heteronormative status quo in ways that the
Obergefell plaintiffs had not. Their perceived nonconformity cost them more
than just cake.
Moreover, their discrimination claim involved religious beliefs that
reaffirmed the dominant, heteronormative status quo-specifically Christian
protecting sexual minorities. Id. at 13-14. These additional reasons suggest that the addition of
"sexual orientation" was not a categorical decision to protect sexual minorities but a compromise
between various converging interests.
433. 517 U.S. 620, 635-36 (1996).
434. Brief for Respondents at 1-2, 42-43, Masterpiece Cakeshop, Ltd. v. Colo. Civil Rights Comm'n,
138 S. Ct. 1719 (2018) (No. 16-111).
435. BELL, supra note 409, at 9.
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beliefs against same-sex marriages held by a deeply religious merchant. In
following Bell's theory of racial sacrifice, it might be possible for queer sacrifice
to take place when the facts present a sexual orientation discrimination suit filed
by a same-sex couple whose destabilizing sexual identities threaten the status
quo more than other assimilated and respectable same-sex couples would.
However, what could seem even more threatening to the Court was how that
sexual orientation discrimination suit by this nonconforming queer couple
directly confronted religion through a moment of Christian antipathy toward
same-sex marriages. This direct confrontation with religion offered the tipping
point to which the Court responded by reversing the appellate court decision
favoring the couple, not by finding fault with the CADA claim itself but through
a questionable finding of religious hostility in the lower proceedings. It could be
that the Court's protection of religion--reflecting its interest in protecting the
heteronormative status quo-was provoked by anxiety over having to protect
queerness under CADA, even if marriage equality legally existed. The reversal
in Masterpiece was likely an abrogation of effective remedies under CADA
because otherwise the use of remedies under CADA would somehow threaten
the dominant group. It would have led to an acknowledgement of queerness.
Accordingly, Masterpiece extends Bell's racial sacrifice theory-but as an
instance of queer sacrifice. If interest convergence has already been observed in
other moments within the LGBTQ movement, then one could plausibly read
instances in which sexual minorities did not prevail, such as Masterpiece, as
moments of queer sacrifice within a similar-perhaps, identical-mechanism of
sexual minority justice akin to Bell's theory of racial fortuity. Here, we have
"queer fortuity" instead of racial fortuity. Precisely in this comparison, examples
of interest convergence and queer sacrifice could also animate advances for
sexual minorities consonant with how Bell's thesis offers specific strategies
against mechanisms of subordination and injustice in the racial justice context.
As much as Part II has shown that Bell's thesis has been appropriate for
explaining Masterpiece, it also serves to guide us forward. Part III will explore
such possibilities.
HI. FORTUITY BEYOND MARRIAGE
At first glance, the Masterpiece decision ought to engender various levels of
pessimism for sexual minorities in the post-marriage-equality era. From Part i's
discussion, the decision reveals significant limits with the level of formal legal
equality that assimilated same-sex couples had received in Obergefell.
Masterpiece illustrates the constraints of both marriage rights and sameness
arguments, and exhibits the lengths to which the Court will go to preserve a
discriminatory status quo in the face of protecting sexual minorities who appear
less mainstream. This was the result even when Craig and Mullins had an
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effective and probable legal remedy under CADA. Commentators have drawn
multiple conclusions about the case depending on each commentator's level of
pessimism. Some regard the decision as narrow; others disagree. 436 But by
applying Bell's theory, this Article has argued that Masterpiece is a setback for
the gay movement-a movement that has, in considerable parts, shifted away
from employing grassroots liberationist tactics pinned on transforming existing
hegemony to more assimilative strategies rooted in identity politics and single-
issue causes that are often more salient to what matters to the elite-tier
demographic of the sexual minority population.
A. Changed Conditions
As the Court's reversal of Craig and Mullins's CADA discrimination claim
has perhaps shown, so long as the kind of sexual minorities seeking remedial
protection under antidiscrimination laws seem to pose a threat to the status quo,
the interest in protecting them is less likely to align with dominant interests than
when the litigants seemed more assimilated and respectable. As a result, the
status quo will be preserved if a solution to do so exists. In Masterpiece, that
solution involved prioritizing an already-existing aspect of the dominant status
quo: anti-gay religious belief. As an instance of queer sacrifice, the Court used
religious freedom to undo the substance of Craig and Mullins's public
accommodations claim of sexual orientation discrimination, while affirming
Phillips's right to refuse because of his religious beliefs.
Masterpiece's legal contours, of course, beg the question of how sexual
orientation antidiscrimination claims at the Court might succeed in the future. A
few weeks after releasing the decision, Justice Kennedy, the swing vote and
author of previous gay rights decisions, as well as the author of Masterpiece's
majority opinion here, retired from the Court's membership. 411 With his
retirement, the new composition of the Court tips ever more socially and
politically conservative, thus becoming a more challenging forum for sexual
minorities.4 38 Even if antidiscrimination legislation that protects sexual identity
436. Compare Amy Howe, Court Rules (Narrowly) for Baker in Same-Sex-Wedding-Cake Case,
SCOTUSBLOG (June 4, 2018, 4:07 PM), https://www.scotusblog.com/2018/06/opinion-analysis-
court-rules-narrowly-for-baker-in-same-sex-wedding-cake-case [https ://perma.cc/BC6J-ZVZJ],
with Douglas Laycock & Thomas Berg, Masterpiece Cakeshop--Not as Narrow as May First
Appear, SCOTUSBLOG (June 5, 2018, 3:48 PM),
https://www.scotusblog.com/2018/06/symposium-masterpiece-cakeshop-not-as-narrow-as-may-
first-appear [https://perma.ccVC9E-EPL2].
437. Michael D. Shear, Supreme Court JusticeAnthony Kennedy WillRetire, N.Y. TIMES (June 27,2018),
https://www.nytimes.com/2018/06/27/us/politics/anthony-kennedy-retire-supreme-court.html
[https://perma.cc/VHS7-3LJU].
438. Adam Liptak, Confirming Kavanaugh: A Triumph for Conservatives, but a Blow to the Court's
Image, N.Y. TIES (Oct. 6, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/10/06/us/politics/conservative-
supreme-court-kavanaugh.html [https://perma.cciY7S9-WWXN].
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were to pass federally, such as the proposed Equality Act, 439 what would prevent
the Court from denying an otherwise valid instance of sexual orientation
discrimination if the interests in upholding such protection failed to converge
with the interests in status quo protection? Given what occurred in Masterpiece,
what could prompt the Court not to commit other moments of queer sacrifice in
future cases? In the Supreme Court's 2019-2020 term, the consolidated Title VII
cases, Altitude Express, Inc. v. Zarda and Bostock v. Clayton City Board of
Commissioners, in which gay plaintiffs confront acts of employment
discrimination based on sex discrimination, seem particularly challenging in
some instances.440 First, unlike the antidiscrimination law that Craig and Mullins
relied upon in Masterpiece, Title VH of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 does not
explicitly protect sexual orientation,4 41 even though some-including the lower
decision in Zarda-have argued that it does if one relies on a sex-stereotyping
theory.442 Secondly, the theory of sex-stereotyping challenges the status quo, not
in terms of religion, but in terms of status quo's values and norms regarding
hetero-masculinity, which is, as some have noted, subject to bias and judicial
interpretation based on mainstream ideas of gender.443 Therefore, like religion, a
439. Jacob Ogles, Pelosi Prioritizing LGBTQ Equality Act as Speaker, ADVOC. (Jan. 4, 2019, 10:24 AM
EST), https://www.advocate.com/politics/2019/1/04/pelosi-prioritizing-lgbtq-equality-act-speaker
[https://perma.cc/2UZM-FNER].
440. Altitude Express, Inc. v. Zarda, 139 S. Ct. 1599 (2019); Bostock v. Clayton Cty. Bd. of Comm'rs,
139 S. Ct. 1599 (2019).
441. E.g., Jennifer C. Pizer et al., Evidence of Persistent and Pervasive Workplace Discrimination
Against LGBTPeople: The Needfor Federal Legislation Prohibiting Discrimination and Providing
for Equal Employment Benefits, 45 LoY. L.A. L. REv. 715,742 (2012) ("No federal statute explicitly
prohibits employment discrimination based on sexual orientation or gender identity.").
442. Zarda v. Altitude Express, Inc., 883 F.3d 100, 119-24 (2d Cir. 2018).
443. Luke A. Boso, Real Men, 37 U. HAw. L. REv. 107, 147-48 (2015). As Boso observes,
[g]ender is relational and culturally informed, and no two individuals will express
masculinity or femininity in precisely the same ways. Nor will two individuals
possess identical ideas about how others should perform their gender (to the extent
that one is concerned about policing others' gender conformity). This reality
potentially confounds sex stereotyping analysis: what does it mean to conform to
male or female sex stereotypes when there is no uniform masculinity or femininity to
which one must conform? The answer lies in identifying and understanding the
dominant, emblematic versions of gender in any given social context. These
dominant versions of masculinity or femininity serve as the tool for evaluating men
and women in a particular setting.
Id. (footnote omitted). Under this logic, Boso further prescribes that
[iun male sex stereotyping cases, then, it matters little whether a plaintiff deviates
from masculine norms in ways that the presiding judge would characterize as
feminine, or even whether a plaintiff thinks of himself as masculine or feminine. For
a boy or an adult man, simply being different from the most dominant form of
masculinity in a schoolroom, workplace, or small town can mark him as not a real
man. Differences can render seemingly sex-neutral traits and behaviors proxies for
femininity, and it is reasonable to infer that people who treat boys and men
disparately based on these differences are discriminating on the basis of sex. Plaintiffs
are entitled to make this showing in court, and they should not have their claims
thrown out by judges who are unwilling to think critically about gender.
Id. at 149.
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challenge based on sex-stereotyping again could provoke or threaten the
establishment-minded.
Whether the Zarda and Bostock litigants have captured enough interest
convergence to prevail at the Court remains to be seen at the time of this writing.
Conditions have changed since Obergefell. The Court is now a less gracious and
promising an avenue for sexual minorities than when it decided the marriage
cases. But the problem of strategy for true equality should not have been
exclusively hinged on the legal forum.4 44 Assimilationist strategies based on
changing organizational practices in the gay movement that survived since AIDS
epidemic campaigns have professionalized the face of gay rights lobbying and
political organization.445 Some of the blame for the limitations in Masterpiece
lies also within the narrower, single-issue approaches-such as marriage
equality-that funneled gay rights into identity politics and a politics of
respectability. Unfortunately, respectability politics played into the dominance
and power of the mainstream culture, rather than gaining equal footing with the
mainstream. Perhaps engaging with a politics of respect for all types of sexual
identities, instead, would have avoided a more accommodating position against
the mainstream.
Even worse, if Bell was correct in interpreting his own racial fortuity theory,
then his observation stands that racial progress and likely advancements for other
marginalized groups are "pre-ordained" by the back-and-forth process of interest
convergence and involuntary sacrifice at the hands of the dominant power rather
than solidifying as "hard-earned entitlement[s].' 4 6 Placing this notion within the
context of sexual orientation antidiscrimination, Bell's remark here about the
illusion of hard-earned entitlements in successes driven by interest convergence
would even pierce or debunk the respectability politics that the Obergefell
plaintiffs courted during that litigation in order to obtain marriage equality. One
previous strand of conceptualizing Obergefell has focused on how same-sex
couples there had earned their entitlement to marriage through their appearances
of respectability-by how much their sameness dignified themselves enough for
the Court to extend to them fundamental rights to marry, rather than by their
showing of any intrinsic human worth or dignity. However, if applying racial
fortuity to explain gay rights advancements, then Bell would perhaps offer an
even more cynical view than respectability politics. His theory would deny
Obergefell's success as any hard-earned entitlement. Rather, his theory of
fortuity grafted here would conclude that equality for sexual minorities in
444. See BELL, supra note 409, at 185-86 (discussing over-reliance on the court system in racial equality).
445. See Marie-Amdlie George, The LGBT Disconnect: Politics and Perils. of Legal Movement
Formation, 2018 WiS. L. REv. 503, 535 (2018) (describing how queer activism that came about
during the AIDs crisis "was short-lived" and that "most of these groups disbanded by the mid- 1990s,
leaving only professionalized rights organizations that pursued assimilationist strategies").
446. BELL, supra note 409, at 9.
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Obergefell was driven by conditions beyond the control of sexual minority
litigants themselves and that "[i]ts departure, when conditions change, [was]
preordained, '" 4 7 as it is in Masterpiece. In this view, Obergefell's success was,
indeed, pre-ordained by changing conditions that provided sufficient interest
convergence; it was not necessarily earned through a mere showing of
respectability. Other considerations were at play.
B. Masterpiece's Missed Fortuity
Even if Bell's racial fortuity theory could be extended to comprehend the
legal and political advancements for sexual minorities, this thesis ought not to
stifle the movement, nor the aspirations for true equality. Indeed, to combat the
dilemma of racial fortuity, Bell responded with a strategy he called "forged
fortuity." 448 Drawing on the view here that Masterpiece represents queer
sacrifice and that the movement for advancing true'equality for sexual minorities
could be similarly understood within Bell's racial fortuity thesis-albeit, "queer
fortuity" here-sexual minorities might benefit from Bell's call to persist with
forged fortuity, which he described as focusing less on the judiciary for results
and "more on tactics, actions, and even attitudes that challenge the continuing
assumptions of white dominance." 449 In particular, Bell had insisted that
African-Americans "initiate and support actions that seemingly fly in the face of
interest-convergence principles when those actions make life more bearable for
blacks in a society where blacks are a permanent, subordinate class."45 In such
a way, "[r]ecognition of our true state will serve as a gateway to an era where we
forge fortuity, that is defy the workings of the involuntary sacrifices and interest-
convergence determinants of racial policies and practices.',451 Bell's examples of
forged fortuity included the lunch counter sit-in protests by African-Americans
that allowed them to "overcome traditional laws of trespass and breach of the
peace" and prompted leaders of such protests "to think and plan within a context
of 'what is' (the existing problem) rather than simply rely on the abstract concept
of equality. ',452 For Bell, the crux of these sit-in protests for explaining forged
fortuity strategies was "that a great many whites would not maintain
discriminatory policies if the cost was too high."453 Likewise, Bell's example of
the strategies employed by William Robert Ming, a lawyer defending Dr. Martin
447. Id.
448. See, e.g., id. at 190.
449. Id. at 9.
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Luther King, Jr. in a state income tax fraud claim, also displayed forged fortuity
tactics that "articulate[d] racially realistic positions that touch[ed] some whites
in the pocketbook, [and expected] that their sense of justice [would] follow." 45 4
In the suit that charged King with evading taxes by not reporting the funds
retained by his Southern Christian Leadership Conference as his own taxable
income, Ming defended Dr. King by boosting the number of businessmen in his
all-white jury so that he could effectively win the case by convincing them that
to find against Dr. King, they would be establishing a new precedent that would
permit Alabama to "calculate[] your income taxes based on the total monies you
have in your checking accounts. 4 55 Thus, Ming changed the conditions and
forged fortuity by showing how costly it would be for whites to discriminate
against Dr. King. In some ways, one could recapitulate that forged fortuity
represents action by a marginalized group to maximize self-interest in a way that
harnesses the group's power (rather than playing into the dominant authority) to
drive forth common interests between the marginalized and dominant groups for
producing meaningful, even transformative, change.
By interpreting major gay rights cases, such as Obergefell and Masterpiece,
through an extension of Bell's theories, we receive insight about how such
successes and defeats gained and suffered by sexual minorities are actually still
predicated within the status quo, rather than actual victories that transform the
status quo. Thus, in hindsight, perhaps Craig and Mullins might have benefitted
from legal arguments that had a larger focus on forging fortuity, rather than
relying predominately on persuasions based within constitutional doctrine. Like
the lunch counter sit-ins or William Robert Ming's defense of Dr. King, Craig
and Mullins might have raised reasons why sustaining discrimination against
sexual minorities might not be economically viable for those controlling the
status quo. This is not to say that this line of reasoning would have categorically
altered Masterpiece's course, but perhaps it would have played into the
neoliberal sensibilities of the Supreme Court Justices without affecting
respectability politics. 45 6 Below, the Colorado Court of Appeals had raised the
economics issue, by noting that sexual orientation discrimination in public places
incurs "measurable adverse economic effects. 45 7 The Court of Appeals had
referenced a Michigan study that discussed how discriminatory business
454. Id. at 191.
455. Id.
456. See, e.g., David Singh Grewal & Jedediah Purdy, Introduction: Law and Neoliberalism, 77 LAW &
CONTEMP. PROBS. 1, 13 (2014) ("[N]eoliberalism proves compatible with normatively attractive
doctrines of personal autonomy and identity that operate outside economic relations. The self-
defining, self-exploring, identity-shifting constitutional citizen of recent Supreme Court discussions
of race, gender, and sexuality (some tending 'right,' others 'left' in the current lexicon) reflects the
consumer-citizen model of neoliberal economic doctrine in contrast with the stolid bourgeois ideal
of the classical-liberal subject.").
457. Craig v. Masterpiece Cakeshop, Inc., 370 P.3d 272,293 (Colo. Ct. App. 2015).
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practices against sexual minorities had negative economic impacts on employers
and business profits statewide. 458 On appeal to the Supreme Court in
Masterpiece, the petitioner's brief by Phillips's attorneys unilaterally contested
this point, downplaying the appellate court's analysis. 459 But neither the
Commission's nor Craig and Mullins's respondents' briefs meaningfully
addressed the economics of sexual orientation discrimination to combat the
denial in Phillips's petitioner's brief.460 Rather, the economic impact of the
sexual orientation discrimination was only left for debate by amici-between law
and economics scholars who filed their brief for Phillips's side, 461 and behavioral
economics law scholars who wrote to undermine Phillips's position and to
debunk the law and economics arguments.
4 62
C. Forging Fortuity Through Coalition Building
Following Bell's theory, others, in the context of race, have articulated
multiracial coalition building as an important general strategy for forging
fortuity.463 "Interest," as Sheryll Cashin writes in her study of Bell's thesis, "is
the recognized tactical or strategic advantage that one racial group can gain by
forming a coalition with another group. 464 In this sense, she remarks that
"[t]here is a hopeful upside to Bell's interest-convergence thesis: broad
coalitions for progressive social change are theoretically possible when common
interests, or a convergence of enlightened self-interest, can be established. 465
Cashin's examples of such coalition building that transcends interest-
convergence principles include "coalitions among Asians, Latinos, and blacks
[that] tend to be quite strong when formed around issues that all three groups
benefit from, such as eliminating poverty or unemployment or
458. Id. (referencing MICH. DEP'T OF CIVIL RIGHTS, REPORT ON LGBT INCLUSION UNDER MICHIGAN
LAW WITH RECOMMENDATIONS FOR ACTION 74-90 (Jan. 28, 2013),
https://www.michigan.gov/documents/mdcr/MDCRReport on LGBTInclusion_409727_7.pdf
[https://perma.cc/T49A-EFZH]).
459. Brief for Petitioners at 51, Masterpiece Cakeshop, Ltd. v. Colo. Civ. Rights Comm'n, 138 S. Ct.
1719 (2018) (No. 16-111).
460. See Brief for Respondents at 9, Masterpiece Cakeshop, Ltd. v. Colo. Civ. Rights Comm'n, 138 S.
Ct. 1719 (2018) (No. 16-111). This part of Craig and Mullins' brief is the only place that they
discussed negative economic impact, which was only a conclusory summary of what the Court of
Appeals had discussed.
461. See Brief Amici Curiae of Law and Economics Scholars, Masterpiece Cakeshop, Ltd. v. Colo. Civ.
Rights Comm'n, 138 S. Ct. 1719 (2018) (No. 16-111).
462. See Brief Amici Curiae of Scholars of Behavior Science and Economics, Masterpiece Cakeshop,
Ltd. v. Colo. Civ. Rights Comm'n, 138 S. Ct. 1719 (2018) (No. 16-111).
463. Bergin, supra note 414, at 302 ("Contemporary examples of forged fortuity are visible in the work
of political coalitions.").
464. Sheryll D. Cashin, Shall We Overcome? Transcending Race, Class, and Ideology Through Interest
Convergence, 79 ST. JOHN'S L. REv. 253, 278 (2005).
465. Id. at 276.
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discrimination." 466 Patience Crowder concurs with Cashin in her recent
articulation of Bell's interest-convergence thesis from a transactional
perspective: "[W]ithout significant coalition building among all relevant interest
groups concerned about a particular issue, the unalignment of interests cannot
only undo the outcome that resulted from a convergence of those interests but
can actually abrogate any progress made during the period of convergence. '"467
In Catherine Smith's work on "outsider" interest convergence, Smith augments
Cashin's coalition building idea by adding that, within large coalitions,
"members of subordinated groups go even further and identify how what are
perceived to be white middle class, heterosexual norms and the subordinated
groups' respective group's failures to conform to those norms serve to
marginalize each group and all groups in the coalition. '468 Doing so "may also
reveal how we each, even as members of subordinated groups, play a role in
perpetuating the status quo"469 and how to respond to it with collective action.470
Of course, one danger of coalitions amongst different racial demographics,
as Cashin admits, is how such multiracial coalition building might break down
when specific intra-group ideologies or antagonism interfere with the cohesion
of converging self-interests. 471 The hurdle for multiracial coalitions is finding "a
common interest that is significant enough to overcome any ideological
differences." 472 Scott Cummings responds with two different takes on
overcoming this hurdle. First, he mentions Reva Siegel's view that "it is the
power of countermobilization in politics ... that causes social movements to
reframe their claims in terms that can attract widespread mainstream support. ,473
Secondly, Cummings restates Gerald Torres' perspective that "movements can
succeed in shifting cultural norms in progressive directions so long as 'non-elite
actors have ... a voice earlier in the agenda setting process' thus ensuring the
adequacy of their 'representation.'4 7 4 Both views give a less worrisome take on
the political differences with large multiracial coalitions.
466. Id. at 278-79 (referencing Paula D. McClain & Steven C. Tauber, Racial Minority Group Relations
in a Multiracial Society, in GOVERNING AMERICAN CITIES: INTER-ETHNIC COALITIONS,
COMPETITION, AND CONFLICT 111, 113-14 (Michael Jones-Correa ed., 2001)).
467. Patience A. Crowder, Interest Convergence as Transaction?, 75 U. PITT. L. REV. 693, 694 (2014).
468. Catherine Smith, Unconscious Bias and "Outsider" Interest Convergence, 40 CONN. L. REV. 1077,
1089 (2008) (citing Cashin, supra note 464, at 276).
469. Id. at 1090.
470. See id. at 1092 (discussing how collective perspectives based on "outsider interest convergence" by
subordinated groups support "agency in building a larger social justice framework" and "allow[]
any number of subordinated groups to come together to explore how their interests converge and
opens the door to move beyond a Black-White paradigm" or "Latino-White or Asian-White
paradigm").
471. Cashin, supra note 464, at 279.
472. Id. at 282.
473. Scott L. Cummings, The Social Movement Turn in Law, 43 LAW & SOC. INQUIRY 360, 386 (2018).
474. Id. at 386-87.
2020]
Yale Journal of Law and Feminism
In the advancement of true equality for sexual minorities, Bell's forged
fortuity strategies could help combat the cycle of interest convergence and queer
sacrifice that continue to subordinate sexual minorities. Given the complexities
of racial and queer subordinations, some differences in forging fortuities in the
context of race versus sexuality might occur. However, some commentators
within the sexual minority movement have also noted the need for better
coalition building that shifts the movement away from the professionalized,
single-issue, identity politics organizing of recent decades. Through coalitions,
Bell's theory might bring the movement back to liberationist roots and view
change not just in terms of formal equality but in terms of transforming the
current world-i.e., that discriminatory status quo. In line with views about
coalition building for the sexual minority movement, some prominent LGBTQ
voices have posited similarly. Political science scholar Craig Rimmerman notes
that "[a] central goal of radical democratic politics is to build permanent
coalitions around political strategies and concrete public policies that cut across
race, class, and gender divides, coalitions that will be ready to respond to the
Christian Right's distortions in all political arenas." ' Historian Martin
Duberman writes that in the advancement of sexual minorities the imperative for
coalition building exists. Especially in the post-Obergefell, post-Obama era,
there might be a current spirit for "resistance" but "the parts do not cohere, and
may never-not without a seismic effort to overcome our penchant for single-
issue politics that caters solely to our own primary concerns.' t47 6 He urges further
that "we must combine with allies who we don't love but who share with us a
common enemy-the country's oligarchic structure, its patriarchal author, and
its primitively fundamentalist moral values."
477
In the short years before Obergefell, queer activist Urvashi Vaid wrote that
mainstream gay rights organizations' assimilative approaches have reduced the
movement's goals. 478 In part, this result is so because of the narrow vision of
equality that resonates only with powerful factions of the mainstream gay
movement and causes the movement to conceptualize changes within the
framework of equality that is set ultimately by the dominant status quo.4 79 This
notion might add to the reasons for explaining why the Obergefell and
475. RIvMERMAN, supra note 23, at 160.
476. MARTIN DUBERMAN, HAS THE GAY MOVEMENT FAILED? 206-07 (2018).
477. Id. at 207.
478. URVASHI VAID, IRRESISTIBLE REVOLUTION: CONFRONTING RACE, CLASS, AND THE ASSUMPTIONS
OF LGBT POLITICS 4 (2012) ("From a demand that LGBT people be able to live a public life in a
world in which queer sexualities were not only tolerated but also celebrated, the LGBT movement
now seeks the much narrower right to live an undisturbed private life. From an exploration ofLGBT
difference, the movement has turned into a cheerleading squad for LGBT sameness. And from an
LGBT movement that was deeply engaged in the big arguments and fights of its day, the movement
has become an island onto itself.").
479. Id. at 8-20.
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Masterpiece cases resulted in the way they did, and how they extend Bell's
interest-convergence and sacrifice theses into gay rights, showing that progress
is always "pre-ordained" by the dominant powers at play. Recognition of sexual
identity is not the same as allowing sexual minorities the ability to live full
lives.48° The goal is not just true equality, but human flourishing. Change must
affect the status quo in a way that transforms current hegemonic ideas about
sexual minorities and result in a redistribution of justice.481 To that end, Vaid
writes:
Without a more substantive definition of equality, without a
commitment to its extension to all LGBT people, without deeper and
more honest appraisals of the limits of the traditions to which LGBT
people seek admission, without a willingness to risk gains made for the
opportunity to create a world that truly affirms the intrinsic moral and
human worth of people's sexual, racial, and gender difference, the
LGBT politics currently pursued will yield only conditional equality, a
simulation of freedom contingent upon "good behavior.'4 82
To displace this continuing phenomenon, she proposes a "justice-based
movement" as a type of "re-formed LGBT movement focused upon social
justice. ' 483 It would be committed to recognizing the different racial and
economic demographics of sexual minorities4 84 and expanding a definition of
equality that is more comprehensive. 485 Such a movement would broaden the
missions of major LGBT organizations, make them more inclusive and
democratic in participation and representation, and force restructure of their
donor schemes that promote assimilationist strategies.486 To echo Bell about the
over-reliance on the judiciary,4 87 Vaid suggests
[s]hifting the arenas where we concentrate-from courts to executive
and administration agencies, for example-and then also shifting how
we consider the goal of our work there, from mere recognition or
naming in a regulatory scheme to a consideration of how it does or does
not help the lives and life chances of our communities, offers a practical
path forward.4 88
480. Id. at 16-17 ("But forming and celebrating queer identity is not and never was the progressive queer
movement's destination. That destination instead was the space to live openly LGBT lives in a
transformed, wider world.").
481. See, e.g., id. at 21 ("An LGBT movement focused on a more substantive notion of equality would
fight for the broadest and most inclusive possible parameters of the issues on which it campaigns
and not the narrowest or the safest.").
482. Id. at 5.
483. Id. at 20.
484. Id. at 20-21.
485. Id. at 21-22.
486. Id. at 22-28.
487. BELL, supra note 409, at 9.
488. Id. at 29.
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Lastly, for such a movement to flourish, "we will have to join with straight allies
and create a new powerful electoral majority in this country. ' 4 89 Here, Vaid
arrives at her concept of coalition building for sexual minorities. Specifically,
she mentions that "[flor many decades, progressives have talked about the need
to link up with each other beyond identity, around shared values and goals.
490
Thus, instead of working in political silos, "[w]e who have been working for
LGBT liberation certainly do not see our goal as building a gay silo or living in
one." 491 Those moves would be assimilative. Rather "[w]e see our work instead
as building common ground., 492 Vaid's conception of coalition building is
broad, philosophical, and liberationist, compared to the assimilative methods of
lobbying by current mainstream gay rights organizations. It also approaches
Cashin, Crowder, and Smith's extensions of Bell's forged fortuity.
Reaching back to Bell's iterations of forged fortuity, like white dominance,
sexual minorities must presume heterosupremacy at play in everyday life.493
Because of that supremacy, queer people are often undermined or
subordinated-whether they are getting married, applying for a job, renting an
apartment, or shopping for a cake. Understanding this perspective, sexual
minorities ought to be subversive and work actively to protect their self-interest
but also not eager to sell out just to gain access to the dominant status quo.494
Through inter- and intra-interest convergence, coalitions must be formed with
other marginalized groups; and they must exist and protest collectively in ways
that resemble in spirit the lunch counter sit-ins that Bell mentioned-against the
dominant status quo, increasing the cost of discriminatory beliefs and practices.
The larger and more robust the coalitions are, the less it will be in the dominant
group's interest to sustain discrimination. Together with other groups, sexual
minorities ought to able to create change that is lasting, transformative, and
indeed liberationist.
Scholarly calls for coalition building echo each other. On more liberationist
terms, all of these calls could be workable as examples of forging fortuity. Within
489. Id. at 202.
490. Id. at 203.
491. Id. at 204.
492. Id.
493. Id. at 190 ("Many blacks already understand and incorporate this approach in interchanges with
whites on the job, and in their commercial and community dealings. My parents were typical of
many who drilled into me at an early age that because you are black, you have to be twice as good
to get half as much. Unspoken in that advice is that whites are presumed competent until they prove
the contrary. Blacks are assumed to be mediocre and certainly no intellectual match for whites until
their skills and accomplishments gain them an often-reluctant acceptance. Success for the black
person requires effective functioning achieved with the knowledge that his or her work will not be
recognized or rewarded to the same degree as a white person doing the same thing. A black person
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the racial context, the scholarly observations for coalition building with common
interests externalize Bell's forged fortuity. Brought into the sexual minority
context, the call for broad coalition building-particularly one that appears more
transformative-echoes the need not only to combat a continuing inequality
imposed against sexual minorities by those operating within a discriminatory
status quo, but also the need to resolve the intra-group marginalization between
assimilated, elite gays and lesbians and sexual minorities living outside that sub-
category.495 These overlapping calls and suggestions for coalition building are
more liberationist than assimilative. Because such coalition building would
hopefully seek to challenge the hegemony and not play into it, in that sense, a
reformed movement that forges its own fortuity by coalescing around values and
issues beyond identity politics should be broad and should be investigated
earnestly as the next step forward.4 96 Invariably, it ought to dial up the LGBTQ
movement's approaches and tactics a few degrees more liberationist and some
significant degrees more queer.
CONCLUSION
Sexual minorities still live at the mercy of the dominant status quo. By
conceptualizing Masterpiece as an example of queer sacrifice and seeing how
Bell's theory of fortuity fits appropriately over the progressive ebb and flow of
the sexual minority movement, it is possible to perceive that the movement needs
to forge its own fortuity in order to further antidiscrimination efforts and
effectively reach toward the state of true equality and human flourishing. To that
end, coalition building that focuses on common values and interests rather than
identity politics might be the solution to press upon upending the dominant status
quo. Whether individual marginalized groups can lift their focus off identity
politics and then merge with other groups into multilateral coalitions striving.
upon democratic values is the difficult challenge that remains to be seen. But
once there, the potential might make such coalitions worth the effort. Particularly
for sexual minorities within such coalitions, liberationist approaches might need
to guide the movement to advance more collectively and transformatively. That
notion is the possibility that propels us beyond queer sacrifice and toward
fortuity.
495. E.g., Nourafshan & Onwuachi-Willig, supra note 67, at 540-41 ("[T]he interests of these
marginalized groups would be best advanced through mutual support of overlapping concerns and
intersectional issues.").
496. See Bergin, supra note 414, at 303 ("Social scientists have shown that orienting diverse groups of
individuals towards a common goal can reduce the impact of racial prejudice.").
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